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This work investigates the epistemology of claims that are
made within historical accounts in order to make sense of
the past.
The broad plan is as follows. There is some scene-setting
in chapter 1. Then in chapters 2 and 3, we explore how
historians make sense of the past and what is achieved
when they do so. In chapter 4, we set out the concept of
epistemic respectability. In chapters 5 and 6, we move on
to the application to historical claims of variants of long-
established epistemological approaches.
Debts to other authors are recorded in the footnotes. There
is also a great debt to the staff of the British Library
and Cambridge University Library, to those who keep the
world wide web running, and to those who create and
maintain online repositories of academic papers. The author
is entirely responsible for all defects in the work.
We can all help the culture of learning to flourish by
making work freely available. It has been wonderful to see
open access gaining ground in recent years. This work is
published under a Creative Commons licence, as set out on
page ii. It is available at https://rbphilo.com/.
vii
Preface
Work in epistemology is not normally treated with the
caution that is appropriate when work has commercial
significance, but the author declares that he has not





References have been given in the form of chapter and
section numbers, or chapter numbers and section titles,
when doing so serves to identify passages precisely enough.
This approach should be increasingly useful with the
rise of the electronic text. Roman numerals have been
converted to Arabic numerals when they merely give
volume, chapter or section numbers, rather than being parts
of titles or numbers of prefatory pages. Non-English words
for “volume”, “part”, “chapter” and “edition” have been
translated into English in footnotes except when they occur
within titles of such components of works rather than as
external markers.
Some of the books to which we refer exist in several editions.
Material may appear, disappear or move around from one
edition to the next. If a reference does not appear to point
to the right place, the first step is to check the bibliography
to see which edition to use.
Cross-references within the text are given by section
number. A reference to a general line of argument is to
the whole section. For example, a reference to section 2.1
is a reference not only to what comes immediately under
the heading so numbered, but also to what comes under
the headings numbered 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and so on. But when a
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References
reference is to some specific point, the point will be found
in the material that comes immediately under the heading.
Thus if reference were made to a specific point in the form
“section 2.5”, the point would be found before the heading
numbered 2.5.1.
The PDF file of this work at https://rbphilo.com/ is
searchable, so there is no index. Some software will not find
a phrase in a PDF file when it runs over two lines, or a word
when it is hyphenated over two lines. But a search for the
start of the phrase or word will usually suffice.
This study has grown out of some parts of Baron,
Confidence in Claims, particularly chapter 5 and section
8.3 of that work. At various points we shall borrow material
from that work. But when one borrows from oneself, specific
citation at every turn would be excessive. Citation from that
work is therefore limited to occasions on which additional





The project of this work is to propose an epistemic standard
for certain historical claims. The claims in question are
those that offer to make sense of events, states of affairs
or ways of life. They may for example state that certain
events led to other events or that in certain circumstances,
certain developments were not surprising.
(We shall refer to claims rather than beliefs, and to the
making of claims rather than the formation or holding of
beliefs, because our concern is with an academic discipline
that is generally practised within a community. Beliefs only
matter when they become accessible to other historians as
claims, whether explicit claims or implicit ones that other
historians can identify if they think about the implications
of what has been written.)
1
1 Introduction
An epistemology sets out an understanding of good qualities
of claims. It will typically state standards for them to be
justified, and in turn for them to amount to knowledge. This
can improve our understanding of concepts such as those
of justification and knowledge. It can also discipline the
making of claims. Those who make claims may be influenced
by epistemic standards. And even if they are not, external
commentators can apply such standards when they reflect
on the claims made. Finally, an epistemology can improve
our understanding of what is achieved when claims meet the
relevant standards. When the claims fall within the scope of
an academic discipline, this can improve our understanding
of what the discipline achieves.
We shall set out why it is worth proposing an epistemic
standard that is tailored to claims which offer to make sense
of the past in sections 1.3 and 1.4. Broadly, the objective is
to have a standard which can be of use in relation to claims
that are perfectly sensible but may well be contested, as well
as in relation to claims that are not likely to be contested.
In order to achieve this, we shall propose a standard of
epistemic respectability in place of the usual standard of
justification.
1.2 The claims that interest us
1.2.1 The contents of the claims
The claims that interest us are not claims that merely
report evidence, make obvious deductions from evidence or
catalogue events, but claims that offer to make sense of the
past. They will do so by setting out why certain events
occurred, or why certain states of affairs or ways of life
2
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prevailed, arose or died out. The claims may mention causes
and effects under those labels, or they may set out how
events, developments and conditions made other events,
developments or conditions unsurprising. We shall use the
phrase “the claims that interest us” specifically to refer to
claims like this, even though claims of other sorts may also
be of great interest to historians.
The claims may not even be spelt out. A historian may give
detailed descriptions of people and events, and leave it up to
her readers to make causal or other connections explicit in
their own heads.1 The epistemic standard we shall develop
does apply to specific claims, so they must be identified.
But it may be applied to implicit claims so long as we first
make them explicit. One should proceed with caution when
tempted to attribute implicit claims to historians. But if
one seeks to judge the claim rather than its author, claims
may be spelt out and judged without fear of unfairness.
We have already excluded from our range of interest claims
that merely report evidence, make obvious deductions from
evidence or catalogue events. We shall make one more
exclusion, at the opposite extreme. We shall not try to
formulate an epistemic standard for very large-scale claims
about how a period of history or some general phenomenon
should be viewed. Such claims have for example been made
as to ways in which views of the history of Europe in
the third to eighth centuries AD should or should not be
influenced by the concept of late antiquity.2 Other such
claims have been made as to whether and in what sense
we should see a scientific revolution in the early modern
1 An example is provided by an account of Thomas Cromwell’s
involvement with various evangelicals, an involvement which contrib-
uted to his fall and execution: Brigden, “Thomas Cromwell and the
‘Brethren’”.
2 For a survey of debates see Escribano Paño, “El concepto de




We exclude such claims because they would require their
own special type of standard, if indeed they could have one
at all. They are prone to be too general and wide-ranging
to be open to judgement by reference to specific facts about
the past. Historians may be limited to judging such large-
scale claims to be interesting or fruitful, or the reverse.
There will of course be hazy boundaries between the class
of claims that interest us and the two classes of excluded
claims.
1.2.1.1 Making sense
Having indicated which claims interest us, we can say what
we mean by making sense of the past. Making sense is a
matter of showing that events, states of affairs, actions and
ways of life had their origins, their interactions and their
consequences, rather than forming a mere jumble connected
only by time and place.
This does not mean that any indication of origins, in-
teractions and consequences is as good as any other.
Some claims may go deeper than others. Some claims
may assert connections between events, states of affairs,
actions and ways of life that are more plausible than
connections asserted by others. And some claims may reflect
the available evidence more extensively than others.
Setting out origins, interactions and consequences may
involve claiming causal connections of the type that can
be supported by reference to laws of nature. But it is
more likely to involve drawing on the everyday resources
3 Heilbron, “Was There a Scientific Revolution?”
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we exploit to understand people’s conduct, including our
everyday psychological understanding of people (our folk
psychology) and the thick concepts we use to describe
human situations and conduct, concepts such as those of
an obligation, a goal, an opportunity, a danger, kindness,
revenge, legislation, and military attack. (We shall use the
term “thick concepts” to refer to concepts with substantial
descriptive content. We shall not insist that they also have
evaluative content, although many of them will have that.)
When resources like folk psychology and our thick concepts
are exploited, connections can be claimed without recourse
to laws of nature, laws which in any case are in short supply
when the subject matter is human actions and ways of life.
1.2.2 Examples of claims
We shall now give some examples of claims that interest us.
In each example, we shall draw attention to how a general
understanding of the ways in which people think and act
helps to make the claim plausible. We do this here because
we shall remark on this phenomenon in section 2.1.1.1.3.
It has been claimed that a desire by Christian Roman
emperors in the fourth century AD to secure the position
of a single official religious organization and harmonize
belief played a key role in the development of a vicious
policy of enforcement, and was also a precondition of
radicalization and intolerance of dissent among Christians.4
The account holds together and the claims are supported
both because of the evidence cited, and because it is easy
to see the political appeal to emperors of a single religious
organization as a potential tool of government, to see the
4 Hahn, “The Challenge of Religious Violence: Imperial Ideology
and Policy in the Fourth Century”, pages 379-384.
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need for harmonized belief because if diversity were allowed,
people would explore options and the grip of a single
organization would lessen, and to see how people can get
carried away and start to enforce uniformity once they have
come to the view that it is important.
The Defenestration of Prague in 1618 has been explained
(without any claim that the event was inevitable) as a
consequence of pressures brought to bear on Protestants
by Catholics in preceding years.5 The explanation gains
its power both from the assembly of examples, including
interference in the process of granting citizenship and
pressure to hand over churches, and from our understanding
that the rebels could care deeply about their beliefs, would
resent interference and threats to their communal property,
and could easily be provoked to action as soon as they
found that the ultimate authority (in this case the Emperor)
showed no inclination to heed their complaints, so that they
had no hope of an improvement in their lot through normal
channels.
Increasing difficulties in the government of Scotland in the
early seventeenth century have been explained by reference
to a diminution in communication and consultation at a
less formal level than that of parliaments between the King
and significant elements of the population, particularly
those who did not have court connections.6 The argument
is supported by a compilation of evidence. And it is
rendered acceptable by our awareness that consultation
breeds consent, while its lack breeds both resentment among
the governed and a lack of awareness by the ruler of what
people really think which increases the risk of the ruler’s
taking decisions that will not be accepted.
5 Mortimer, The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt
in Bohemia, 1618, chapter 7.
6 MacDonald, “Consultation and Consent under James VI”.
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The desire of some liberals in Belgium in the mid-nineteenth
century to keep the franchise very limited, while others
wanted to extend it, has been explained by reference to fear
within the former group that an extension of the franchise
without the prior secularization of education would lead to
the Catholic faction’s returning to political power, while
some in the latter group saw extension as a way to achieve
important liberal ends.7 The explanation derives its force in
the minds of readers both from the evidence assembled, and
from their own familiarity with the fact that it is possible
for someone in a reforming frame of mind either to restrain
himself for fear of wrecking the whole project or to press
ahead because he believes that bold action is the way to
get results.
The existence of sumptuary legislation in England in the
fourteenth century has been explained as a way to mark
status and preserve social structure, at a time when the
availability of traditional ways to structure society was
declining.8 Evidence is cited to support this claim. And the
claim resonates with modern readers both because they are
familiar with the use of clothing to signal status, even if
scales of status are no longer as well-defined as they used to
be, and because they are familiar with the human capacity
to fear changes in the social order.
7 Gould, Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party
in Nineteenth-Century Europe, pages 32-36.
8 Hinton, Gold and Gilt, Pots and Pins: Possessions and People





A claim may be justified in the sense that an expert with
full access to the evidence who regarded the claim as correct
could not sensibly be argued to run a significant risk of
error. This is the sense of justification we shall adopt. It
sets a high bar. But that is appropriate if we want to pick
out the type of justification that is standardly taken to be
one of the main requirements for knowledge.
When this standard of justification is met, that can suffice
to endorse the claim as one which should be made.
It would however be very difficult to regard a claim as
justified when there was or could easily be significant
disagreement among experts as to whether it should be
made. Disagreement over a claim or scope for disagreement
would indicate that neither side had decisive arguments,
even if individuals thought that arguments in favour of their
own views were decisive. And such disagreement can easily
arise in relation to claims that interest us. We shall say in
some detail why this is so in section 4.1.3.
It is not that historians lack ways to test claims. They can
verify evidence, check reasoning from evidence to claims,
and ask whether accounts make sense as wholes. But the
tests are not as decisive as tests that are typically available
in the natural sciences. The extent of disagreement that
sometimes exists among historians, even when there is
plenty of evidence, reflects this lack of decisiveness.
We shall refer to the claims that are or could easily be
objects of disagreement as contestable claims. We shall only
use this term where there is reason to make a claim, but
8
1.3 Justification and respectability
there is still significant scope for disagreement over the
claim on reasonable grounds. That is, the source of actual
or potential disagreement is the scope to disagree over the
interpretation of evidence, over how one should reason from
the evidence to conclusions, or over how well a claim fits in
with a wider understanding of the past, rather than the
source’s being a paucity of evidence that would open the
way to speculative claims.
(This is a general restriction on our project. We shall not
concern ourselves with cases in which evidence is in such
short supply that the only options open to historians are to
speculate or to limit themselves to recounting such evidence
as there is. We shall also not concern ourselves with cases
in which the scope for disagreement is insignificant. This
may be insignificance of the number of historians who might
disagree, when disagreement would require the pursuit of a
very tendentious line of argument, or insignificance of the
size of disagreement, when reasonable disagreement would
only relate to minor details of a claim. And we shall not
concern ourselves with claims that there is no reason to
make in the first place.)
We shall also refer to non-contestable claims, meaning those
where there is reason to make the claims and no significant
scope for disagreement on reasonable grounds. (We do not
use the alternative word “incontestable” because it would
suggest that certainty as to the correctness of a claim was
the only reasonable attitude.) When a claim is regarded as
mistaken and there is no significant scope for disagreement,
its contradictory will be a non-contestable claim.
Contestable claims may make up only a modest proportion
of claims, but they include significant claims that are
intended to help make sense of the past. This creates a
problem for the epistemic standard of justification. It is
9
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perfectly usable in relation to non-contestable claims, most
if not all of which will be justified, but contestable claims
simply get labelled as not justified. This is safe, but it means
that the standard can do nothing to discipline the making
of a number of potentially significant claims.
We shall develop a standard to discipline the making of
contestable claims that will also function perfectly well
for non-contestable claims. Conveniently, ensuring that it
functions for both types of claim will save us from having to
concern ourselves with where to draw a boundary between
contestable and non-contestable claims. It would be difficult
to draw such a boundary, given that we do not require there
to be no scope to disagree for a claim to be non-contestable,
only that there be no significant scope. Ensuring that
our standard functions for both types of claim will also
protect us against the risk that some non-contestable claims
may fail to meet the standard of justification, so that it
would not be usable to discipline the making of them. The
standard we develop will be available, just as it will be
available for contestable claims.
Our main move will be to shift from asking which claims are
justified to asking which claims it is acceptable to make. We
shall identify the acceptable claims by saying that they are
epistemically respectable, and shall call the corresponding
quality epistemic respectability. We shall henceforth speak
simply of claims being respectable and of respectability,
omitting “epistemically” and “epistemic”.
For a claim to be respectable there must be evidence that
can be interpreted in a reasonable way to support it and no
weighty evidence that definitely speaks against it, the claim
must cohere with the account within which it is made, that
account must be internally coherent, both the claim and the
account must cohere with the background supplied by other
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accounts, for example accounts of related periods of history,
and claims which provide support that the claim needs in
order to be respectable must themselves be respectable.
We shall fill this out in chapter 4. As we shall see there, a
claim may be respectable even if it is contestable. And all
non-contestable claims will be respectable.
1.4 Our plan of work
The examples we gave in section 1.2.2 are of claims
that promise to make sense of the past. Historians can
arrive at appropriate claims by exploiting various resources,
which we shall discuss in chapter 2. We shall group them
together under the heading of humanistic resources. This
term will cover folk psychology, our thick concepts, social
conventions, narrative practice, and abilities such as being
able to work out what it would be or have been rational for
someone to do in given circumstances. Then in chapter 3 we
shall look at the sense that can be made of the past. What
we say in these two chapters will reassure us that claims that
interest us can be perfectly solid. Solidity might be placed
in doubt by the exploitation of humanistic resources, an
exploitation which makes the process of historical research
unscientific. If we examine how humanistic resources are
exploited and what kind of grasp of the past may be gained,
we may be able to lay such doubts to rest or at least contain
them.
In chapter 4 we shall set out the need for our standard
of respectability, then set out and explore the standard
itself. The picture of historical work that we shall paint
in chapters 2 and 3 will provide context for our discussion
in chapter 4. That picture will be of a way of working that
11
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is disciplined but also flexible and far from scientific, and
of the corresponding results. This will make it unsurprising
that claims are contestable and that the application of our
standard of respectability will require judgement rather
than being mechanical. But there will be little reference
back to details of that picture to account for details of what
we say in chapter 4. Rather, the link will be from whole
picture to whole discussion.
Our definition of respectability will lead us to make
connections with epistemology more broadly. In chapter 5
we shall consider how evidence for claims can support their
respectability, making connections with foundationalism,
and how the fitting together of claims and accounts can
support the respectability of the claims, making connections
with coherentism. In chapter 6 we shall consider how ways of
working to arrive at claims can be relevant to the attitudes
of historians who might want to make use of claims made
by others, where the historians who might make use of the
claims have not examined the evidence in detail themselves.




Making sense of the past
2.1 Humanistic resources
Human beings are complex. They are also thinking and
emotional creatures who interpret the world, other people
and themselves, and who act more or less rationally
under the influence of their thoughts and their social
environments.
The practical way for historians to make progress despite
the complexity and the varying degrees of rationality of
human beings is to make use of the implicit wisdom as to
how people think and act that has been built into human
thought and language over the centuries. On the basis of
this wisdom, the fact that certain circumstances make sense
of certain conduct is simply obvious. This means that when
sense is made of the past, much need not be worked out by
historians or spelt out for their readers.
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Historians tap into this accumulated wisdom by exploiting
several resources: folk psychology, thick concepts, social
conventions, narrative practice, and social abilities. We shall
call these humanistic resources.
Humanistic resources are useful because the people studied,
the historians who study them, and the readers of historical
accounts have a very largely common human nature.
Without commonality of human nature there would be no
useful folk psychology to be had, and similarly for the other
resources (apart from social conventions that were easy to
make explicit and thick concepts with contents that could
likewise easily be made explicit, such as the concept of a
military attack). The resources might still exist, but either
they would be appropriate to the people studied and ill-
adapted to the patterns of thought of historians and their
readers, so that they would not provide shortcuts to making
sense of the past because much would need to be worked
out and spelt out, or they would be inappropriate to the
people studied, in which case they could not be exploited
effectively.
In section 2.1.1, we shall set out the various resources. Then
in section 2.1.2 we shall note the points at which they are
effective, in guiding historians in their work and in making
accounts satisfying for readers. In section 2.1.3 we shall
consider the choice of resources. In section 2.1.4 we shall






2.1.1.1.1 The nature of folk psychology
Our everyday psychological understanding may be set out
in a folk psychology. By this we mean a set of psychological
principles which can be used to make sense of what people
do, and sometimes to predict what they will do. Examples
are the principle that people who have a great desire for
something will work hard to get it, and the principle that
people will be very concerned when their future prosperity
is uncertain.
Such principles are far from being laws of nature, but when
someone is seen to have acted in accordance with them it is
easy to see their actions as making sense. Indeed, a demand
for more to be said about why they acted as they did might
well be regarded as inappropriate.
2.1.1.1.2 The scope of folk psychology
We shall take folk psychology to include our everyday
understanding of how groups behave, as well as our
understanding of how individuals conduct themselves.
We shall also not limit folk psychology to principles that are
likely to be of universal application, such as the principle
that someone with a great desire for some given result
will work hard to achieve the result. We shall take it to
include principles that only have much prospect of playing
significant roles in accounts when those accounts relate
to certain times and places, such as a principle that the
members of a privileged class may easily form a collective
15
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view that they deserve their privileges.1 We shall also take
it to include principles that were relevant in the societies
studied but that would now be regarded as passé, such as
a principle that people defer to other people on the basis of
social class (the principle that they do defer, not that they
should defer).2
2.1.1.1.3 Examples
If we look back at the examples we gave in section 1.2.2,
we can see principles of folk psychology at work. In the
example of Christian Roman emperors, the principles that
political leaders are keen on institutions that will cement
their power and will be inclined to oppose any diversity
that would undermine those institutions, that diversity of
views encourages questioning, and that people convinced of
an idea can easily become zealots, sustain the account. In
the example of the Defenestration of Prague, the principles
that people can care deeply about their beliefs, can resent
interference and threats, and can take drastic action when
no other route to a remedy is in sight, are put to work.
In the example of the government of Scotland, the principle
that people like to be consulted is at work. In the example of
liberals in Belgium, work is done by the familiar fact that
different people with the same objective, unsure of what
will produce the best results, can take different decisions
about what to do and can be sufficiently convinced of the
soundness of their decisions to act in irrevocable ways.
Finally, in the example of sumptuary legislation, the fact
1 That principle is for example at work to underpin the historical
account given in Doyle, Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of
Revolution, particularly chapters 1 and 2.
2 Such changes in the relevance of principles can be a result
of complex processes. For the example of deference see Sutcliffe-




that people like to signal their status and the fact that they
often fear social change are at work to make the account
satisfactory.
2.1.1.2 Thick concepts
Historians can make sense of the past by characterizing
states of the world and what happened using thick concepts
that reflect the nature of human life from the point of
view of human beings. They may for example identify
obligations, goals, opportunities, dangers, acts of kindness,
acts of revenge, acts of legislation, and military attacks.
This sort of characterization comes naturally to historians
by virtue of both the resources of the languages in which
they write and their attunement to what is salient for
human beings with the normal ranges of hopes, fears
and desires. And it makes actions comprehensible by
showing them to be natural or at least unsurprising in the
circumstances.
Two uses of thick concepts are involved here.
The first use is to make connections with underlying
characteristics that are attributed to agents. An action may
for example be described as one of kindness or revenge, or
as performed in order to satisfy curiosity or in a depressed
mood. Such descriptions allow connections to be made with
characteristics such as a kindly or a vengeful disposition, or
a tendency to curiosity or depression. Peter Goldie has made
the case that this is a good way to make sense of actions.3
The second use is to set actions in a social context which
allows an action and responses to it to be seen as what
we would expect of human beings generally, or of human
3 Goldie, “There are Reasons and Reasons”, section 6.3.
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beings in a particular setting. Thus if someone in business
installed new machinery, that might be characterized as a
move to increase profit. That would make sense both of the
action and of any response by people in similar businesses
to do the same thing.
Both uses of thick concepts may be in play when making
sense of the same action. And the same thick concept may
be put to both uses, for example when an action is described
as the fulfilment of an obligation. A connection may be
made with the character of the agent, as the kind of person
who takes obligations seriously. Sense is also made of the
action by setting it in a social context in which we would
expect obligations to be fulfilled, perhaps a context in which
there were legal or social penalties for non-fulfilment.
The case for using thick concepts in either way extends
to actions where there is no counterparty to respond
to the action who is identifiable at the time. This is
obvious for the first way: psychological dispositions can take
effect in such cases. It is less obvious, but still the case,
for the second way. For example, those who introduced
printing may have had no expectation that any specific
people would make use of it, even though they would have
expected it to be used by people in general. But as soon
as a historian characterizes printing as a way to share
information efficiently (a characterization so obvious that
it might not even be stated), government responses, both
to use printing to disseminate their own material and to
control its use by others so as to limit the dissemination
of other material that was thought to be undesirable, make
perfect sense.4 Sharing, information and control are all thick
concepts which embody ideas of how human beings may
4 Egan, “To Count Grains of Sand on the Ocean Floor: Changing





Thick concepts also play a valuable role in the char-
acterization of circumstances or events that were not
items of human conduct at all and of their physical and
biological consequences, when the task is to make sense
of human responses. For example, once historians have
characterized a sequence of events as a climatic change
and a consequent effect on agricultural yields that was
sufficiently adverse to lead to famine, human responses
in the form of rebellions, local declarations of autonomy,
and invasions of countries with weakened governments by
countries that maintained strong central governments can
be seen as perfectly natural.5 The connection between
natural events and human actions can be made because the
identified consequences of natural events are characterized
in ways that give them obvious relevance to human desires
– in the case of famine, the desire for food.
Our remarks so far on the use of thick concepts relate most
obviously to writing the history of sequences of actions
and events. But similar things may be said when the task
is to understand a society, how it functioned, and why
people lived as they did. The complexity that lay behind
the generation of the day-to-day responses of people to
their circumstances can be handled by seeing the lives led
and the circumstances in human terms, using appropriate
thick concepts. For example, Mogens Herman Hansen has
made sense of the classical Greek city-state way of life by
considering social, economic and military needs, and the
understanding people had of their political communities.
He uses thick concepts such as those of the public sphere,
cults, trade, and civil war.6 These thick concepts are obvious
5 Serels, “Food Insecurity and Political Instability in the Southern
Red Sea Region During the ‘Little Ice Age,’ 1650-1840”.
6 Hansen, Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State.
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ones to use. But beneath the surface they hold information
about how human beings and human societies operate, and
about which connections between actions and actions, and
between circumstances and actions, should not surprise us.
This information beneath the surface helps historians to cut
through the complexity of human beings.
2.1.1.3 Social conventions
Sometimes historians can make sense of past actions
by drawing attention to social conventions, or (if the
conventions are familiar to current audiences) merely by
using concepts that will remind audiences of the existence
of those conventions.
Quentin Skinner, in the course of arguing that we can
make sense of actions against the background of conventions
and without looking inside people’s heads, has pointed out
that we can interpret someone’s arm-waving as a warning
because we are aware of the convention that arm-waving
can be used to warn.7 We can extend the argument to more
sophisticated conventions. For example, acts of retaliatory
violence between individuals that would strike many people
today as unwise can make sense when they are interpreted
as defences of personal honour that were required by the
conventions of the time.8 Such bygone conventions will
generally need to be spelt out by historians, and claims
Hansen discusses the public sphere in chapter 20, cults in chapter 19,
trade in several chapters but particularly in chapters 14 and 24, and
civil war in chapter 21.
7 Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method, page
97.
8 Liliequist, “From Honour to Virtue: The Shifting Social Logics
of Masculinity and Honour in Early Modern Sweden”, section “The




that they existed will need to be supported by evidence,
but they can still suffice to make sense of conduct. The
general principle of folk psychology that people can feel
bound by conventions secures the link from convention to
actual conduct. A historian is only likely to need to do more
work when a convention strikes modern readers as utterly
bizarre. We shall consider such cases in section 3.1.3.
Having brought social conventions into the discussion, we
can set out a related role for thick concepts. Some thick
concepts allow actions to be labelled with the significance
they had in the relevant contexts, where their significance
was in turn determined by social conventions. A waving
is brought under the thick concept of a warning, or a
walk by a group of politicians through an area that was
called a voting lobby is brought under the thick concept of
bringing down a government. In that way the significance
of an action is presented on the surface when the action is
mentioned. This greatly facilitates the location of actions in
narratives that show how circumstances, events and actions
were connected.9 Many of the thick concepts that do this
kind of work will be specific to the ways in which particular
societies and their institutions functioned.
2.1.1.4 Narrative practice
Daniel Hutto has argued that the process of understanding
other people is centrally a matter of narrative practice.10
Having learnt this practice by listening to stories in child-
hood, we enter into the practice ourselves. For our purposes
we may see the practice itself, considered separately from
9 For a discussion of the use of concepts to bring out the
significance of actions see Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences
of Man”, part 2.
10 Hutto, “Folk Psychology without Theory or Simulation”.
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actual narratives, as a humanistic resource. It is a way
of working which tends to generate accounts that we find
satisfactory. They satisfy because the practice is one of
giving accounts that would if analysed be found to respect
the principles of folk psychology. This is not to say that a
narrator consciously applies folk psychology. The narrator
does not use folk psychology as a tool. Rather, narrative
practice should be seen as a direct act of making sense.
In addition, there are aspects of the practice that could
not be reduced to principles of folk psychology even if
one were to analyse the practice in a detached way. For
example, there is the tendency of good narrators either to
supply information that makes actions appear reasonable
or to explain apparently unreasonable actions, and their
tendency to give neither too much nor too little detail.
Narrative practice is, in Hutto’s view, primarily a second-
personal practice in which understanding can develop
through conversation.11 But the practice is not exclusively
second-personal. We may therefore extend the idea to the
historian’s comprehension of individuals from the past,
even though that looks decidedly third-personal. (Talk of
conversation with the past is not to be taken literally.)
2.1.1.5 Abilities
Another conception of how people make sense of other
people’s conduct has been put forward by Adam Morton,
11 For the primacy of the second-personal see Hutto, “Folk Psycho-
logy without Theory or Simulation”, section 7.2. See also Stawarska,
“Persons, Pronouns, and Perspectives”, introduction (before section
5.1), on the distinction between conceiving the task of making sense
as one undertaken from a third-personal, spectatorial standpoint and
conceiving it as one undertaken as a second-personal practice in which
the interaction of two people itself yields mutual understanding.
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who sees the achievement as depending on the use of a
range of abilities which are grouped together largely by the
fact that they are brought to bear on the task of making
sense.12 The abilities include being able to sense someone
else’s mood and being able to work out what it would be or
have been rational for someone to do in given circumstances.
Given that these abilities are acquired by living in societies
and that their worth depends on human nature’s being as
it is, we may see the abilities as a humanistic resource.
The abilities in question are primarily practical, to be used
when one interacts with others. One happy result, which
may not be an explicit goal, can be a satisfactory afternoon
or a satisfactory life.
The results of the exercise of the abilities in question need
not include any explicit conclusions about why people acted
as they did or how they might act next. It is therefore not
obvious how we should see these abilities as put to work
in the writing of historical accounts, even if we have no
doubt that they are put to work. But we can set out two
possibilities.
The first possibility is to see them as put to work in
mental re-enactment. It can be argued that re-enactment
is required in order to understand the actions of historical
figures. This line was taken by R. G. Collingwood, whose
ideas have been sympathetically expounded and developed
by William Dray.13 Re-enactment would help the historian
to see, from the point of view of a historical figure, how that
figure’s actions made sense. And success in re-enactment
would require possession of abilities of the kind that Morton
12 Morton, “Folk Psychology does not Exist”.
13 Collingwood, The Idea of History, Revised Edition with Lectures
1926-1928 ; Dray, History As Re-Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea
of History.
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mentions.
The second possibility is that an awareness of the import-
ance of such abilities in the societies that a historian studies
may help her to make sense of the past. An example is
given by the claim that social abilities, including the ability
to network and the ability to obtain people’s trust, were
significant in building the power of royal secretaries in
Sweden.14 In such cases it is not the historian’s own abilities
that are put to work, but her awareness of why such abilities
matter, an awareness that will have been born of her own
experience of putting them to work in everyday life.
2.1.2 Points at which the resources are
effective
Humanistic resources are put to work, in closely related
ways, at two different points in the process of making sense
of the past.
The earlier point in time is this. When historians set out to
write accounts, they think about the people studied in ways
that would be recommended on the basis of folk psychology.
They do so even though they may be unconscious of doing
so, and even though principles of folk psychology may not
in themselves feature even in the unconscious parts of their
reasoning. (They might not feature if, for example, some
form of simulationism were an appropriate characterization
of historians’ mental processes.) Historians also draw on
their repertoires of thick concepts, see conduct in the light
of social conventions of which they are aware, exercise their
own abilities, notice the exercise of specific abilities by




historical figures, and write in ways that follow the implicit
guidance provided by narrative practice. Exploitation of all
of the humanistic resources, or processes of thought which
have the same effects as the exploitation of those resources
would have, will guide historians both in their selection
and analysis of material and in their writing of finished
accounts. The task of writing historical accounts is thereby
made feasible.
The later point in time is one we indicated in section
1.2.2. In our examples there we noted how a general
understanding of the ways in which people think and act
can sustain historical accounts. In the best cases, such
an understanding helps to make accounts compelling and
specific claims thoroughly convincing. But even when that
is not achieved, the understanding at least helps to make
accounts flow, to convince readers that sense really is being
made of the past, and to make specific claims plausible.
Such a general understanding may be captured both in folk
psychology and in a repertoire of thick concepts. Sometimes
the general understanding will be brought to bear on
examples of conduct automatically, and sometimes it will
only be brought to bear when the conduct is presented as
being in accordance with social conventions that are spelt
out by historians. Finally, the abilities that readers exploit
to make sense of people in their own lives can be put to
work to help them make sense of the past when accounts
do not spell everything out.
2.1.3 The choice of resources
There is debate as to which resources should be used. Any
particular choice of resources would have some bearing on
the epistemic standing of historical accounts. On the one
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hand it would be attractive to have no need to enquire
into the states of mind of historical figures, states of mind
for which there is often no direct evidence. On the other
hand it would be attractive to make some contact with
the minds of historical figures, both in order to garner
information and so as to avoid writing accounts that would
seriously misrepresent those figures. Such contact would
seem to depend on achieving some empathetic rapport with
historical figures.15
We shall not try to resolve the question of which resources
should be used. In practice historians must do what they
can, using whatever resources are available, and then reflect
on the epistemic standing of whatever accounts they write.
But the debate should be noted, and the effects of the
use of different resources should be borne in mind when
we consider the respectability of specific claims. We shall
therefore sketch a couple of positions in the debate here.
2.1.3.1 Thick concepts and social conventions
One point of entry to the debate is provided by the
reasons for the exploitation of thick concepts and social
conventions we set out in sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.3
respectively. Those reasons not only show that thick
concepts and social conventions help to make the past
intelligible. They also suggest that when understanding
historical figures, historians need not engage with the
inner workings of agents’ minds, or at least not with
their detailed workings on specific occasions once some
appropriate general characteristics have been attributed.
15 For a survey of views on concepts of empathy that is set in the
context of work on the teaching of history see Endacott and Brooks,
“Historical Empathy: Perspectives and Responding to the Past”.
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The implications would however be limited. Even if this
line of thought were successfully pursued to the point of
showing that states of mind did not need to be mentioned
at all in historical accounts, that would not make an
understanding of human beings in folk-psychological terms
irrelevant. Rather, folk psychology would operate behind
the scenes. The thick concepts we have discussed capture
principles of folk psychology. For example, the concept of a
warning (Skinner’s example of a convention, but also a thick
concept) captures the principle that people will respond
to certain signals by taking evasive action, and will do
so for good reason. The concept of curiosity captures the
principle that people may seek to gather information for
no apparent reason, perhaps learning something interesting
or annoying other people in the process. The concept of
sharing, as in the example of printing, captures the principle
that people can grasp that other people might benefit from
access to resources and may then choose to provide access.
The concept of famine captures the principle that people
become distressed to the point at which they may take
drastic action when food is short. And the concept of a
cult, as used by Hansen in relation to Greek city-states,
captures the principle that people may feel comforted by
affirming beliefs in the presence of others who affirm the
same beliefs.
We can look at this from the other direction. Not only
do such thick concepts capture various principles of folk
psychology. Our grasp of folk psychology allows us to be
happy that characterizations of circumstances, events and
actions which use the concepts can indeed help to make
sense of the past. We feel comfortable using the concepts
because we appreciate that they are generally appropriate
to ways in which people actually think, feel and act. So
we do not fear that an account which used the concepts
might misrepresent the psychological connections that were
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in play. Moreover, it is a historian’s (usually unconscious)
application of folk psychology, or her execution of mental
processes that have the same effect, which leads her to
select circumstances, events and actions appropriately and
to characterize them using appropriate thick concepts. She
looks for a way to make sense of the past in human terms.
That goal guides her work of selection and characterization.
2.1.3.2 Engagement with minds
Another position in the debate over the choice of humanistic
resources is that historians should engage directly with the
minds of historical figures. Two views in particular would
encourage such engagement. The first view is that of R.
G. Collingwood, who argued that mental re-enactment was
required.16 The second view is that of Karsten Stueber, who
argues that empathy is central to the understanding of other
people.17
We should however note that neither of these two views
in favour of direct engagement would require historians
to engage in explicit discussion of the states of mind of
historical figures. The failure to require this indicates that
the positions in the debate over the choice of resources
we have sketched here do not fall into two directly
contradictory camps: “do not discuss states of mind” versus
“discuss states of mind”. Rather, the contrast is between
seeking evidence in external facts and seeking to be guided
by empathetic contact that is far from entirely governed by
publicly accessible evidence. This lack of total government
16 Collingwood, The Idea of History, Revised Edition with Lectures
1926-1928 ; Dray, History As Re-Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea
of History.




by publicly accessible evidence does not however preclude
several historians reaching the same conclusions through
the use of empathetic methods. Moreover, historians who
use empathetic methods will also make extensive use of
publicly available evidence.
2.1.4 Supplementation and adjustment
Humanistic resources as they are used in contemporary
society are not always enough. Both supplementation and
adjustment may be needed. Our concern here is with
supplementation and adjustment in ways that preserve the
central importance of humanistic resources – and we shall
merely note the topic of adjustment, deferring discussion
until section 3.3.3. We shall look beyond humanistic
resources when we discuss systematic psychology in section
2.3.
2.1.4.1 Supplementation
Technical concepts may need to be put to work. For
example, it has been claimed that a particular interaction
between cultural background and spontaneity is what gave
Willy Brandt’s kneeling at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in
1970 its great impact. The claim is supported through the
use of technical concepts such as those of orders of audience
and the Chancellor’s two bodies, one as the representative
of his country and the other as an individual human being.18
18 Rauer, “Symbols in Action: Willy Brandt’s Kneefall at the
Warsaw Memorial”. For orders of audience see pages 260-261. For the
Chancellor’s two bodies see pages 275-276. Conclusions are set out on
pages 274-277.
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One could debate whether the use of technical concepts
added something wholly new, or simply brought out the
analytic power which was latent in everyday thick concepts
and folk psychology. While the answer would not really
matter for our purposes, there is an argument in favour
of the latter view. This is that the technical concepts used
can often be explained in everyday terms, even though they
are not habitually used in everyday life. To return to the
example of Willy Brandt, we do not often think in terms
of orders of audience, but we have an easy grasp of the
distinction between those who witness an event directly
(the first-order audience), the media that represent the
event (second-order), and those who see the event as it has
been packaged and presented by the media (third-order).
Similarly, while we do not often think in terms of two
bodies, we have an easy grasp of the fact that someone
can live in an official role while also having their private
thoughts.
2.1.4.2 Adjustment
Both the thick concepts used to characterize circumstances,
events and actions, and the folk psychology which supports
their use in making sense of the past, may need to be
adjusted when studying times and places other than one’s
own. We shall discuss this topic in section 3.3.3. We defer
our discussion to that section because it is there that we
shall discuss the dangers of inappropriate adjustment and
how adjustments may be controlled. We shall do so in the
context of a discussion of concerns one might have about
historical claims.
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2.2 The quality of humanistic
resources
2.2.1 Principles and practice
We started our list of resources with folk psychology. Other
resources bear various relationships to the principles of
folk psychology, principles such as the ones we gave by
way of example in section 2.1.1.1.3. Thick concepts capture
principles. Social conventions must accord with principles in
order to be adopted (unless they are imposed with threats
of punishment for non-observance), and may themselves
amount to principles specific to their societies once they
have been internalized. Narrative practice requires narra-
tion in accordance with principles. And the exercise of
abilities, whether by historical figures or by historians, has
the same effect as the exerciser’s putting principles to work.
These links between folk psychology and other resources
need not be visible in practice. Even if we view human
interaction as a matter of the application of folk psychology
itself, we are unlikely to think that principles of folk psy-
chology are often made explicit. Even those who advocate
a theory theory of how people make sense of other people’s
conduct would not claim that people were continually
conscious of principles of folk psychology, and those who
prefer simulationism might deny the principles themselves
any effective role in either conscious or unconscious mental
processes that led to responses to other people’s conduct.
Likewise we are usually unaware of principles that are
captured by thick concepts, and it could be argued that
the principles themselves played no effective role in either
conscious or unconscious mental processes involved in
narrative practice or the exercise of abilities. For such
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reasons we speak of according with principles and having
the same effects as putting principles to work. We want to
allow both for the possibility that the principles themselves
are at work, and for the possibility that it is merely as if
they were at work.
Principles of folk psychology may not often appear on the
surface, but they can be made explicit. So when we speak of
these principles, we mean principles that historians would
make explicit if challenged to do so. From the point of view
of theory theory, that would amount to uncovering what
was already somewhere in their minds. If the process of
making sense were viewed in a simulationist way, or as the
use of thick concepts, as engagement in narrative practice or
as the exercise of abilities, it would mean working backward
from the processes thought to be used to principles that
would, if put to work, produce comparable results. We
should also note the approach of Peter Godfrey-Smith, who
sees folk psychology as a model rather than a theory.19
Under this approach the task of working backward would
amount to discerning the principles with which such a
model could be seen as complying.
There is a question as to whether such working backward
would yield even roughly the same set of principles
regardless of how the process of making sense were viewed
(simulationism, thick concepts, narrative practice, abilities
or a model), who did the work to identify the principles,
or whose performance in making sense of other people’s
conduct was used as the starting point. But we may
reasonably hope that the results of different pieces of work
of this type would not differ unacceptably, or at least that
they would not if all the working backward were carried out
by people within the same culture and they started with the
performance of people within a single culture.
19 Godfrey-Smith, “Folk Psychology as a Model”.
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Those who analyse processes by which people make sense
of other people’s conduct tend to argue that their preferred
views of the processes (views such as theory theory and
simulationism) are the appropriate ones. We, by contrast,
have not approached the topic as a quest for the appropriate
view. Rather, we have mentioned several different resources
which may be exploited when writing historical accounts.
We have no need to prefer any particular view of the mental
processes of exploitation.
2.2.2 The quality of folk psychology
Although we do not claim any primacy for the resource
of folk psychology, the links between its principles and
the other resources mean that we should take a special
interest in the quality of folk-psychological principles. While
there might be no need to derive such principles from
practices of simulation, thick concepts, narrative practice,
abilities or models, and while any purported derivation
might be disputable, it would be hard to see an account as
satisfactorily making sense of the past if it were arrived at
in a way from which principles could easily be derived when
the derived principles would strike people as unacceptable.
The unacceptability of the principles would give rise to a
modus tollens challenge to the methods that had been used
to arrive at the account.
Our notion of the quality of principles is ill-defined, but
it is broadly a notion of being appropriate to the task of
making sense of people. We shall not try to derive all sorts
of possible principles and then check them to see whether
they would be satisfactory. Instead we shall enquire into
the quality of the folk psychology we actually use, this
being a more practical if less comprehensive way to address
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concerns about quality. If we have reason to think that
our folk psychology is of good quality, then we may take
it that when historians rely on humanistic resources that
are closely tied to it, the accounts they write will have a
good prospect of making sense of the past without serious
misrepresentation.
Our usual folk psychology is far too ill-defined to be
supported in the ways that a scientific theory might be
supported. Fortunately, we can find another way to support
the view that the principles of folk psychology are a broadly
appropriate resource to exploit when making sense of the
past. Having said that, there are risks.
2.2.2.1 Support from effectiveness
Folk psychology gains support from its effectiveness in
everyday life – or the effectiveness of thick concepts that
capture its principles, social conventions that accord with
its principles or amount to principles that are specific
to particular societies, narrative practices that accord
with its principles, and abilities the exercise of which
has the same effects as putting its principles to work.
We can work and play together, and we can navigate
around difficult people. If we systematically screened out
important considerations we would not get on as well as
we actually do, and the failures of human beings when
they interacted with other people would be a good deal
more numerous than they actually are. This suggests
that when historical work is consciously or unconsciously
guided by folk psychology or related humanistic resources,
considerations that were important to historical figures,
whether as conscious motives or otherwise, will tend to get
noticed. Then there is a good prospect that the significant
reasons for their conduct will be mentioned in historical
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accounts.
This is not to say that human beings never overlook
important considerations in their practical lives. It is
obvious that they sometimes do. Sometimes their failures
are very serious, for example when diplomacy fails and
war ensues. But folk psychology and related humanistic
resources still do their everyday job reasonably well.
We may add two points that come to the fore when
historical accounts are written. Both points support the
exploitation of folk psychology and related humanistic
resources.
The first point is that folk psychology contains within itself
the germ of historical thought. Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin
Heidegger both explored consequences of the fact that
human beings live in time and understand their lives within
a temporal framework.20 This central role of time permeates
folk psychology and related humanistic resources. People
are seen as reacting to events in the past, as planning for
events in the near or distant future, and as having a sense
of the course of their lives laid out in time.
The second point is this. In the course of his work on
historical understanding, Dilthey claimed that the human
sciences rested on the relationship between lived experience,
expression and understanding, and that development of
the human sciences required a deepening of experience.21
Such claims would suggest, although they would not prove,
that the human sciences had to be conducted in ways that
20 Dilthey, “Die Kategorien des Lebens”, translated as “The
Categories of Life”; Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, translated as Being and
Time, sections 61 to 83.
21 Dilthey, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswis-
senschaften”, page 131, translated as “The Formation of the Historical
World in the Human Sciences”, page 153.
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respected the content of folk psychology. If they were not so
conducted, they would lose touch with human experience.
They would do so because the exploitation of humanistic
resources is the only practical way to link human experience
and work in the human sciences, and those resources can
only be exploited effectively when work is conducted in
terms that respect the content of folk psychology.
2.2.2.2 Scope for error
We should not suppose that folk psychology will be free of
error.
For example, it is natural to think that people who
have attitudes to certain conduct, either favourable or
unfavourable, will govern their own behaviour in accordance
with those attitudes. Thus someone who says they are
against cheating should be very unlikely to cheat. But
psychological research indicates that this is not so, and
that people will act at variance with their expressed
attitudes.22 It is therefore helpful for historians to keep
an eye on psychological research, in case folk psychology
and thick concepts that are closely related to it need to
be corrected in various ways. In this example, the thick
concept of cheating carries within it the idea of disapproval
of cheating by anyone, including cheating by the person
who uses the concept to describe other people’s conduct.
The principle of consistency of attitude at work in this case
might need to be adjusted so that potential disapproval of
oneself was more open to being overridden than potential
disapproval of others. This might however be a systematic
adjustment across a range of concepts, with the effect that
22 Myers and Twenge, Social Psychology, twelfth edition, chapter
4.
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the application of any concept within the range to one’s own
conduct showed greater tolerance than would be extended
to other people.
While adjustments of this nature may be needed, there is no
sign that folk psychology and thick concepts that are closely
related to it will turn out to have given us a fundamentally
inappropriate way to think about human conduct.
2.2.2.3 A remaining risk
Despite the everyday effectiveness of folk psychology and
related humanistic resources, there is a risk to consider.
People studied might be seen in a particular way in order to
make them fit modern folk psychology and thick concepts,
when those modern resources were not quite appropriate to
them. Then a historical account would not make sense of
their way of life or their conduct in a satisfactory manner.
It would instead convey a false picture of them.
The hope must be that detailed investigation would reveal
that evidence had been misconstrued or inconvenient
evidence had been ignored. But we cannot be wholly
confident that this hope would be fulfilled. The risk will
be lower, the greater the commonality of human nature
across different times and places, because then divergence
that would be great enough to make modern folk psychology
and thick concepts inappropriate would be less likely. We
shall discuss the extent of commonality in section 2.4.2.
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2.3 Systematic psychology
We shall now note some ways in which systematic psycho-
logy might help historians to make sense of the past.
2.3.1 Psychohistory
Psychohistory has been conducted for many decades, both
in biographical studies and in other types of work. But it
is hardly scientific, and it has plenty of critics.23 We should
therefore not assume that psychohistory will help historians
to make sense of the past in ways that will yield acceptable
accounts, although we should not reject its contributions
out of hand either.
2.3.2 Social psychology
Social psychology focuses on the thoughts and conduct of
people in relation to other people.24
One stream of work in social psychology is not relevant to
our project. This stream concentrates on abstractions that
do little or nothing to make sense of specific events.25
23 For a brisk survey see Hunt, “Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and
Historical Thought”, pages 338-341.
24 One useful introduction and survey is Myers and Twenge, Social
Psychology.
25 See for example the papers in Integrative Psychological and
Behavioral Science, volume 46, number 4, 2012, a special issue
entitled Bridging History and Social Psychology. Even the papers
in the collection that do engage closely with specific events, such
as Sandall, “Representing Rebellion: Memory and Social Conflict
in Sixteenth-Century England”, tend to provide social-psychological
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Social psychology has a role that is more relevant to our
interests in a second stream, the one in which it is used to
show how certain events could have taken place where those
events are ones that challenge the explanatory capacities
of folk psychology and our usual thick concepts.26 In such
cases it can add to the power of folk psychology and our
thick concepts to make sense of the past. The process of
making sense of the past does however remain dependent
on our folk psychology and thick concepts, for two reasons.
The first reason is that our folk psychology and thick
concepts are needed to allow the fluent use of concepts used
by social psychologists, such as the concepts of prejudice
and of the media’s influence on people’s beliefs.27 These
concepts do not have contents that it would be practical to
formulate without drawing on our everyday grasp of life in
human societies.
The second reason is that claims of social psychology about
how people conduct themselves are seen as plausible against
the background of our folk psychology and thick concepts.
interpretations rather than directly making sense of events. Sandall
offers possibilities for making sense of events (for example in the
discussion of memories on pages 563-564), but does not on the whole
go on to convert them into accounts that actually make sense of events.
Moreover, when accounts that do make sense of events are offered,
they are ones that could easily have been given without drawing on
the resources of social psychology. An example is the discussion on
page 565 of the Mousehold Articles, the contents of which help to
make sense of the fact that Kett’s Rebellion occurred.
26 See for example Overy, “‘Ordinary Men,’ Extraordinary Circum-
stances: Historians, Social Psychology, and the Holocaust”.
27 The example of prejudice is taken from Dixon, Durrheim,
Kerr and Thomae, “‘What’s So Funny ’Bout Peace, Love and
Understanding?’ Further Reflections on the Limits of Prejudice
Reduction as a Model of Social Change”. The example of media
influence is taken from Happer and Philo, “The Role of the Media
in the Construction of Public Belief and Social Change”.
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The claims could only be made plausible without reliance
on that background if a great deal more evidential data
than are in fact available were provided.
There is no conflict between this second reason and
the point that recourse to some of the claims of social
psychology may be needed when it is otherwise very hard
to make sense of events. Claims of social psychology are
individually plausible in the light of our folk psychology. For
example, we would happily accept that people sometimes
focus on details of a task and ignore the bigger picture.28
The individually plausible claims then come together to
make sense of extraordinary events.
2.3.3 Personality psychology
Personality psychology overlaps with social psychology, but
its main interest is in people individually.29
Personality psychology might be expected to play a
substantial role in making sense of historical events that
were triggered by the actions of powerful individuals.
There might for example be scope to show that conditions
around an individual, either at the time or earlier in life,
encouraged suspicion or impulsiveness. Such traits could
usefully be mentioned in giving accounts of actions that
would otherwise seem strange. But in fact, personality
psychology is far from being able to play that sort of
role in relation to specific individuals. Results obtained
are statistical, rather than definitely applying to given
individuals, and even the statistical links found can be
28 Overy, “‘Ordinary Men,’ Extraordinary Circumstances: Histori-
ans, Social Psychology, and the Holocaust”, pages 521-522.
29 One useful introduction and survey is Larsen and Buss,
Personality Psychology: Domains of Knowledge About Human Nature.
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of poor quality.30 A historian could rely on such work to
claim that in a specific case, given conditions might have
encouraged given traits, but that would only amount to
speculation about a possible explanation that might be
inappropriate in the instant case.
Personality psychology is more likely to be useful when the
task is to make sense of the behaviour of a substantial
group of people, whether politicians or citizens generally,
rather than the conduct of individuals who are of particular
interest.31 But the personality traits that are normally
identified in such work are the same as, or very close to,
traits as they are identified in folk psychology. And even
when the traits are not close to traits identified in folk
psychology, concepts of the traits would not make sense to
us if we did not have a background of folk psychology. So
yet again there is considerable reliance on folk psychology.
2.4 Commonality of human
nature
We started this chapter by drawing attention to the value
of humanistic resources. Their exploitation allows historians
to cut through complexity and make sense of the past. But
the resources are only useful because the people studied by
historians, the historians themselves, and their readers have
a largely common human nature.
30 For example, there is an unsurprising negative correlation
between perceived availability of social support and neuroticism, but
the correlation coefficients found only range between −0.3 and −0.5:
Swickert, “Personality and Social Support Processes”, page 531.
31 An idea of what can be achieved may be gleaned from Caprara
and Vecchione, “Personality Approaches to Political Behavior”.
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We shall now explore the nature and extent of this com-
monality, and then ask whether commonality is essential.
2.4.1 The nature of commonality
The commonality of human nature that concerns us is
a commonality of both biology and culture. For our
purposes, human culture is part of human nature. The
role of culture means that we must expect there to be
limits to commonality. Cultures differ from one another, so
commonality is never perfect and may be far from perfect.
But biology is overwhelmingly common.
The common human nature in question is not limited to
first-order elements, shared tendencies of people to react
to situations that appear to them simply as states of the
world. It includes an important second-order element, a
common appreciation of oneself and other human beings as
subjects who think, act, interact, and think of one another
as subjects. Such an appreciation of the nature of other
people as subjects with mental lives like one’s own has an
effect on thought and conduct. The appreciation of other
people in general that someone has may be expressed in
the folk psychology that can be attributed to them on the
basis of their thoughts about others and their use of thick
concepts.
2.4.2 The extent of commonality
There is evidence for commonality, but there is also
evidence of its limits. Areas covered by evidence and
research include social values and behaviour, the usefulness
across different cultures of a common set of factors to
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identify when analysing personality, amounts of variation
within and between cultures as measured by reference to
those factors, and emotions and associated phenomena.32
Some areas of lack of commonality would not be predicted
on the basis of common sense, and are only identified
through systematic research. This cautions us not to assume
commonality just because it seems likely. It is for example
important not to assume that all cultures have the same
notions of the senses and their relative importance, and
to recognize that the social significance of various senses
can differ from one culture to another.33 There are however
concerns about methods of research and the drawing
of conclusions.34 These concerns should lead us to be
cautious about assessments of the extent or the limits of
commonality.
The extent of commonality that can be regarded as
established is however enough to make it plausible that
there should be a largely commonly usable folk psychology
and set of thick concepts. It is also plausible that current
narrative practice should be appropriate when writing
about the past. And we may expect current social abilities
both to be useful to historians when writing about the
past and to have been useful, perhaps in modestly modified
forms, to historical figures. Social conventions look as
though they should be more readily open to change,
but fortunately old conventions are reasonably easy for
32 For studies that tell us about commonality and its limits see
Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis and Sam, Cross-Cultural
Psychology: Research and Applications, third edition, chapters 4 (so-
cial values and behaviour), 5 (personality factors), and 7 (emotions).
33 Low, “The Social Life of the Senses: Charting Directions”, pages
271-273.
34 For a survey of concerns see Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Cha-
siotis and Sam, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications,
third edition, chapter 12.
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historians to identify and explain to modern readers.
Support for the view that there is extensive commonality,
at least across a range of current societies, may come
from the establishment of commonality of factors in
personalities. It is usual to identify five of them and to
call them neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience,
agreeableness and conscientiousness.35
Having said that, the evidence is mixed. For example, when
Chinese ideas of personality are studied, some limits of an
analysis in terms of the usual five factors emerge. A sixth
factor, interpersonal relatedness, seems to be required.36
The fact that this additional factor is not needed in the west
indicates a limit to commonality. On the other hand, it is
perfectly possible to write accounts of how people behaved
in non-western societies which make sense to westerners
with their own conceptions of how people are likely to think
and act. We may take as an example an account of how,
in Ming Dynasty China, families handled the obligation
imposed on them to provide soldiers. The adjustment of
inheritance rights within a family to compensate those who
became soldiers when several members of the family could
serve but only one was required makes perfect sense to
modern western readers.37
Such examples may be adduced to oppose any argument
that since most of the direct evidence of commonality
relates to current societies, historians should not rely on
35 Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis and Sam, Cross-
Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications, third edition, pages
112-113; McCrae and Costa, “The Five-Factor Theory of Personality”,
pages 159-162.
36 Cheung, Leung, Zhang, Sun, Gan, Song and Xie, “Indigenous
Chinese Personality Constructs: Is the Five-Factor Model Complete?”
37 Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late
Imperial China, chapter 1.
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commonality between the present and the past. However,
as examples, they cannot supply a positive demonstration
that commonality is the norm. The success of the accounts
in making sense of the past indicates commonality in the
relevant instances. Commonality is not established first in
order to argue for the worth of the accounts.
One form of commonality which is especially likely to be
restricted is commonality of social culture at the level of
mores. Mores can change over less than a century, even
within a single culture with a continuous history that does
not include any disruptive merger with another culture.
Mores of sexual conduct and of concern for the natural
environment are recent examples.
Finally, it should be noted that we have discussed evidence
for and against the putative fact of commonality. We have
not discussed work on how mechanisms analogous to those
of biological evolution might have steered human nature
in similar directions in different societies on account of
the widespread occurrence of the relevant evolutionary
pressures, although much work has been done on the
evolution of features of societies.38 We have also not
discussed work on the relative roles of innate nature
and acquired culture in the formation of human beings
fit to live in society.39 Our focus on the putative fact
of commonality reflects our need to ask whether there
is enough commonality to support the exploitation of
humanistic resources. In our context, we do not need to
ask how commonality is to be explained.
38 Guala, “The Evolutionary Program in Social Philosophy”;
Lewens, “Cultural Evolution: Integration and Skepticism”.
39 For an outline of this topic see Bloch, Anthropology and the
Cognitive Challenge, chapter 4.
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2.4.3 Is commonality essential?
It is not obvious that making sense of the past requires
that the people studied and the people studying them have
a largely common human nature. Indeed, strictly speaking
that might not be required. But the use of folk psychology
and many of our thick concepts in a way that allows
historians to work efficiently does require commonality. At
least, we have not found any way to get the job done in the
absence of commonality. We shall now elaborate briefly on
this point, and then note some views put forward by other
writers which suggest that commonality may be needed for
reasons more fundamental than the need to work efficiently.
2.4.3.1 Efficiency
It is commonality of human nature that allows historians
and their readers to see straight away that certain cir-
cumstances could motivate certain actions or make certain
ways of life appealing or acceptable. (We shall say more
about this in section 3.1.1.) They do not need to think
through how psychological mechanisms work. They can
apply principles of folk psychology, use their normal thick
concepts, exercise their own social abilities, and recognize
the significance of those abilities in the lives of historical
figures, all without stopping to spell out what they are
doing.
Another reason why commonality matters is that the
concepts that are put to work in folk psychology, such
as motive, fear, and ambition, and many of the thick
concepts in everyday use, are somewhat loose – although
the concepts of folk psychology are only seen to be loose if
one pauses to make those concepts explicit. The appropriate
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application of concepts, whether concepts of folk psychology
(some of which will count as thick concepts) or thick
concepts generally, is best achieved by having a grip on the
concepts from the inside, the grip that comes with a human
nature and a human life in which the concepts are routinely
put to work. Without this grip, historians would get bogged
down in worries about whether people and events fitted the
conditions of application of concepts. It is true that with
this grip such potential difficulties are glossed over, but
at least the progress made has a good prospect of being
sensible and not leading historians into serious error. If a
historian were to go badly wrong, it is likely that either
she or other historians would think “Hang on, this account
is not convincing”. That thought would prompt revision or
withdrawal of the account.
Some support for the significance of commonality in
comprehension comes from a study which found coupling
between the brains of the narrator of a story and the person
who was listening, where stronger coupling was associated
with greater comprehension.40 That study related to an
exercise which was rather different from that of the
past speaking to historians through documents and other
evidence, so we cannot draw any robust conclusions in our
context, but there is a clear suggestion that commonality
should be important in historical work.
2.4.3.2 More fundamental reasons
Quite apart from the practical consideration of efficiency,
it is arguable that commonality is required in principle if
we are to make use of our thick concepts. Broadly, the
40 Stephens, Silbert and Hasson, “Speaker-Listener Neural Coup-
ling Underlies Successful Communication”.
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argument is that a human nature is required in order to
grasp those concepts. Specifically, the concepts are argued
to have a normative content that needs to be grasped in a
way that is only feasible if one has the appropriate nature.
For example, a human being sees directly that if someone
else has assisted him in the past, that is a reason to help her
when she is in some difficulty. There is a direct appreciation
that this would be the right thing to do unless there were
good reasons not to help. A non-human creature could
be given information about the concepts of assistance and
obligation, and could calculate that when two human beings
had interacted in a certain way in the past and were in
certain current situations, certain labels would apply to
their mental states and they would act in certain ways. But
such a diversion via laborious computation could be argued
to change the contents of the relevant concepts, in this case
the concepts of assistance and obligation. Specifically, if
the computational route were followed, the question “Why
should someone help someone else who had previously
helped them?” could always be asked. A variant of G.
E. Moore’s open-question argument would have practical
force, rather than being safely confined to philosophical
debate.41 On the other hand someone who, as a human
being, grasped the relevant concepts directly, would not see
such a question as arising, whether in their own mind when
it was their situation or in the mind of a historical figure
who had been in such a situation.
Several philosophers have thought along these lines, and
we shall now give some examples. These philosophers have
however put their ideas forward in various ways and in
the context of various arguments, so we should not freely
attribute to them the line of thought about the importance
of commonality that we pursue here.
41 Moore, Principia Ethica, chapter 1, section 13(2).
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Bernard Williams argued that several evaluative concepts
are only properly grasped by people who either have the
interests that support use of the concepts as guides to
conduct, or at least see those interests as interests. People
who did not even see them as interests would not see how
to apply the concepts in novel situations.42 Possession of
the relevant interests, and perhaps even the ability to see
them as interests, would be likely to depend on possession of
a human nature. This matters in the context of historical
studies because evaluative terms are used to describe the
motives and actions of people in the past, for example when
an action is seen as prompted by a felt slight to someone’s
honour and is seen as re-establishing their honour.
Charles Taylor sets out connections between the concepts
we use that allow us to see those concepts as evaluative
in a sufficiently strong and direct way for them to guide
our conduct. He takes as an example the concept of shame,
and shows how shame can be taken personally by a subject
because the significance of certain actions or characteristics
as shameful is embedded in the subject’s culture. He also
argues that the concept can only have any sense at all so
long as shame is experienced as significant.43
Alan Millar argues that a grasp of normative commitments
plays a vital role in seeing actions as motivated by reasons,
and hence in understanding why people acted as they did in
particular circumstances.44 A grasp of commitments which
saw them as normative would come most easily to a creature
with a human nature.
42 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pages 141-142.
43 Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, part 2, section 1.
44 Millar, Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing
Explanation. The argument builds up right through the book, but
chapter 1, section 4.5 and chapter 8 are particularly relevant in our
context.
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In addition to such arguments that relate to the use of
thick concepts, it is arguable that commonality is required
in principle in order to exploit folk psychology itself.
Karsten Stueber has argued for the essential role of a form
of empathy in which we re-enact the thought processes
of the person understood. This kind of empathy allows
us to appreciate that person as an agent and to see the
reasons they had for their actions as reasons, and not merely
as causes.45 Among his conclusions are that emotional
attunement is needed in order to see which aspects of a
situation appeared to a subject as salient, and that we
can only identify people’s thoughts as reasons for action
if we treat them as thoughts that could have been our own
thoughts.46 Both of these conclusions would seem to exclude
understanding actions as being for reasons unless the person
gaining the understanding shared a human nature with the
agent.
Wolfgang Spohn has argued that researchers in the human
sciences must engage in normative discourse from the
perspective of the people studied, people who themselves
accepted the relevant normative demands.47 The possession
of such a perspective would require possession of a human
nature in common with the people studied. (Spohn’s precise
argument is however entwined with a view of human
history as a struggle for improvement.48 This makes his
45 Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and
the Human Sciences, pages 21, 40-45 and 152-171; Stueber, “Under-
standing versus Explanation? How to Think About the Distinction
Between the Human and the Natural Sciences”, section 3.
46 Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and
the Human Sciences, pages 160-165.
47 Spohn, “Normativity is the Key to the Difference Between the
Human and the Natural Sciences”, sections 2 and 3.
48 Spohn, “Normativity is the Key to the Difference Between the
Human and the Natural Sciences”, page 248.
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argument most obviously appropriate in the context of
Whig historiography, although it could be applied outside
that context.)
The arguments we have cited in this section do not add
up to a decisive demonstration that commonality of human
nature is essential, either for the use of thick concepts or
for the exploitation of folk psychology. Our own conclusions
should be tentative. It could be argued that if one were to
allow that questions such as that of whether there was at
least some reason to help someone who had been helpful
in the past would be reasonable questions to ask, that
would not really amount to a change in the content of
the concept of an obligation. Normativity might be argued
not to be a type of content at all. Instead it could be
regarded as an external feature of the use of concepts
by human beings which could be replaced by a factual
assertion that in certain circumstances certain mental
predicates would apply to human beings, with consequences
for conduct which could be explained by the fact that those
predicates applied. We have also not said enough to rule
out theory theory in favour of the simulationism which
bears a positive, if indirect, relationship to the idea of
needing to have a direct grasp of the evaluative nature of
concepts. In particular, we have not said enough to rule
out theory theory in a context such as academic history,
in which reflection is permitted and actions are limited
to publishing accounts and doing more research. These
features of academic history add to the plausibility of theory
theory’s being appropriate. We have no desire to settle the
debate between theory theory and simulationism. But even
without doing so, we can still appreciate the importance of
commonality of human nature.
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2.5 Reasons to exploit humanistic
resources
We shall now set out some reasons why the exploitation of
humanistic resources is widespread in the humanities and
the social sciences.
We shall range over the humanities and the social sciences,
even though our focus is on history, because the points we
shall make can be made across most of that range. There are
however areas in the social sciences, and to a lesser extent
in the humanities, to which the points we shall make in
this section would not apply, or would only apply with very
limited force. Those parts of economics in which the focus
is on the construction of tidy theoretical models would be
examples.
2.5.1 Practicality
We have already set out one reason for the widespread
exploitation of humanistic resources. Such exploitation
makes it feasible to get work done. It allows researchers to
cut through the complexity of human beings and societies.
Then they can write accounts that make sense of the human
world.
2.5.2 A shortage of laws
We shall now turn to another reason for the widespread
exploitation of humanistic resources, the shortage of laws
of nature at the human level.
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Laws of nature are very helpful when writing accounts that
explain the course of events. A common goal of explanations
in the natural sciences is either to bring phenomena under
laws, or to set out mechanisms that reliably give rise to the
phenomena. The identification of a reliable mechanism is in
turn most powerfully explanatory if we are shown why the
mechanism can be expected to work as advertised. That
is most easily done by pointing to laws that govern how
the parts of the mechanism will act and interact. When
laws and mechanisms are invoked, the resulting accounts
connect facts with one another in a compelling way.
Useful laws of nature are in short supply in the humanities
and the social sciences. People are governed by laws of
nature, but there is a shortage of laws that govern human
conduct which describe it at the level of conduct – that
is, at the level at which actions, social interactions, and
circumstances as they appear to people are picked out,
rather than at the level at which neuronal activity or
anything comparably physical or biological is picked out.49
It is not that laws at a human level are wholly unavailable.
Economics can provide several examples, such as the law
of diminishing returns, although the applicability of any
such law to a given real-world situation should always be
checked. It has also been argued that in the social sciences
more widely there are plenty of useful generalizations
which have at least some of the flavour of laws.50 But the
availability of laws, or even of generalizations that resemble
laws, is far too patchy to allow laws to predominate in
accounts that make sense of human life and conduct.
49 For reasons why laws should be in short supply see Baron,
Confidence in Claims, sections 3.4.1 and 5.5.1.
50 Goertz, “Descriptive-Causal Generalizations: ‘Empirical Laws’
in the Social Sciences?”
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Given the shortage of laws of human conduct and laws of
society, it is not easy to invoke laws and mechanisms to
support claims of connection between events, actions and
features of environments. It is then natural and sensible
to compensate for the shortage of laws by drawing on
our accumulated implicit wisdom as to how human beings
think and act. This can be done by exploiting humanistic
resources, which in their various ways capture much of that
implicit wisdom.51
Despite the shortage of laws, it is sometimes possible to
give accounts that rely heavily on laws and mechanisms.
In economics, for example, theories can be used to set out
how values of different economic variables associated with
the production of goods and services are apt to be related
to one another, and consideration of the technicalities of
production and of how producers are assumed to think
can explain why they should be related in those ways.52
There is also scope to explain by reference to mechanisms
in the social sciences more generally.53 And there is scope
to blend generalizations and particular facts through the
construction of analytic narratives.54
Having said that, even in economics explanations are not
often of the quality that is commonly available in the
natural sciences. Components of identified mechanisms and
51 For a discussion of the lack of laws and of reliance on an
understanding that is founded on experience of human life see Berlin,
“The Concept of Scientific History”.
52 This can be seen from any economics textbook, for example
Lipsey and Chrystal, Economics, chapter 5 (in the thirteenth edition).
53 Examples can be found in the chapters of Manzo (ed.), Ana-
lytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Mechanisms are especially
conspicuous in chapter 3, Wikström, “Why Crime Happens: A
Situational Action Theory”; chapter 8, Grossman and Baldassarri,
“The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-
the-Field Experiment in Uganda”.
54 Alexandrova, “When Analytic Narratives Explain”.
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interactions of those components are likely to be described
in ways which do not specify all of the details that might
make a difference to the operation of the mechanisms or the
outcomes. This incompleteness, along with the typical lack
of a full set of laws which are anywhere near exceptionless,
will mean that widespread exceptions to the normal
operation of a given mechanism often cannot be ruled out.
(Exceptions might not in fact be widespread, but it would
often not be possible to be sure in advance that they would
not be widespread.) Such difficulties may be eliminable,
and explanation of the highest quality may be achievable,
within a theoretical model such as a simplified model of
an economy in which everyone has perfect information and
everyone makes economically rational decisions. But such
an account would not represent the real world accurately.
In the humanities, the prospects for explanations of
comparable quality to those given in the natural sciences are
even slimmer than they are in the social sciences. Even when
generalizations and particular facts fit together nicely, we
may be concerned that generalizations have been tailored
and particular facts have been selected to produce this
happy result. In that case success should not be taken
to show that an author has really got to grips with the
workings of the world.55
2.5.3 Flexibility
The exploitation of humanistic resources leads to work
that falls far short of the precision and the conclusiveness
(so far as reasonably foreseeable) of much work in the
55 This concern would for example apply to the open formulae ap-
proach set out in Alexandrova, “When Analytic Narratives Explain”,
section 3.6. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 of that paper discuss the extent to
which idealization may be a problem.
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natural sciences. When everyday concepts and principles
guide work, this is to be expected. But the looseness
of everyday concepts and principles can also be helpful.
Looseness means that researchers are not driven to write
about human beings and their societies in one precisely
specified way. Rather, humanistic resources open up a range
of possibilities. This allows researchers to be flexible. They
do not need to impose caricatures of human beings, like
that of homo economicus. Such caricatures might well be
necessary if tightly defined concepts and tightly formulated
principles were to be used.
We should not claim that looseness of concepts and
principles, and flexibility as to how to write, are good things
in themselves. If the goal is to understand the world aright,
their opposites are in general preferable. But we can still
note that looseness and flexibility have their advantages
as well as their disadvantages. These advantages give an
additional reason to exploit humanistic resources.
2.6 Hermeneutics
We shall now turn to hermeneutics, an approach to
historical work that has a long tradition. It is of interest
to us because it offers a way to carry out work of the
kind that relies on the exploitation of humanistic resources
in a disciplined fashion. Such a source of discipline is
particularly valuable because the strict tests of claims which
are often available in the natural sciences are only rarely
available in relation to claims in the humanities that do
more than merely report evidence, make obvious deductions




The hermeneutic tradition is a rich source of methods
of work that are appropriate when a historian must feel
her way into her subject matter, repeatedly reviewing her
interpretations of evidence.
The tradition is a long and complex one.56 We shall be
selective, and shall not try to be faithful to the tradition as
a whole. While a great deal of the hermeneutic tradition
is concerned with historical work, thinkers within the
tradition have made recommendations as to how the past
should be studied which vary too much for us to want to
endorse views that are specific to individuals. They also
vary too much for an endorsement of the whole set of
recommendations to be meaningful.
In addition to selecting to suit our own requirements, we
shall abstract from the specific recommendations of various
thinkers and consider the general idea of careful work back
and forth between interpretations and evidence, and among
interpretations which need to fit together. This idea is
widespread across the tradition.
Conveniently, our approach of selecting and abstracting
will save us from having to commit to any view that the
methods of the human sciences must, by virtue of the role of
meanings, be quite different from the methods of the natural
sciences. There are arguments that such a view would be
56 For a detailed history of hermeneutics see Detel, Geist und
Verstehen: Historische Grundlagen einer modernen Hermeneutik,
part 1, “Geschichte der Hermeneutik und Theorie des Geistes”. For a
critical survey of hermeneutic thought see Forster, German Philosophy
of Language from Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond, chapter 9. For a brief
summary set in the context of the study of history see Makkreel,
“Hermeneutics”.
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mistaken.57
The approach of the part of the tradition that is relevant
to our concerns is to make sense of a text both by
identifying meanings of its parts, the words and sentences
which have meanings given by the rules and the usage of
the relevant language, and by identifying meanings of the
whole text. This part of the tradition is associated with
Herder, Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey.58 Details
varied considerably as between these authors, and further
variations were introduced later.
A central concern of this part of the tradition is that the
initial reading of a text should not be the final reading.
The initial reading is likely to involve comprehending each
sentence first and then assembling the sentences into a
whole, with this first stage being heavily influenced by a
modern outlook and probably not taking much account of
the complexities of the circumstances in which the text
was written. There need to be several more readings, if
the meanings of parts and the meaning of the whole as
they stood at the time when a text was written are to
be identified with sufficient accuracy. These subsequent
readings will take place within a process in which the reader
goes back and forth between readings of parts, readings of
the whole, and information about the context, repeatedly
57 Mantzavinos, Naturalistische Hermeneutik, translated as Natur-
alistic Hermeneutics.
58 For an account of the development of the relevant kind of
hermeneutics in the hands of Herder see Michael Forster’s introduction
to Herder, Philosophical Writings, pages xiv-xxi. For Schleiermacher
see Hausheer, “Three Major Originators of the Concept of Verstehen:
Vico, Herder, Schleiermacher”, section 4. For Droysen see Maclean,
“Johann Gustav Droysen and the Development of Historical Her-
meneutics”. For Dilthey see Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey: A Hermeneutic
Approach to the Study of History and Culture, chapter 4; Rickman,
Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies, chapter 10.
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making adjustments to the meanings attributed to parts
and the whole until a satisfactory equilibrium is reached.
The context includes the author’s entire body of writing,
the ways in which the relevant language was used by others
at the time and, in some versions of the tradition, the
author’s actions aside from writing and the non-linguistic
historical context. Attribution of a meaning to a text as a
whole is constrained both by the latest meanings attributed
to parts and by the wider context, especially elements
that would indicate the author’s psychological traits. These
constraints allow some potential meanings to be attributed
to the whole, while ruling out other meanings. Attributions
of meanings to parts are likewise constrained both by the
latest meaning attributed to the whole and by the wider
context, especially the state of the relevant language at the
time. These constraints allow some potential meanings to
be attributed to parts, while ruling out other meanings.
Moreover, it is not only attributions of meaning to the whole
and to parts which can be adjusted. There may be scope
to make adjustments to background theories, principles
of interpretation that are put to work, and views of the
context.
2.6.2 The extension to ways of life and
conduct
2.6.2.1 Using the tradition
A historian may well juggle views of the events or ways of
life studied and interpretations of the evidence. But her task
will often not be limited to, and will sometimes not even
include, establishing the meanings of texts. Despite this,
there is scope to make use of the hermeneutic tradition. A
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general form of procedure, the juggling of overall views and
repeatedly reinterpreted detailed evidence, can be found
both in the interpretation of texts and in other work that
aims to make sense of the ways of life or conduct of people
in the past. The central figure among those within the
hermeneutic tradition who have seen it as applicable to the
writing of history generally, and who have done so while
still highlighting systematic ways of working, is Wilhelm
Dilthey.59
Moving on to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, we find
two other things that are of great interest to us and are
applicable to the writing of history generally. (What we say
about them here reflects our own purposes just as much
as it reflects Gadamer’s own ideas as set out in the places
cited.)
The first thing of interest is a discussion of the role of
the historian’s starting position and her consequent ability
to make judgements as to meaning in advance of a full
consideration of all the sources. We might be tempted
to stigmatize such judgements as liable to bias historical
research, but they are essential tools with which to come to
an understanding. Such judgements must however be tested
against the sources, and the historian needs to be aware of
her judgements made in advance.60
59 See in particular Dilthey, “Das Verstehen anderer Personen und
ihrer Lebensäußerungen”, translated as “The Understanding of Other
Persons and Their Manifestations of Life”.
60 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophi-
schen Hermeneutik, volume 1, part 2, section 2.1.a.a, “Heideggers
Aufdeckung der Vorstruktur des Verstehens”, translated as Truth and
Method, part 2, section 2.1.a.1, “Heidegger’s Disclosure of the Fore-
Structure of Understanding”. See also volume 1, part 2, section 2.1.c,
“Die hermeneutische Bedeutung des Zeitenabstandes”, translated as
part 2, section 2.1.b.3, “The Hermeneutic Significance of Temporal
Distance”, which expands on this topic and also sets the stage for the
next thing we shall mention, the process of the fusion of horizons.
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The second thing of interest is a characterization of the
process of achieving understanding as involving a fusion of
the horizons of the historian and the people studied into a
single expanded horizon, a task that should be performed
with full awareness of the historian’s initial horizon and
its difference from the horizon of the people studied.61 (A
related approach is that of Charles Taylor, when he argues
for the use of a “language of perspicuous contrast” in which
members of one society can come to understand another
society.62) Gadamer’s discussion of the historian’s starting
position and his idea of a fusion of horizons are of more
interest in our context than his wider reflections on how it
is possible to understand the past.63
2.6.2.1.1 Differences
While the general form of hermeneutic procedure may carry
over from the study of texts to a wider range of historical
work, some details are different when the objective is not
to interpret texts but to make sense of human conduct. We
shall note a few differences here.
61 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophi-
schen Hermeneutik, volume 1, part 2, section 2.1.d, “Das Prinzip der
Wirkungsgeschichte”, translated as Truth and Method, part 2, section
2.1.b.4, “The Principle of History of Effect (Wirkungsgeschichte)”;
volume 1, part 2, section 2.3.c, “Der hermeneutische Vorrang der
Frage”, translated as part 2, section 2.3.c, “The Hermeneutic Priority
of the Question”.
62 Taylor, “Understanding and Ethnocentricity”, part 2. The idea
of such a language is introduced on page 125, and the connection with
Gadamer is made on page 126.
63 These wider reflections are found throughout Gadamer, Wahrheit
und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, volume
1, part 2, “Ausweitung der Wahrheitsfrage auf das Verstehen in den
Geisteswissenschaften”, translated as Truth and Method, part 2, “The
Extension of the Question of Truth to Understanding in the Human
Sciences”.
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One difference is that in the interpretation of texts, the
evidence is primarily the words of the texts on which
the interpreter comments, whereas in other work pieces
of evidence may play merely supporting roles, rather than
leading roles, in the accounts that historians write.
A second difference is that the range of types of evidence
will in general be wider when the task is to make sense
of human conduct. Pieces of evidence will include written
records, material remains, information about the state
of technology, geographical information, and many other
things to which historians pay attention.
A third difference is that when the task is to make sense
of human conduct, the range of types of view taken by
historians will in general be wider. Views will sometimes
be of what people meant when they said or wrote certain
things, but they will often be of which circumstances,
events, and actions of other people led the people of
immediate interest to act in certain ways (whether on
specific occasions or generally), or how people of some
relevant type thought at the relevant time, or what they
valued or found unacceptable.
Finally, as we noted in section 2.1.3, there is an approach to
historical work that seeks to avoid exploring the minds of
historical figures. There is a contrast here with thinkers in
the hermeneutic tradition who have seen such exploration as
important. Schleiermacher is the leading example, although
his interest in the exploration of minds arose out of the
fact that his subject matter was the meanings of texts.64
64 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik mit besonderer Bezie-
hung auf das Neue Testament, “Hermeneutik: Einleitung” and “Her-
meneutik, zweiter Theil: Die psychologische Auslegung”, translated
as Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings, “Hermeneutics:




Dilthey, whose interests extended beyond the meanings of
texts to the interpretation of the past generally, also started
by attaching particular importance to the exploration of
minds, to be conducted in empathetic ways. While he
gradually moved away from using the individual mind as a
starting point to using the visible social world of meanings,
expressions and actions as a starting point, he did not go
so far as to abandon empathetic approaches.65
2.6.2.2 Benefits of the tradition
A historian’s awareness of the hermeneutic tradition and
her being influenced by it as she works may increase the
proportion of the claims she makes that are respectable,
both by encouraging her to keep referring to the evidence
and by encouraging her to work toward a view which
is internally coherent. There are several reasons why the
tradition may be helpful, but reasons that derive from ideas
about textual interpretation differ from reasons that derive
from ideas about historical work in general, although the
two sets of reasons do overlap.
We shall start with ideas about textual interpretation.
The tradition of textual interpretation has been developed
over a long period and in a self-critical way, so its
recommendations as to how to juggle overall views and
interpretations of detailed evidence have been put to
the test. We may reasonably hope that these well-tested
recommendations will be of use in historical work generally.
The tradition encourages authors to consider a wide range
of evidence, covering not only the people of immediate
interest but also their contexts. The tradition also supplies
65 On both Schleiermacher and Dilthey see Kögler and Stueber,
“Introduction: Empathy, Simulation, and Interpretation in the Philo-
sophy of Social Science”, section 5.
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a model for thinking systematically about different types
and levels of work, about objectivity, and about circularity
in reasoning.66 It has indeed been argued that systematic
approaches borrowed from the natural sciences can be
employed in the interpretation of texts.67 And even without
making such a connection with the natural sciences there is
scope to say that a form of objectivity is available, even if
not the kind of objectivity that is available in the natural
sciences.68
One useful effect of awareness of the tradition should be
to restrain any impulse to explain someone’s conduct by
reference to their general attitudes and characteristics until
it has been confirmed that the attribution of those attitudes
and characteristics is supported by evidence drawn from a
context that is wider than the immediate context of the
conduct in question, and that the attribution does not
conflict with other evidence drawn from any such wider
context.
Turning to ideas about historical work in general, we
again find a useful emphasis on the need both for the
historian to work systematically and for her to be aware
of how she works. The hermeneutic tradition tends to
make procedures of coming to understand explicit.69 This
66 Seebohm, Hermeneutics. Method and Methodology, chapter 6.
67 Mantzavinos, “Text Interpretation as a Scientific Activity”.
Mantzavinos’s line of argument does however place him outside some
parts of the hermeneutic tradition. It moves him away from the view
that the role of meanings in the human sciences requires their methods
to be quite different from the methods of the natural sciences.
68 Betti, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geistes-
wissenschaften, translated as “Hermeneutics as the General Methodo-
logy of the Geisteswissenschaften”. Betti had significant disagreements
with Gadamer, but fortunately we merely borrow from the tradition
so we do not need to resolve such disagreements.
69 Kögler, “Empathy, Dialogical Self, and Reflexive Interpretation:
The Symbolic Source of Simulation”, section 1.
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encourages reflection as to what can be worked out at
each stage and on what basis. Consciousness of procedures
and reflection on what can be worked out and why should
increase the probability that mistakes will be noticed.
We also find reflections on the role of judgements made in
advance and on the process of coming to an understanding
of the past, and a reminder that it is important for the
historian to be aware of both her judgements in advance
and the role of her own position in the process of coming to
an understanding. This philosophical work does not supply
the historian with detailed methods to use, but awareness of
it should alert the historian to the danger of being led astray
by the content of her own starting position. In particular
it should help the historian to avoid presentism, that is,
reading her own perspective back into the past.70 At the
same time, the work of Gadamer to which we have referred
should reassure the historian that she should not even try to
wipe her mind clean of her existing views before she starts
work.
Finally, we should note that our emphasis here has been
highly selective. This reflects our approach of drawing
attention to what happens to be useful in the hermeneutic
tradition. Specifically, we have concentrated on what
reflection and a methodical approach can do to control
the work of historians. We have for example not drawn
on arguments related to objectivity, realism and relativism
that are based on the general nature of interpretation.71
Such arguments operate at too abstract a level to serve our
purpose. We first take it that the claims that interest us are
70 Hunt, “Against Presentism”, decries the vice. Fischer, Histori-
ans’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pages 135-140,
analyses it.
71 For a survey of some arguments of that nature and a discussion
of their limitations see Detel, Geist und Verstehen: Historische
Grundlagen einer modernen Hermeneutik, section 10.2.
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not irremediably subjective. We then enquire into the ways
in which historians come to make claims, and the forms of
reassurance as to specific claims that may be available.
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Chapter 3
The sense that is made
In this chapter, we shall consider the end result of the
historian’s work. In section 3.1, we shall consider the
influence of commonality of human nature on how historical
figures are perceived. While this section is in itself about
the process of making sense, we include it here because
it provides a setting for section 3.2. In that section, we
shall explore the tradition of seeing historical accounts as
providing Verstehen. Then in section 3.3, we shall turn to
some concerns we might have about claims that are made
when sense is made of the past in the ways we discuss.
3.1 Commonality and perception
Commonality of human nature has considerable influence
on how historical figures are perceived.
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3.1.1 Human ways
When a historian writes an account of human conduct, she
considers the available evidence in the light of a view of the
people studied as having had human ways comparable to
her own. This view will usually be implicit, but it will still
affect her and her readers’ perception of the people studied.
The people studied will be seen as having been motivated
to act in certain ways by specific considerations, whether
events, circumstances, or the actions of others, and those
considerations will be ones that could have motivated the
historian or her readers, either as they were or as they
might have been, to act in the same ways. (We shall
discuss what hypothetical modifications of historians and
their readers are allowed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.) The
people studied will also be seen as having been able to
feel comfortable in certain habitual behaviour for certain
reasons, and the reasons will be ones that might also have
allowed the historian or her readers, either as they were
or as they might have been, to feel comfortable in the
same habitual behaviour. Seeing historical figures as so
motivated or able to feel comfortable will allow a direct
humane comprehension of them, of their actions and of their
attitudes to events and the actions of others.
We do not claim that historians or their readers will be
conscious that the considerations could have motivated
them or that the reasons might have allowed them to feel
comfortable. They might be conscious of those things, but
even if they were not, the common ground between the
people studied, the historian and her readers would still
help historical accounts to flow and make sense of the past.
We also do not argue that historians should work by
standing in the shoes of the people studied. We only note
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from our external perspective that historians and their
readers could have been motivated or might have been
able to feel comfortable, given their internal perspectives.
Standing in shoes is however not excluded by the fact that
our own aim is limited in this way.
Finally, in the phrases “act in the same ways” and “feel
comfortable in the same habitual behaviour”, the words
“the same” are important. It is not enough that the motives
and the reasons of the historical persons might have had
some influence over historians and their readers, so that
they could have been motivated to do something or other,
or might have been able to feel comfortable in some habitual
behaviour or other. We require that the motives and the
reasons would have been capable of motivating the same
actions or allowing comfort in the same habitual behaviour.
3.1.2 Ranges of motives and reasons
The references to considerations that could have motivated
the historian or her readers and to reasons that might have
allowed the historian or her readers to feel comfortable
may appear to be rather restrictive. But “could have
motivated” and “might have allowed the historian to feel
comfortable” allow considerable latitude. We only require
that motivating considerations be ones that could have
motivated the historian to act in the same ways, either
as she was or if she had been different in ways she could
imagine. Likewise we only require that the reasons might
have allowed the historian to feel comfortable in the same
habitual behaviour, either as she was or if she had been
different in ways she could imagine. This allowance for the
historian’s having been different in ways she could imagine
extends to her readers and their capacity for imagination.
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We again do not argue that historians should work by
standing in the shoes of the people studied. That might be
thought to follow from the introduction of historians’ and
their readers’ imagination as to how they might have been.
But no actual imagination is required. We merely propose
hypothetical imagination so as to identify the scope of the
differences allowed.
3.1.3 Limits to comprehension
There are limits to the range of differences we envisage,
which in turn set limits to the ability to comprehend
historical figures and events in the way we are considering
here.
“Different in ways she could imagine” is restricted to
what the historian could imagine from the inside, with
an empathetic grasp of the alternative character. It is not
meant to extend to detached thoughts that she could in
theory have had certain characteristics which would have
allowed appropriate motivation or feelings of comfort, when
her actual self would not be able to have an inner grasp of
what that would be like. The same limit would apply to her
readers.
The consequent existence of limits on the scope to compre-
hend in the way we are considering here is comparable to
the existence of imaginative resistance.1 That phenomenon
is mainly associated with fiction and with ethical imagin-
ability. It could however be extended to factual accounts,
in which the difficulty of the historian or the reader might
1 Imaginative resistance is analysed in Gendler, “The Puzzle of
Imaginative Resistance”; Gendler, “Imaginative Resistance Revis-
ited”; Stueber, “Imagination, Empathy, and Moral Deliberation: The
Case of Imaginative Resistance”.
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be captured in the words “That is how it really was, but
I cannot relate to the people involved”, and to a broader
range of difficulties than ethical ones.
While the difficulties may not be limited to ethical ones,
the ethical incomprehensibility of certain conduct is an
important type of limit. There are instances in which we
cannot see any way to regard the conduct in question as
acceptable. The question “How could they have done that?”
may be felt to have no answer that modern people could
regard as providing justification. How, for example, could
a modern historian relate to people who would bury the
members of a ruler’s harem (alive or killed for the occasion)
in the ruler’s tomb?2
This does not mean that no sense can be made of such
conduct. It is just that it may not be possible to see the
people studied as having been motivated by considerations
that might also have motivated us to act in the same
way. For example, sense has been made of ritual human
sacrifice by reference to the role it can play in supporting
social stratification.3 But that piece of work relies on careful
statistical analysis, rather than on laying out information in
a way to which the reader could relate by seeing that he too
might have been motivated to engage in human sacrifice.
It is sometimes possible to see people who acted in ethically
incomprehensible ways as motivated by considerations that
2 One example of this kind of procedure is set out in Ssu-ma
Ch’ien, The Grand Scribe’s Records, volume 1: The Basic Annals of
Pre-Han China, “The First Emperor of Ch’in, Basic Annals 6”, section
265, page 155. Human remains consistent with that account have been
found: Cao and Zhang, “Emperor Qin Shihuang’s Mausoleum site in
Xi’an”, page 42.
3 Watts, Sheehan, Atkinson, Bulbulia and Gray, “Ritual Human
Sacrifice Promoted and Sustained the Evolution of Stratified Societ-
ies”.
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might have motivated us to act in the same ways. There
may be scope to see historical figures as motivated by
such considerations, but within a context which meant that
the consequences of their acting as they did strike people
outside that context as unspeakably evil. An example is
given by attempts to explain how large numbers of people
could willingly have participated in the Holocaust.4 The
explanations tend to be reasonably closely related to an
everyday understanding of human nature, for example in
drawing attention to the willingness of people to follow
orders when a system that encourages obedience has been
created. Motivation by orders can make perfectly good sense
to historians and their readers. They may come to see how
actions which would normally not even be considered may
become possible for people in certain contexts. It may even
be possible for a historian or her readers to say “I might
have done that in those circumstances”.
Looking beyond the ethical, perceived irrationality in the
thought of people studied can also present obstacles to
comprehension. Special approaches are needed to deal with
such cases.5 Even the initial diagnosis of error in the thought
of the people studied can require considerable care.6
Even in cases of perceived irrationality, it may be possible
for a historian to see motivations that she and her readers
would actually share. Consider for example the consultation
of oracles in order to determine the best course of action.7
4 For a survey of explanations, set in the context of a discussion of
the relevance of the Milgram experiments, see Overy, “‘Ordinary Men,’
Extraordinary Circumstances: Historians, Social Psychology, and the
Holocaust”.
5 For a critical introduction to such approaches see Lukes, “The
Problem of Apparently Irrational Beliefs”.
6 Lloyd, Being, Humanity, and Understanding: Studies in Ancient
and Modern Societies, chapter 2.
7 There are examples in Herodotus. For a discussion of these which
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We now recognize that such activity is entirely pointless if
it is predicated on the staff of oracles having access to the
gods rather than their having human and natural sources
of information, except perhaps when the point is to have
one’s confidence bolstered rather than to improve decision-
making. But a historian can still see both the people studied
and herself as wanting to know the likely consequences of
alternative actions and as inclined to use whatever seems to
be a useful predictor. The fact that ideas of what may be a
useful predictor have moved on does not detract from that.
The historian could easily see that if those ideas had not
moved on, she too could have been motivated to consult an
oracle.
3.2 Verstehen
There is a long tradition of thought about historical work
that is centred on the concept of Verstehen. An exploration
of some aspects of that tradition will give us a way to look
at the sense that historians make of the past. In setting out
what is involved in Verstehen, we shall draw on what we
have said in section 3.1 about the perception of historical
figures.
In section 3.2.1, we shall indicate what we mean by
Verstehen. Then in section 3.2.2, we shall look at the
traditional contrast between Erklären and Verstehen.
makes it clear that we should not see the Delphic Oracle simply as
an ancient version of a modern source of information see Fairbanks,
“Herodotus and the Oracle at Delphi”. For examples from the Dodona
Oracle see Eidinow, Oracles, Curses, and Risk among the Ancient
Greeks, chapter 5 and appendix 1.
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3.2.1 The concept of Verstehen
The concept of Verstehen has a complex history. There is
no precise and universally agreed content of the concept.
Rather, the content tends to emerge from uses that are
made of the concept.8 But the general idea is that a
historian and her readers achieve Verstehen when they
achieve a humane understanding that is of a broadly
empathetic nature.
An account that confers Verstehen will connect events,
states of affairs, actions and ways of life in such a way
as to make sense of the actions and ways of life. It can
make that sense when the historian and her readers see
the people involved in the light we set out in section 3.1.1.
Then the historian and her readers will see agents as having
been motivated by certain considerations, where those
considerations could also have motivated them to do the
same things, and they will see the people studied as having
been able to feel comfortable in certain habitual behaviour
for certain reasons, where those reasons might also have
allowed them to feel comfortable in the same behaviour.
(As before, there is no requirement for the historian or
her readers to be conscious that the considerations or the
reasons might have worked for them too. And as before,
limited hypothetical modifications of the historian and her
readers are permitted.)
We should however not read back into our earlier remarks
details of what Verstehen involves that some authors have
proposed. For example, some authors propose reading the
minds of the people studied.9 But nothing in what we have
8 A concise indication of the complexities involved is given by
Scholz, “Verstehen”.
9 For a form of mind-reading see Detel, Geist und Verstehen:
Historische Grundlagen einer modernen Hermeneutik, section 8.1.
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said requires that it be appropriate to see the historian as
doing that, although we have not excluded mind-reading
either.
3.2.2 Erklären and Verstehen
We have not defined Verstehen. It is hard to do more than
indicate its nature. But we can fill out the concept by saying
something about the traditional contrast between Erklären
and Verstehen.
Erklären and Verstehen are two things that an account of
some phenomenon may offer. The customary translations
of “Erklären” and “Verstehen” are “explanation” and
“understanding” respectively. We shall however use the
German words, both so as not to import assumptions
through the act of translation and so as to keep the English
words available for more general use.
Erklären is the usual goal of the natural sciences, although
it may also be available in other disciplines. An account
that offers Erklären will typically explain a phenomenon
by reference to regularities and reliable mechanisms that
are found in the world. Such accounts often invoke, or at
least implicitly rely on, laws of nature in order to make
good the claims that regularities exist or that mechanisms
will reliably function in the ways that are needed for the
accounts to be explanatory. (Mechanisms may be regarded
as reliable when they would work as advertised and lead
to the advertised results on a high proportion of occasions
on which the initial conditions for them to operate were
satisfied.)
Writing such an account tends to involve a detached
consideration of phenomena, describing and analysing them
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as objectively as possible. The human nature of those who
write or read the explanations tends to be irrelevant, even
when human beings are the objects of study (for example,
in a study of human biology).
Accounts that offer Verstehen, on the other hand, are
conspicuous in the humanities and the social sciences,
disciplines in which accounts make sense of human ways of
life or conduct. The consideration of phenomena is not so
detached, and the human nature of the writers and readers
of accounts is important.
Accounts that are given in reliance on their authors seeing
the people studied in the way we set out in section 3.1.1 can
easily be given in the absence of the well-defined regularities
in the operation of the world that are generally needed
to provide Erklären. A shared grasp of what it is to have
certain characteristics and desires, and what it is to choose
what to do, adds a richness of unstated detail which makes
up for the absence of well-defined regularities.
It is possible for a historical account to offer Erklären or
something close to it, while its success in doing so still
depends on a broadly empathetic grasp of human nature
of the kind that is more normally the route to Verstehen.
This can happen when the acceptability of a claim that a
reliable mechanism was at work depends on such a grasp of
human nature.
Consider for example an account of the Industrial Revolu-
tion that sets out mechanisms of innovation and investment,
and then shows how their efficacy was underpinned by
levels of trust and standards of conduct that allowed
people to work together on substantial enterprises and have
confidence that their businesses would not be taken from
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them dishonestly.10 Readers will grasp empathetically how
trust and standards of conduct played vital roles, because
they are central to so many human interactions and their
absence unnerves people directly.
Another example is provided by an explanation of the
economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s which is given
partly in terms of institutional arrangements that offered
fixed exchange rates, thereby making it easier to make long-
term investments in fixed capital rather than hold capital
in more liquid form.11 A common human nature allows us
to see that this part of the explanation makes sense. It is
human nature to take such precautions as appear to be
necessary, and then to take opportunities to make money
when risks have been reduced by institutions. But the
substance of the explanation falls squarely within technical
economics, rather than psychology. (It should however be
noted that this is only part of the explanation offered. Other
parts, for example those that set out the attitudes of the
leaders of trades unions and the reasons for those attitudes,
succeed in making sense of the past primarily by exploiting
a common human nature.12)
Additional examples may be found in comparative-historical
analysis.13 This field is largely populated by social and
political scientists rather than historians, but there are
examples in which the aim is to make sense of specific
historical events rather than establish general principles.
Thus a study of how institutions of central and local
10 Mokyr, “The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution”.
Mokyr sets out the importance of trust and standards of conduct in
section 2.3.
11 Marglin, “Lessons of the Golden Age: An Overview”, section 1.3.
12 Marglin, “Lessons of the Golden Age: An Overview”, sections
1.1 and 1.2.
13 For a survey of this type of work see Mahoney and Thelen (eds.),
Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis.
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government developed in the early modern period examines
both the backgrounds against which institutions developed
and interactions between institutions.14 Interactions are
described at the institutional level rather than as acts
of individuals working within the institutions. This holds
out the promise of identifying mechanisms which would
not need to be seen as dependent for their operation on
the idiosyncrasies of individuals. Evidence to support such
accounts must of course make reference to what individuals
did, in order to show how institutions actually had their
claimed effects. And it will be an empathetic grasp of human
beings that will allow accounts of what individuals did to
be seen as plausible independently of the fact that those
accounts contribute to accounts of institutional change.
But there may be a degree of abstraction from identified
individuals, in that claims may be made about the conduct
of holders of particular offices or types of office generally.
Such abstraction will move accounts a little closer to giving
Erklären.
Mechanisms set out in historical accounts are likely to be
loose ones. As we noted in section 2.5.2, there is a shortage
of laws of nature, and indeed of regularities that might be
comparable to laws of nature, which characterize the world
in terms that are normally used when studying human
individuals and societies. This shortage makes it hard to
have confidence that any identified mechanisms would be
reliable ones. So while it might be possible for a description
of a situation, processes and some conduct both to be
couched in human terms and to amount to the description
of a mechanism which led to the conduct, it would not
usually be appropriate to see it as describing a mechanism
that would be of general application, whether actually (if
the initial conditions for its operation actually recurred)
14 Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe.
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or hypothetically (if we must imagine those conditions
recurring). We shall give an example of the potential for
mechanisms not to be of general application in section
4.1.3.4.
3.3 Concerns about claims
Concerns may be raised about claims that are made
following work in the ways outlined in chapter 2, or while
viewing the people studied in the way indicated in section
3.1.1. In this section, we shall consider some concerns.
3.3.1 Direct seeing
We need to consider whether reliance on seeing directly
that certain facts were motives for actions or reasons to feel
comfortable in certain habitual behaviour might undermine
historical claims. After all, the process of seeing directly is
not open to checking in the way that reports of primary
sources are open to checking.
In fact, direct seeing’s playing a role in the process of
making sense of the past need not undermine the claims
made at the end of that process. The nature of the claims
would provide some defence against undermining, because
a claim that some given circumstance motivated a given
action, or was a reason why people found some habitual
behaviour comfortable, would state a purported fact. It
would not indicate an internal sensation of the person
making the claim. So even when direct seeing is a route
to claims, it is not an element in those claims. Moreover,
the fact that direct seeing is a tool of limited capacity and
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application would not count against the claims made, any
more than the fact that we rely on specific sensory tools
which have their limits and to which there are conceivable
alternatives undermines statements of information we have
acquired through the use of our senses. A tool may be
effective even if it has limited capacities or there are
alternatives. We do not deny that the exploitation of specific
humanistic resources may sometimes lead us astray. We are
indeed about to consider, in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, some
ways in which things may go wrong. But we can say that
the mere involvement of direct seeing in the exploitation of
humanistic resources does not undermine the claims made.
We should also note that there is no loss of the identity of
the historian or her readers. They all remain well aware that
they are distinct from the people studied. This preserves a
distance which facilitates critical thought. We may draw a
parallel with the point made by Peter Goldie that when the
task is to understand another person, it can be important
to keep one’s own position separate from that of the person
who is to be understood.15
3.3.2 Mistakes about normative
attitudes and dispositions
Another concern about historical claims might arise out
of the fact that normative attitudes and dispositions of
historical figures may have played a vital role in connecting
those figures’ circumstances to their conduct, in particular
by determining which elements in their circumstances op-
erated as motives. This significance of normative attitudes
and dispositions means that historians and their readers
15 Goldie, “Dramatic Irony, Narrative, and the External Perspect-
ive”.
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must often have a reasonably accurate, even if often only
implicit, grasp of those attitudes and dispositions if they
are to make sense of historical figures’ conduct in a way
that represents the figures without distortion.
The uncritical exploitation of current folk psychology and
thick concepts implies an assumption that the relevant
attitudes and dispositions were pretty much the same as
they are at the time when the historian writes. That
assumption could be mistaken. If it were mistaken, there
would be a risk of claiming connections between events,
states of affairs, actions and ways of life which should not
be claimed. The danger would be all the greater because
the nature of the error would automatically make the
claims plausible, both to their author and to her readers.
They would be plausible precisely because they would be
supported by current folk psychology and thick concepts.
The possibility of this kind of mistake need not however
undermine historical claims, so long as appropriate precau-
tions are taken. Careful work on recorded conduct, written
sources and material remains can allow historians to get a
reasonable idea of normative attitudes and dispositions that
prevailed in the past.16 If such work is carried out, the risk
is greatly reduced.
3.3.3 Adjustments for different societies
We have just noted the risk of making mistakes about
normative attitudes and dispositions. More generally, it
may be necessary to make adjustments to current folk
psychology and thick concepts for different times and
16 For an example see Hölkeskamp, Reconstructing the Roman Re-
public: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research, especially
chapters 4 and 5.
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places. (The expression “the adjustment of thick concepts”
will cover both adjustment of the whole set of concepts in
use by adding or removing concepts, and adjustment of the
contents of individual concepts.)
Any such adjustments need to be controlled. In this section
we shall say something about the need for adjustment, the
danger of inappropriate adjustment, and how adjustments
may be controlled.
Our attention is here limited to folk psychology and thick
concepts, and does not range over the other humanistic
resources. As regards social conventions, it may very well
be necessary to recognize conventions then no longer exist,
but they are likely to be well-evidenced. Any challenging
adjustments would be adjustments to folk psychology or
thick concepts which had to be made in order to see how
the conventions might have had a hold on people (assuming
that they were not imposed with threats of punishment
for non-observance). As regards narrative practice and
social abilities, their contents are either parallel to folk-
psychological principles or too ill-specified to make it easy
even to identify changes that are less than drastic.
3.3.3.1 The need for adjustment
We are well aware that people in the past differed from
us in various ways. We may even be getting close to
a neurological understanding of certain types of cultural
difference, although such work is in its early stages.17
17 Immordino-Yang, “Studying the Effects of Culture by Integrat-
ing Neuroscientific With Ethnographic Approaches”. For the whole
field of neural correlates of affects see Armony and Vuilleumier (eds.),
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience.
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It would be too quick for historians to refrain from
exploiting humanistic resources in order to write accounts
merely because they did not think that they themselves, as
they actually were, would have been at all likely to have
responded to circumstances in the ways that the people
studied responded. It is important to allow for differences,
particularly differences between what people valued or
found unacceptable in the past and what they value or find
unacceptable now. If appropriate adjustments to current
folk psychology and thick concepts are made, it may turn
out to be perfectly possible to exploit humanistic resources
and still write good accounts.
We set out a wide but limited scope to adjustments to the
mentalities of historians in section 3.1. There we spoke of
the people studied being seen as having been motivated to
act in certain ways by specific considerations that could
have motivated the historian, or as having been able to feel
comfortable in certain habitual behaviour for reasons that
might also have allowed the historian to feel comfortable.
As we noted there, we let “could” and “might” allow for the
historian to have been different from her actual self in ways
she could imagine from the inside.
The adjustments to folk psychology and thick concepts
we have in mind here are ones that would, if imagined
by a historian as being made for the purposes of her
own life, amount to changes to her own mentality within
this scope. (We emphasize again that this procedure of
hypothetical imagination does not require the historian to
stand in the shoes of people studied. She need not actually
adjust her own mentality, even temporarily and purely
for the purposes of her research.) Wider adjustments may
sometimes be appropriate, for example to deal with extreme
cases of the type we mentioned in section 3.1.3, and we
do not rule them out. But such wider adjustments would
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move the historian away from the conduct of historical work
through the exploitation of humanistic resources supported
by the existence of a largely common human nature.
We can illustrate the process of adjustment within the limits
we have set out by reference to two examples in which
historians have drawn attention to ways of thought that
are no longer current in order to help make sense of the
past.
Our first example is this. It has been argued that in order
to understand how the Roman Empire worked despite the
limits of straightforward coercive force, we must recognize
the significance of the fact that Romans responded to
the demands of honour, both as possessors of it and
by respecting it, in ways in which we would no longer
respond.18 The idea that honour is to be valued has not
disappeared from our thought. But the idea is much weaker
now than it was in the past, and ideas of what might be
required to defend one’s honour have changed considerably.
Thus the current thick concept of honour, and the folk-
psychological principles that it captures, need adjustment
in order to see how honour could have played a key role in
the functioning of the Roman Empire.
Our second example is this. An understanding of some
medieval ideas of who counted as foreign and of what it
meant for someone to be a foreigner can help to make sense
of attitudes to heretics and people of other religions.19 In
order to make sense of the past in the way proposed, we
must adjust the thick concept of foreignness and the folk-
psychological principles that it captures.
18 Lendon, Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the
Roman World.
19 Connell, “Foreigners and Fear”, sections A and B.
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3.3.3.2 The danger of inappropriate adjustment
The need for adjustment gives rise to a concern. If we were
to allow uncontrolled adjustment or non-adjustment, all
sorts of poor accounts might come to look like good ones. A
historian might accidentally suppose a way of thought that
was not in fact close to the way in which the people studied
thought, but that made it easy to write accounts that were
plausible because everything seemed to fit together well.
One risk is that a historian might start from her own folk
psychology or set of thick concepts but fail to tweak them
in the right ways or to the right extent. Another risk is that
she might suppose some fresh folk-psychological principles
or thick concepts, believing them to be appropriate when
they were not.
In relation to thick concepts, the difficulty of adjustment
is evidenced by the fact that anthropologists need to
take great care when identifying and giving content to
concepts that would be appropriate to an emic approach, an
approach that sought to reflect the ways of thought of the
people studied.20 There is also a risk that modern languages
may not have the words to indicate concisely and accurately
the contents of some concepts, contents that were perfectly
clear to the people studied, so that historians may either
misrepresent the contents or mistakenly conclude that they
20 For the emic approach, and the contrasting etic approach that
seeks to identify and give content to cross-cultural concepts, see
Barnard, “Emic and Etic”; Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis
and Sam, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications, third
edition, pages 23-24. The latter text notes the benefit of using a careful
iterative approach. For difficulties in making use of concepts that
would be appropriate to an etic approach and in grasping concepts
that would be appropriate to an emic approach see Helfrich, “Beyond
the Dilemma of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Resolving the Tension
between Etic and Emic Approaches”, pages 133-138.
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were more or less indeterminate.21 A further risk arises in
connection with concepts that the people studied used but
that suffered from incoherence. Historians may deny the
incoherence in the interests of doing supposed justice to
the people studied, and may thereby misunderstand both
the concepts and the culture.22
Such concerns should not drive us to regard the task of
adjustment as impossible. There is always a risk of error,
but the incidence and the magnitude of errors may be
reduced to tolerable levels. We shall now consider ways in
which reductions may be achieved.
3.3.3.3 A rule against ad hoc adjustment
One control over adjustments is to observe a rule that they
should not be ad hoc. They should be supported by evidence
from beyond the current account.
For example, when Richard W. Kaeuper wished to make
sense of some patterns of violence in the high middle
ages by drawing attention to how knightly status was
heavily invested with the meaning of prowess in combat, he
undertook a detailed study of texts that set out the deeds
of both real and fictional characters in order to support
the argument that knightly status was so invested.23 Thus
21 For an example in relation to the interpretation of texts see
the discussion in Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding
Method, pages 48-49, of the concept of virtù as used by Machiavelli
and his contemporaries.
22 Gellner, “Concepts and Society”, sections 15 to 17.
23 Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe. Chapter 7
sets out the association with prowess, and Kaeuper makes the case
that there was a strong association in real life as well as in literature
from page 139 onward.
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attribution of the appropriate content of the thick concept
of knightly status was not ad hoc.
3.3.3.4 The study of concepts
Adjustments can also be controlled by making a careful
study of the history of concepts, based on the interrogation
of evidence. Such a study can expose areas of risk and
can help to bridge the gap between past and present.24
Moreover, if a historian can get the contents of thick
concepts right, that should also encourage appropriate
adjustments to folk psychology and deter inappropriate
ones. A folk psychology will only be appropriate if it fits
well with the contents of the thick concepts in use at the
time and place studied.
Cultural history is of particular interest here.25 The
very fact that cultures and mentalities can be studied
systematically, allowing good historical work to be sorted
from bad, gives reassurance that it is possible to understand
past mentalities well enough to support the making of
appropriate adjustments to current folk psychology and
thick concepts. Error is not ruled out, but there is scope
to reduce both the number and the magnitude of errors
made.
24 Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte”, especially
section 3, “Zur Theorie der Begriffsgeschichte und der Sozialgeschich-
te”, translated as “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”, especially
the final section, “On the Theory of Begriffsgeschichte and of Social
History”; Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts: A
Critical Introduction.




We said in section 1.3 that for a claim to be respectable
there must be evidence that can be interpreted in a
reasonable way to support it and no weighty evidence that
definitely speaks against it, and that in addition the claim
must cohere with the account within which it is made, that
account must be internally coherent, both the claim and
the account must cohere with the background supplied by
other accounts, and claims which provide support that the
claim needs in order to be respectable must themselves
be respectable. In this chapter, we shall say more about
respectability.
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4.1 The need for the standard
4.1.1 The disciplining of claims
The standard of respectability is intended to apply to
the claims that interest us. The standard should impose
discipline on the making of claims and give guidance as
to which claims should be regarded as reasonable following
debate among historians. Historians might not think out
loud in epistemological terms, but one may expect claims
that are broadly accepted by serious historians to qualify
as respectable, and claims that are generally rejected by
them not to qualify as respectable. Some but not all of the
claims in the middle ground, accepted by some historians
but rejected by others, may qualify as respectable.
It might be thought that the standard of justification would
suffice. We could simply say that claims should be made,
and should be allowed to stand following debate, if and
only if they were justified in the sense that regarding
them as correct could not sensibly be argued to carry a
significant risk of error. But when we look at the claims that
interest us, we find that this would not suffice because some
important claims are contestable and cannot be regarded as
justified.
These contestable claims could usefully be brought within
the scope of a standard of respectability for the sake of the
discipline it would impose on the making of claims. Some
contestable claims would meet the standard, but others
would fail it. The fact that any contestable claim would
be supported by some reason to make it would not suffice.
The standard would determine whether the reasons to make
it were good enough for it to be reasonable to make the
claim. The standard of justification, on the other hand,
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would not be so discriminating. Its use would simply lead to
the rejection of contestable claims for failure to meet that
high standard.
4.1.2 Evidence of the need
Evidence that it is worth introducing a new standard,
more relaxed than that of justification but not too relaxed,
can be found in the fact that disagreement over how to
interpret given sequences of events or given periods in
history is widespread. There are published collections of
disagreements.1 And some fields, such as the historiography
of the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries in Britain, are a rich source of
examples.2
If we look at such examples, the impression given is that the
claims in question would generally not count as justified by
traditional epistemic standards. Certainly it would be very
hard to accept that rival claims on the same point were all
justified. And yet rival claims on a given point can all be
reasonable ones to make, and to put to work in conducting
further research. Historians who reject a claim may still
recognize that it is not an outlandish claim. At the same
time, they would not allow that all claims made by serious
historians were reasonable. There is therefore a role for our
proposed new standard.
1 One example is Lamont (ed.), Historical Controversies and
Historians.
2 There is an overview of the historiography, published in 2010, in
Griffin, A Short History of the British Industrial Revolution, chapter
1. There is a more detailed account of the debates of recent decades,
published in 1999, in Mokyr (ed.), The British Industrial Revolution:
An Economic Perspective, chapter 1 (the introductory chapter by Joel
Mokyr).
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4.1.3 Why some claims are contestable
In chapters 2 and 3, we painted a picture of historical
writing as the result of a process that is disciplined but also
flexible and far from scientific. This makes it unsurprising
that there are plenty of contestable claims. Now we shall
consider some more specific reasons why claims may be
contestable.
4.1.3.1 Alternative interpretations of evidence
There can be scope to interpret evidence in different
ways. Different claims can appear to be supported under
different interpretations. The risk of this happening is
particularly great in relation to the claims that interest
us, claims that do not merely give basic information
but relate pieces of information to one another in order
to make sense of the past. The links from evidence to
such claims are complex, and each claim will typically be
supported by a range of pieces of evidence. This gives
scope for interpretation to have a proportionately greater
influence, and straightforward reporting of evidence to have
a proportionately lesser influence, than with claims that are
supported by single pieces of evidence.
The existence of claims that offer different views of the
same topic is not necessarily a problem. Claims may
be complementary, rather than conflicting. But a given
interpretation of pieces of evidence may leave some claims
without much support. When there is scope for support to
be lost in that way, claims may be open to being contested
by historians who would favour interpretations of evidence
that would lead to the loss of support. The same problem
would arise when claims actually conflicted, but with the
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added twist that questions of interpretation would have to
be settled for any of the conflicting claims to be safe from
contest. So long as questions of interpretation were not
settled, the claims would all remain in play. Each of them
would then be exposed to the risk that a good case might
be made for a conflicting claim. (Conflict may amount to
logical contradiction or some milder clash that is still serious
enough to make the joint assertion of two or more claims
come across as making no sense.)
We shall now look at some ways in which interpretations of
evidence can vary.
4.1.3.1.1 Pieces of evidence
Much historical evidence comes in the form of documents.
These are sometimes open to different interpretations, and
alternative interpretations may support different claims. An
example is disagreement over the significance of the right
to bear arms in the Declaration of Rights (later the Bill of
Rights) put forward by the English Parliament in 1689. It
might be claimed that the document had been designed
to confer an individual right on people in general with
the expressed restrictions not meant to be of significance,
or alternatively that it had been designed to control the
ownership of guns in the interests of the upper classes.3
When evidence is in the form of physical artefacts, there
can also be scope to interpret it in different ways. Again,
different interpretations may support different claims. An
example is a reassessment of developments in Roman
architecture in the second century AD. Its author argues
3 Schwoerer, “To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective”.
The two interpretations noted here are set out on pages 28 and 48
respectively.
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that rather than a revolution in building methods, there
was evolution based on expertise that had been developed
over a long period.4
4.1.3.1.2 The influence of an overall approach
Not only can pieces of evidence be interpreted in different
ways one at a time. Historians can also approach the periods
they study from different perspectives, and can interpret
whole bodies of evidence accordingly. Then they may see
different claims as supported, and are likely to contest some
claims that they do not see as supported.
Marxism is the most obvious example of an overall approach
that can influence the interpretation of whole bodies of
evidence. The tradition is too varied to allow an easy
summary of the main biases introduced, but expressions
of concern are not hard to find. One author has pointed
out the dangers of historians under the influence of Marxist
thought concentrating too much on working-class culture.5
Another has set out the perils of a Marxist approach when
tackling the history of hangings in London in the eighteenth
century.6 And a third author has set out how historians
working under a Marxist regime took a particular and
inadequate view of a rebellion in the ninth century.7
Marxism is however not the only approach that can
4 Mark, “Reinterpreting Ancient Roman Structure”.
5 Bercuson, “Through the Looking Glass of Culture: An Essay
on the New Labour History and Working-Class Culture in Recent
Canadian Historical Writing”.
6 Reid, “Tyburn, Thanatos, and Marxist Historiography: The Case
of the London Hanged”.
7 Goldberg, “Popular Revolt, Dynastic Politics, and Aristocratic




influence the interpretation of whole bodies of evidence. It
has for example been argued that a particular view of the
rise of the state in early modern times has supported a view
that the urge to violence was steadily tamed by the state,
and that this latter view does not stand up to a thorough
analysis of the evidence.8
The possibility that an approach may influence the view
taken of a body of evidence as a whole raises a particular
concern. When pieces of evidence are interpreted one at
a time, without interpretation being heavily influenced by
some overall approach, historians may well be open to
the arguments of other historians that various interpret-
ations should be considered. They may then recognize the
relativity to their own interpretations of their individual
verdicts on claims, and may be appropriately reluctant to
dismiss other verdicts on the same claims. But when an
overall approach guides a historian’s interpretation of a
large proportion of the evidence, she is likely to build a
whole coherent picture of the period studied that is shot
through with her interpretation, and to view any further
evidence that comes to her notice accordingly. Then it may
be hard for her to see that other interpretations sometimes
deserve open-minded consideration. And if a substantial
number of historians adopt the approach in question and
come to see themselves as constituting a whole school of
thought, they may happily become convinced that claims
which are in fact only supported given their approach are
simply justified independently of their approach. From the
perspective of such a school of thought, the suggestion that
claims were contestable might seem to be inappropriate.
But from the outside we would see that there was significant
scope to contest claims on reasonable grounds, since so
much depended on whether a particular approach to the
8 Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France, Introduc-
tion and Conclusion.
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past was appropriate.
4.1.3.2 Selection
There is often a large body of evidence available, so
historians must make their selections from it. It would not
be an option to give a single account that would make
use of all the evidence at once. Doing so would make it
impossible to give a coherent account that would convey
a clear message, whether the account was a narrative or
took some other form. The need to give a coherent account
forces the historian to select pieces of evidence that will
play roles in the account. Different selections may make
different claims appear to be supported and not undermined
by evidence. Then the claims that are only supported
and not undermined given certain selections may well be
contestable.
It is the absence of undermining that is most significant
here. As we noted in section 4.1.3.1, it is not necessarily
problematic if different but non-conflicting claims are
supported under different interpretations of evidence. They
may even all be justified so long as they all enjoy enough
support under all reasonable interpretations of the evidence.
But if a historian has not taken account of all of the
available evidence, other historians who regard some claims
made as dubious may look for, and perhaps find, evidence
that undermines those claims.
It might be thought that this would not be a problem. The
pieces of evidence not used would merely be checked to
make sure that they did not count against claims made.
This would not however be enough. A historian may be able
to review all the evidence briefly, but she will not have time
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to develop all of its implications. Some challenges to her
account might only emerge if some non-obvious implications
were developed. In particular, a lot of development might be
required to identify alternative interpretations of the past
that were worth considering. Some interpretations might
leave some claims looking decidedly inappropriate.
We also have no reason to think that selection would
be neutral, a kind of random sampling that would allow
accounts to be tested fairly by reference to the selected
evidence. Sometimes a neutral sampling procedure would
be practical. There might for example be a large collection
of legal documents of the same type, such as transfers of
land. But very often this would not be so. Pieces of evidence
are often of diverse types. Then the idea of a single random
sample from the whole body of evidence would not make
sense, and a complete set of random samples from all of the
groups of pieces of evidence of the various types would be
too time-consuming to obtain.
Even leaving such difficulties aside, selection would often
not be neutral because selection is closely entwined with
interpretation. The pieces of evidence that are used create
a particular view of the past. Once the process of inter-
pretation has started, there may well be a snowball effect.
As available evidence is reviewed, items may be chosen for
use precisely because they fit well with an interpretation
that has been developed already. Then evidence which
would undermine that interpretation, and would thereby
undermine some of the claims that depended for their
support on the chosen interpretation, is likely to be ignored.
The concern is all the greater when selection has from the
start been governed by an overall approach. This was for
example a concern about the work of Christopher Hill. It
was alleged that he could find what he needed to support
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his interpretation of seventeenth-century England simply
because there was so much evidence from which to choose.9
4.1.3.3 Imprecise terms
Another reason why claims that interest us may be contest-
able is this. Terms used are not always sufficiently precise to
allow evidence to be used to refute the contradictories of the
claims made. If for example it is claimed that a particular
country was the dominant power in a region (where this is
not immediately obvious from size and military strength),
or that certain events were the main causes of other events
(again, where this is not immediately obvious), it may well
not be clear how to assess dominance, or significance in
causation, in such a way as to be able to show from evidence
that it would not be plausible to claim that the country was
not the dominant power, or that the events were not the
main causes.
4.1.3.4 Claims that one thing led to another
Many of the claims that interest us set out how one thing
led to another. There are some difficulties that are specific
to claims of this type.
Manifestly causal claims are of this type. So are other claims
in which the state of affairs and events at one time are
described in order to make sense of how things were and
what happened at a later time, without explicit assertions
of causation being made.
9 Hexter, “The Burden of Proof. Christopher Hill: Change and
Continuity in Seventeenth Century England”. Hexter’s attack on Hill
has however been criticized in turn: Palmer, “The Burden of Proof:
J. H. Hexter and Christopher Hill”.
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Historians may well disagree as to whether a given body
of evidence is enough to show that a claim of this type
is correct. The disagreement is likely to make the claim
contestable. We can get an idea of the sources of difficulty
by looking at some examples.
Our first example concerns serfdom. A perfectly plausible
mechanism for the development of serfdom has been set
out, but it is frankly acknowledged not to do its work in
making sense of the existence of serfdom without reference
to exogenous factors, nor to apply everywhere it might
have been expected to apply.10 Imprecision as to the
details of a mechanism, its failure to apply everywhere
it might have been expected to apply, and the need to
refer to exogenous factors can all make it hard to test a
proposed mechanism’s sufficiency in a specific case, and
therefore to reach agreement on a claim that connections
between circumstances and events in that case were indeed
those of the mechanism. (Strictly speaking, sufficiency
would not be enough to show that connections were
those of the mechanism, because some other mechanism
might also have been in play. But mechanisms are thin
enough on the ground in history that a conclusion that a
sufficient mechanism was the actual mechanism will often
be reasonable.)
A second example illustrates how obstacles to reaching
agreement on how circumstances and events were connected
can arise both out of gaps in the evidence and out of the
10 Domar, “The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis”.
An exogenous political factor is mentioned on page 21. A case in
which the hypothesized mechanism does not seem to have operated
as might have been expected is set out on pages 28-30. And while
elaborations of the proposal by others, for example Rosa, “The Causes
of Serfdom: Domar’s Puzzle Revisited”, may help, they still leave us
with something which is far from having the firmness that is common
in mechanisms that are set out in the natural sciences.
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scope to interpret evidence in different ways. This example
is given by debates over what lay behind the Viking raids in
the decades around 800 AD and later Viking expansion.11
A third example is given by debates over the origins of
the Thirty Years War. Different background understandings
of the history of preceding decades and even centuries,
and different views of what mattered to people and how
they made their decisions, have encouraged different causal
analyses.12
We should not be surprised that agreement is often hard
to reach. The human world is complex, and events that
attract the attention of historians are often multi-faceted.
Beyond general complexity, there are specific difficulties
that stand in the way of substantiating claims of causation
by reference to patterns in data, even when numerical data
are available.13 Moreover, while techniques such as process
tracing can be useful ways to discipline reasoning even when
numerical data are not available, they still do not serve to
resolve all disputes. This is at least partly because they
rely on the availability of the right kind of evidence to
discriminate between hypotheses.14
11 Barrett, “What Caused the Viking Age?”
12 Wilson, “The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48”.
13 For these difficulties see Franzese, “Multicausality, Context-
Conditionality, and Endogeneity”.
14 For process tracing see Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal
Inference” (the need for the right kind of evidence is noted in the






4.2.1 The maintenance of discipline
We want a standard of respectability that can be used to
mark claims as acceptable to make without any requirement
for them to be justified in the sense that it would not
sensibly be arguable that regarding the claims as correct
carried a significant risk of error. But we must not move
away from ideals of rationality, or from the view that some
claims are in better standing than others. There are two
reasons why we must not do so.
The first reason is that if we were to move away from those
ideals and that view, we would lose touch with a sense
of working under the discipline of the external world and
striving to get things right rather than wrong. That would
mean giving up both an important source of motivation and
a vital regulatory constraint.15
The second reason is that we want our concept of
respectability to yield appropriate judgements when the
relevant claims or their contradictories are non-contestable.
Whatever concept of respectability we use should apply
in such a way that the great majority of non-contestable
claims are classified as respectable and the great majority
of contradictories of non-contestable claims are classified
15 For a comparable role for the concept of truth see Price, “Truth
as Convenient Friction”. Price takes the view that the norm of truth is
a vital constraint on what people say, and that norms such as those of
justification would not do just as well. He might therefore be suspicious
of our use of the standard of respectability. But we shall leave it open
to historians to aspire to make correct claims even when the claims
they manage to make are contestable.
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as not respectable. This would require the classification of
claims as respectable or as not respectable in a disciplined
manner that was governed by ideals of rationality. Any
undisciplined approach would have little or no prospect of
achieving the desired result for non-contestable claims and
their contradictories.
There is an assumption here that our standard of respect-
ability should be used to test all claims. This is however
appropriate. It would be decidedly odd to prevent the
approval of claims as respectable merely because their
qualities made them non-contestable.
4.2.2 The requirements
We shall say that a claim is respectable if and only if it
meets all of the following requirements.
1. The claim has strong support from at least some of
the evidence, under some reasonable interpretation
of that evidence and making reasonable inferences.
This will allow the claim to be supported in a
foundationalist way.
2. There is no weighty evidence that definitely speaks
against the claim.
3. The claim coheres with the account within which it is
made, that account is internally coherent, and both
the claim and the account cohere with the background
supplied by other accounts. If this requirement is
met, that will allow the claim to be supported in a
coherentist way.
4. Any claims which provide support that the claim
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needs in order to be respectable are themselves
respectable.
4.2.2.1 The first requirement: evidence in support
With regard to the first requirement, claims need not be
implied by evidence as a matter of logic. That would be too
demanding in history, or indeed elsewhere in the humanities
and the social sciences, for two reasons that are related to
each other.
The first reason is that claims, whether descriptions of
pieces of evidence or other claims, can only be placed in
patterns of logical inference that are truly secure if either
the claims are very precise or the range of possibilities
encompassed by an antecedent is so much broader than
the range encompassed by a supposed consequent that not-
withstanding lack of precision, correctness of the antecedent
is bound to require correctness of the consequent. Many
claims will not be precise enough, and there will often not
be a sufficiently broad-to-narrow relationship.
The second reason is that there would often be scope
to block a logical inference by identifying some special
circumstance which was not ruled out by the evidence and
which, if it obtained, would mean that a consequent did not
follow inevitably from its antecedent.
These two considerations will often prevent the construction
of extended patterns of logical inference, because it will
often not be long before one reaches some point at which a
logically watertight link cannot be made.
A looser standard of implication must therefore be adopted.
But that is not problematic for historians. They have a
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perfectly good sense of when it is appropriate to say that
evidence interpreted in a particular way strongly supports
a claim.
The first requirement only permits reasonable interpreta-
tions of evidence and reasonable inferences. Interpretations
and inferences which were based on principles that other
historians would not put to work in the study of any
events or periods of history would be excluded. Thus claims
that would only be made by people such as conspiracy
theorists would not qualify as respectable. The application
of tests of reasonableness will inevitably require judgement
rather than the purely mechanical application of rules,
even a complex set of rules, and there are likely to be
borderline cases. But it should usually be practical to reach
a widespread consensus, even if unanimity is out of reach.
The requirements of reasonableness are not merely restrict-
ive. They also give permission to interpret evidence and
make inferences in more than one way. Some reasonable
interpretations and inferences might lead to the view that
certain evidence supported a given claim, while others did
not do so. Those who did not see evidence as supporting a
claim might refuse to make the claim, or might even make
some claim that contradicted it. But they could still see
the claim as meeting the first requirement, in that they
could see how one could reasonably interpret the evidence
and make inferences in ways that would make the evidence
supportive. Thus disagreement on respectability should be
rarer than disagreement on which claims to make. And
claims made by revisionist historians who abide by scholarly
norms are not debarred from respectability.
Finally, the first requirement refers to strong support. This
is to be read as requiring not merely a decent weight of
evidence, but also any specific items of supporting evidence
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that the claim requires. If some crucial piece of evidence is
unavailable, a claim will fail the first requirement even if
there is a lot of other evidence for it.
4.2.2.2 The second requirement: a lack of
contrary evidence
The second requirement concerns only evidence that def-
initely speaks against a claim. The exclusion of evidence
that would only debatably speak against a claim is
motivated by a desire to allow for disagreement among
historians as to whether evidence really does speak against
a claim, disagreement which may well reflect different
interpretations of evidence.
Evidence should be regarded as definitely speaking against
a claim if the only way to prevent its doing so would be
to adopt an unreasonable interpretation of it, or to reject
normal rules of inference in order to block the derivation
of an argument against the claim. Fantasists who seek
to ensure that evidence does not demolish their strange
theories need to rely on unreasonable interpretations or on
refusal to make inferences that are permitted by normal
rules.
Finally, the second requirement is not that there should be
no evidence that definitely speaks against a claim, only that
there should not be weighty evidence.
104
4.2 Requirements for respectability
4.2.2.3 The third requirement: coherence
4.2.2.3.1 Claims, accounts and backgrounds
Under the third requirement a claim must cohere with the
account within which it is made, and that account must be
internally coherent.
Both the claim and its account must in turn cohere with
the background supplied by other accounts. These include
both accounts of related historical periods or events, and
accounts of different sorts that cover the same period or
events as the account in question (such as an account of
the economic situation, when the account in question is of
political events).
In addition to background accounts like these that sup-
ply historical detail, there are background accounts that
supply general principles. These include accounts of folk
psychology and economic theory. What we say about
background accounts in relation to the third requirement is
intended to encompass background accounts of this nature,
as well as background accounts that supply historical detail.
Background accounts that supply general principles will
however only play a prominent role in our discussion in
sections 4.3.3, 5.2.4.2 and 5.2.5.
We shall speak of an account’s or a claim’s background,
meaning the whole of the background supplied in this way.
We shall also speak of parts of a background, meaning the
parts that are supplied by particular accounts.
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4.2.2.3.2 Engagement and conflict
The third requirement is meant in both a positive and
a negative sense. Claims must engage with at least some
other claims in their accounts, and they must not conflict
with other claims in their accounts or in any background
accounts. Accounts must show a degree of internal unity,
rather than merely being made up of claims that do not
conflict with one another. (This internal unity will be
given by the engagement of a good proportion of claims
within an account with other claims in the same account.)
And accounts must engage with at least some background
accounts that supply historical detail, as well as not
conflicting with any background accounts. We shall however
not require specific claims of immediate interest to engage
directly with background accounts. Indirect engagement, by
virtue of their engaging with claims in their own accounts
and those accounts engaging with background accounts, will
suffice.
Engagement might involve inferential relationships between
claims. Then antecedent and consequent would engage with
one another. Or it might for example involve one claim’s
stating a causal connection, while other claims described
the putative causes and effects in ways that made the claim
of a connection credible. Then all of these claims would
engage with one another. Engagement will often show, or
contribute to showing, that events, states of affairs, actions
and ways of life had their origins, their interactions and
their consequences, a task we introduced in section 1.2.1.1
as making sense of the past.
An account will engage with another account through
claims in the former account engaging with claims in the
latter account. The claims that engage may or may not
include specific claims of immediate interest.
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Two claims conflict if they are inconsistent or if most
historians would think it would make no sense to make both
of the claims together. We adopt this definition of conflict
despite its imprecision because logical inconsistency is not
the only sign that something is amiss.
An account will conflict with another account if many
claims or significant claims in the former account conflict
with claims in the latter account. We here show a degree
of tolerance. The third requirement may be met even when
there are a few conflicts and they do not involve significant
claims. We do not however extend this tolerance to conflicts
within accounts. An account is under the control of its
author, and she should eliminate internal conflicts.
When conflict does appear, the response that is most likely
to be appropriate will be to amend or withdraw a claim or
an account. But sometimes the appropriate response will be
to eliminate the conflict by amending background accounts.
We shall say more about the notion of coherence in sections
5.2.2 and 5.2.3. And we shall discuss relationships such as
those between a claim of a causal connection and claims
that describe putative causes and effects in section 5.2.3.1,
under the general heading of positive relationships.
4.2.2.3.3 Nesting
The nesting of accounts, requiring a claim to cohere with
its own account and both the claim and that account to
cohere with the background supplied by other accounts,
deliberately allows for a degree of flexibility in the boundary
between a claim’s own account and other accounts.
If for example a claim about a particular event is made in
the context of an account of an extended period of time, it
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may be appropriate to see only the portion of the account
that relates to the event and the period immediately
surrounding it as the claim’s own account, and to see the
rest of the account as a background account. Any part of
a large account in which a claim plays a significant role
or which has some immediate bearing on the plausibility of
the claim should be included within the scope of the claim’s
own account, but further reaches of a large account may be
considered to supply background.
The reason for drawing a boundary between accounts in a
particular place will often be convenience of argument. It
is easier to see whether an individual claim coheres with a
reasonably narrow context than with a very wide context.
Then claims that fall at the first hurdle of coherence with
their own accounts can be detected quickly and alternative
claims can be given serious consideration. Given that a
claim that coheres with its own account must still be tested
for coherence with background accounts, and that whatever
the extent of a claim’s own account, engagement of that
account with background accounts must be established,
there should not be much scope to manipulate judgements
as to respectability by moving the boundaries between
accounts.
4.2.2.4 Failing the third requirement
Sometimes a claim will lose respectability by failing the
third requirement – although given the imprecise nature of
the notion of coherence, it may be debatable whether there
is sufficient lack of coherence.
An example of an argument which could be used to show
that a claim failed the third requirement is given by Jenny
Wormald’s discussion of whether the Casket Letters were
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forged. (“Forged” here means wholly or very substantially
forged, so that the letters should not have been used against
Mary Queen of Scots. Minor emendations would not count.)
In Wormald’s view, there was only one group of people
who would have had the opportunity to forge the letters.
Wormald argues that it would make no sense to think
of their having done so, given their other actions and
the people they would have had to fool.16 If Wormald’s
argument were accepted, then a claim that the letters were
forged would fail the third requirement because the claim
would not cohere with an account of the context, specifically
an account of the other conduct and the knowledge of the
people who might have produced or ordered forgeries. Such
an account of the context might be in the account within
which a claim that the letters were forged was made. But if
it were in another account, that account would clearly be a
relevant background account.
A claim that the letters were forged would be a straight-
forwardly factual claim. Correspondingly, Wormald’s aim is
to establish the fact that the letters were not forged. She
even dismisses the debate over whether they were forged
as unimportant in the wider context.17 But if we look
at John Guy’s account of enquiries into Mary’s conduct
that were made in the period from 1567 to 1569, we can
see that Wormald’s consideration of coherence has wider
implications.
Guy portrays those enquiries as being driven forward by
plotting by various parties to establish Mary’s guilt by
relying on letters that were in Guy’s view forgeries, and
16 Wormald, Mary Queen of Scots: a Study in Failure, page 186,
with the discussion running over pages 184-187 (in the 2017 edition;
pagination differs in earlier editions).
17 Wormald, Mary Queen of Scots: a Study in Failure, page 187 (in
the 2017 edition; pagination differs in earlier editions).
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despite the lack of any other clear evidence against her.18
If Wormald’s argument were to be accepted, Guy’s account
would unravel because it requires the letters to have been
forged, and on the basis of Wormald’s account a claim
of forgery would not cohere with the context. Then a
central claim which may be derived from Guy’s account,
the claim that Mary was treated unjustly on account of a
coincidence of the desires of Moray and Cecil to have her
seen as complicit in Darnley’s murder, could not be seen as
respectable unless some other support for it that did not
involve the claim of forgery were provided.
The example of the Casket Letters illustrates one way in
which claims that offer to make sense of the past can be
tested to see whether they meet the third requirement.
Straightforwardly factual claims that are presupposed by
claims that offer to make sense of the past, and that
therefore need to be in or be read into the same accounts as
the sense-making claims, can be assessed for their coherence
with background accounts. Argument via straightforwardly
factual claims has the advantage that it is likely to be
well-controlled. The need to identify specific purported
facts, which can be set out in uncontentious ways even if
their status as facts is disputed, holds out that promise.
There may also be scope to conduct an entire argument
as to coherence at some more abstract level where claims
that offer to make sense of the past are considered for
their coherence with one another without reference to
concreta. But such arguments are likely to be contentious
in themselves, with the criteria for their success or failure
being both imprecise and of uncertain application.
18 Guy, My Heart is My Own: The Life of Mary Queen of Scots,
chapters 25 and 26. Guy makes his case for forgery within those
chapters. Another case for forgery is made in Warnicke, Mary Queen
of Scots, chapter 7, section “The Inquiry into Mary’s Restitution and
the Casket Letters” (pages 173-185).
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The scope to conclude that a claim is not respectable on
the basis of a lack of coherence does give rise to a worry.
If a claim were deemed not to be respectable, it would
seem that the contradictory would have to be regarded as
correct. That would be worrying because there might not
be sufficient evidence either for the initial claim or for its
contradictory.
In fact, the correctness of the contradictory would not
follow. A claim may fail one or more of the tests for
respectability without failure’s showing that the claim
should be regarded as incorrect and thereby giving good
reason to regard the contradictory claim as correct. It may
be that further work will turn up new evidence in support
of the initial claim, or undermine evidence against it, or
amend background accounts so as to remove incoherence
with them. A judgement of lack of respectability is merely
a warning that it would be foolish to make a claim
with confidence. The claim may still be entertained as a
hypothesis and be an object of further research, neither of
which would be appropriate if the contradictory claim were
regarded as correct.
4.2.2.5 The fourth requirement
Claims need the support of other claims in order to be
respectable. Sometimes claims that interest us will need
only the support of reports of evidence. But sometimes
they will also need the support of other claims that
set out connections or that recount actions, events or
circumstances in ways that go beyond merely reporting
evidence. The fourth requirement demands respectability of
such supporting claims whenever they are needed to make
the claim of immediate interest respectable.
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Sometimes the supporting claims will provide direct sup-
port for a given claim, whether by summarizing and
characterizing evidence or by recounting actions, events
or immediate circumstances. Alternatively the supporting
claims may set out how people or things were in general, in
a way that makes the supported claim more plausible than
it would otherwise be.
Supporting claims that perform either function may be
found either in the account that contains the supported
claim or in background accounts. The fourth requirement
therefore means that background accounts cannot simply be
taken for granted. But this does not mean that everything
in background accounts must be examined. Only the claims
in them that provide necessary support for claims of
immediate interest need be examined.
(Strictly speaking, the fourth requirement would also
demand respectability of supporting claims that merely
reported evidence. But that would usually be otiose. The
insistence on reasonable interpretation in the first require-
ment should cover the case, and concerns about coherence
that might arise out of application of the third requirement
could not be allowed to displace uncontentious reports of
evidence. The fourth requirement’s coverage of supporting
claims that merely report evidence is however harmless.
It also has the advantage of not requiring us to draw a
boundary between claims that merely report evidence and
claims that do more. Any such boundary would be hazy
and could easily classify claims inappropriately.)
The fourth requirement might be feared to give rise to a risk
of circularity. The respectability of a claim might depend on
the respectability of other claims, while the respectability
of one or more of those other claims depended on the
respectability of the first claim. But this risk is in fact small.
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It is normal for claims that are more general or abstract to
need the support of claims that are less general or abstract,
and not the other way round. So it is normally possible to
determine the respectability of claims that are less general
or abstract first, and then pass the support they can provide
upward.
There is however one area in which the impact of the
fourth requirement may be lessened by a form of circularity.
Sometimes claims come together to present an overall
pattern, a phenomenon we shall explore in section 5.2.4.4.
The presentation of such a pattern may contribute to the
respectability of all of the claims, through the pattern’s
amounting to a form of coherence. If the respectability of
many of the individual claims depended on the fact that
a satisfactory overall pattern was presented, then it might
not be feasible to establish the respectability of some claims
and use the results to establish, via the presentation of
the pattern, the respectability of others. Fortunately, it
is not likely that there would be any great dependence
of respectability on the presentation of an overall pattern.
Evidence for specific claims would still play the leading role.
4.2.2.6 The missing fifth requirement
We have not included a fifth requirement, that the account
that includes a claim should not reflect any misreading of
the past brought about by an unwise adjustment to folk
psychology or thick concepts or by the adoption of an
inappropriate general view of the period studied.
One might have expected such a requirement, given the
concerns we expressed in sections 3.3 and 4.1.3.1.2. We have
not added it because the work that it would do can be done
by a combination of the four requirements we have already
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laid down, with one exception that we shall set out shortly.
Specific adjustments to folk-psychological principles or
thick concepts would imply claims that people studied
should have certain mentalities attributed to them. They
might very well be implicit claims, but they could be
made explicit by analysis of an account that exploited
the adjusted folk psychology or thick concepts. Suppose
that claims of immediate interest needed the support of
those claims about mentalities. For example, a claim of
immediate interest might be that someone’s conduct was
a reaction to given circumstances. If those circumstances
would not now provoke such a reaction, but would do
so on the assumption of a mentality that was no longer
current, the claim of immediate interest would need the
support of a claim that past mentalities were different in
the appropriate ways. Then under the fourth requirement,
the claim that mentalities were different would need to have
its respectability tested. Then under the first requirement
there would need to be strong evidential support for that
claim, under the second requirement there would need to
be an absence of weighty evidence against it, and under
the third requirement it would need to fit into a coherent
view of the people studied. These three tests should suffice
to weed out inappropriate adjustments. There would be no
need for a fifth requirement.
Turning to general views, such a view is likely to incorporate
or imply specific claims, for example about human nature
or about how economies behave. Those claims might be
implicit, but they could be made explicit. Then if claims
of immediate interest needed the support of those other
claims, those other claims would themselves need to be
respectable under the terms of the fourth requirement. Then
tests under the first three requirements would have to be
made, and those tests would normally suffice to expose any
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relevant wider defects in the general view. Again, there
would be no need for a fifth requirement.
The one case not covered is that of the general view which
provides support that is needed by claims of immediate
interest, but where some or all of the required support is not
provided through specific claims that it is practical to test.
It is most unlikely that a general view of any worth would
not incorporate or imply any specific claims that were of
significance to an account written under its influence, but it
is possible that support for the claims of immediate interest
would operate through so many reasonably specific claims
that it was not practical to test the respectability of all or
even most of them, or that it would operate through some
claims which were so general that their respectability could
not be tested. Our tests of the respectability of claims do
not guard against the possibility of an inappropriate general
view that provides support for claims of immediate interest
in such ways. To that extent, our concept of respectability
does not in itself allow the construction of a complete
guard against the making of inappropriate historical claims.
It is however possible to live with that limitation. We
may reasonably hope that historians who disputed the
appropriateness of various general views which might skew
specific conclusions would argue against the applicability of
the general views.19
19 Examples are Luebke, “Frederick the Great and the Celebrated
Case of the Millers Arnold (1770-1779): A Reappraisal”, which
challenges long-standing legalistic approaches to the case; Furet, “Le
catéchisme révolutionnaire”, which challenges some Marx-inspired
approaches to the French Revolution.
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4.2.3 Other lines of thought
4.2.3.1 Warranted assertibility
Our concept of respectability has a fair amount in common
with John Dewey’s concept of warranted assertibility.20 But
the two concepts are not the same.
The reason they are not the same is that the concept
of respectability does not redefine or replace the concept
of justification. It sits alongside justification in order to
be used as a regulative standard in relation to contest-
able claims, while also being usable in relation to non-
contestable claims. For Dewey, on the other hand, the
concept of warranted assertibility is used to give a definite
meaning to the concept of knowledge, thereby making a
connection with the concept of truth on the basis that only
true beliefs can be knowledge.21
The difference can be brought out by a consideration of
contradictions. Our approach would allow historians to
accept that two contradictory claims were both respectable
at the same time, although the contradiction would be a
spur to further research. Dewey, on the other hand, would
not be at all keen on saying that two contradictory claims
could both enjoy the status of warranted assertibility at
the same time. This is indicated by his exploration of
20 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.
21 Dewey, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth”,
pages 169-170. We should also note that the wedge that is driven
between norms of truth and norms of warranted assertibility in Smith,
“Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why
Truth and Warranted Assertibility are not Coincident Norms”, is of
little or no significance in the context of academic disciplines, where
it is expected that grounds for assertions will be provided.
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contradiction as an engine of progress in research.22
We should however allow for the fact that outright contra-
diction is less likely to arise between historical claims than
between scientific claims. Historical claims that interest us
tend to be stated with less precision than scientific claims.
A conflict between claims may therefore be less than a
contradiction. That would ease the pain of regarding both
of two conflicting claims as respectable at the same time.
4.2.3.2 Sanford Goldberg
Sanford C. Goldberg takes an approach that is comparable
to our own. He sets out a concept of epistemic propriety,
a property that beliefs may possess. In order to be epi-
stemically proper, a belief must meet epistemic standards.23
We may compare epistemic propriety to our concept of
respectability. There are both similarities and differences.
The first major similarity is that Goldberg promotes
what he calls coherence-infused reliabilism. Beliefs should
be arrived at by reliable means, and the means should
include a test of the coherence of new beliefs with existing
ones.24 Turning to our concept, the careful consideration
of evidence which is the only approach likely to allow a
claim to meet the first two requirements is a reliable way to
arrive at beliefs, and the third requirement imposes tests
of coherence. The parallel between Goldberg’s approach
22 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, chapter 10, especially pages
195-198.
23 Goldberg, To the Best of our Knowledge: Social Expectations
and Epistemic Normativity. Goldberg introduces epistemic propriety
in section 1.1.
24 Goldberg discusses coherence-infused reliabilism in To the Best




and ours is however not perfect. Goldberg’s focus is on
the process of arriving at beliefs. Subconscious monitoring
for coherence with existing beliefs is an integral part of
that process, making it more reliable. We envisage our
requirements being imposed separately and consciously,
once a claim has been presented for consideration.
The second major similarity is this. Goldberg sees re-
quirements on epistemic agents as intimately related to
social expectations, rather than as having come down from
the sky.25 And our requirements reflect the practice of
historians, who insist on looking at the evidence, strive
to paint pictures of the past that are coherent, and
consider whether claims that support other claims are
themselves satisfactory. Again, however, the parallel is not
perfect. Goldberg defends the role that he gives to social
expectations in defining epistemic propriety by reference to
his theory of what he calls the reliabilist rationale.26 We on
the other hand do not develop any such theory.
Turning to the differences, Goldberg is concerned with
knowledge in a wide range of areas, whereas we concen-
trate on historical work. Goldberg gives prominence to
perception, and only has much to say about evidence in
general near the end of his book, while evidence of all sorts,
considered as evidence rather than as some form of sensory
input, is central to our concerns.27 Finally, Goldberg’s
project differs from ours. He is primarily interested in
where our epistemic standards come from, their general
25 Goldberg discusses social expectations throughout chapters 3 to
7 of To the Best of our Knowledge, but particularly in chapter 5.
26 Goldberg, To the Best of our Knowledge, chapter 3. The rationale
is introduced in section 3.2, and the argument is brought to its
conclusion in section 3.8.
27 Goldberg discusses perception in several places in To the Best of




nature, and how they have their effects on our epistemic
assessments. We set out to use specific requirements on
claims to discipline the conduct of historical work, and to
make connections with epistemological traditions.
4.3 Norms
We have given requirements for respectability. In a dis-
cipline like history, it is not possible to test mechanically
whether claims meet such requirements. Judgement is
needed. But if the concept of respectability is to give histor-
ians a way to sort satisfactory claims from unsatisfactory
ones, the exercise of judgement will need to be controlled.
One source of control lies in the norms of the discipline.
Control is supplied if those who judge ask whether those
who make claims have complied with those norms, so long
as the judges are then encouraged (although not bound) to
accord the status of respectability to claims when there has
been full compliance and to withhold that status when there
has been any significant non-compliance. Control arises
from this source because the requirements for respectability
reflect the goals of the norms.
Given that norms in the humanities are not as precise
as many of the norms of the natural sciences (norms of
experimental method and statistical testing, for example),
and given that norms are largely implied by practice rather
than set out in manuals, we must consider whether the
available norms are strict enough and precise enough to
ensure that the exercise of judgement can be controlled
sufficiently to make the concept of respectability useful.
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We shall now make some norms explicit, and for each
one consider the contribution that checking for compliance
might make to controlling judgements as to the respectab-
ility of claims.
4.3.1 Norms of evidence
There are technical norms that relate directly to the
handling of evidence. For example, there are some precisely
specified methods to be used in archaeological excava-
tions.28 There are also methods to use in historical work
generally.29 Methods are not norms in themselves, but
when methods are specified there are associated norms that
they should be used unless there is good reason to do
otherwise. Checks for compliance with such norms should
usefully control judgements as to respectability, because the
methods that the norms enjoin are directed to ensuring a
careful review and analysis of evidence. A failure to use
appropriate methods should lead commentators on claims
to refuse to judge either that there is enough evidential
support for the claims, or that there is no weighty evidence
against them. As a consequence, claims would not be
judged to be respectable. (There might appear to be enough
evidential support and an absence of weighty evidence
against, but when technical methods should be used, failure
to use them will give rise to the risk that evidence will be
missed or misinterpreted.)
28 Roskams, Excavation; Martin, Harrod and Pérez, Bioarchae-
ology: An Integrated Approach to Working With Human Remains. The
latter work is not a manual in itself, but it gives many references
to publications that discuss methods and show their application in
specific excavations.




There is also the less technical norm that a wide enough
range of evidence should be considered. This norm may
relate to primary sources, for example when the norm
requires a political historian to read the surviving private
correspondence of leading figures as well as official docu-
ments. It may also relate to secondary literature, which
should be reviewed for evidence that may count for or
against claims.
Again, judgements as to respectability should be controlled
because if a historian has not visibly considered a wide
range of evidence, anyone considering the claims made
should hold back from treating the claims as respectable
because they could not be sure that there was no weighty
evidence against the claims, so that the second requirement
might not be met. It might however still be possible to judge
that there was enough support for the claims for the first
requirement to be met.
4.3.2 Norms of argument
Norms that relate to arguments in favour of claims tend to
be general guides rather than precise rules.
There is for example a norm that historians should avoid
presentism, that is, reading their own perspective back
into the past. There is also a norm that historians should
minimize the effects of bias in the selection of sources and
should compensate for biases that may have affected the
contents of secondary sources. Methods are available to
address the problem of bias.30
30 Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in
the Study of International Relations”.
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There are also norms that govern specific types of argu-
ment, for example arguments that some writers influenced
others.31 And there are norms of argument that apply in
any field of work, for example the norm that one should not
assume that if one event occurred shortly after another, the
earlier event caused the later one.
Judgements as to respectability are to some extent con-
trolled by checks for compliance with norms of argument.
Such checks will direct attention to inferential links, thereby
helping a commentator to decide whether the evidence
adduced really does give adequate support to the claims
made.
4.3.3 Psychological plausibility
Historical accounts should be plausible in the light of an
appropriate folk psychology. This is so whether accounts
concern individuals or people en masse.
If individuals are considered, it is important that accounts
of why they acted as they did would be plausible for human
beings in general, at least unless some explanation of why
given individuals were psychologically odd is supplied.32
And if an individual’s conduct can be seen as natural
in his or her circumstances, so much the better. (The
adjective “natural” is meant to capture the idea that an
31 Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method, pages
75-76.
32 Geoffrey Elton made a similar norm explicit when he called
on historians to stand back from their completed accounts and ask
whether those accounts were plausible, although his norm was not
limited to occasions on which individuals would have thought about
what to do and decided on actions, nor was it limited to questions of
psychological normality or oddness: Elton, The Practice of History,
second edition, page 78 (page 86 of the first edition).
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individual’s conduct can be seen as having flowed smoothly
from his or her circumstances, without any feeling that more
explanation should be supplied. It is not meant to suggest
that the conduct should appear to have been inevitable.)
Folk psychology may need to be adjusted for different
times and cultures before the test of plausibility is applied
to an account, but as we noted in section 3.3.3.3, such
adjustments should be supported by evidence and should
not be made ad hoc.
If people en masse are considered, accounts that are offered
to make sense of the behaviour of groups need to be
consistent with plausible motivations of the members of
those groups. For example, a historian who considers food
riots may see an ideology of traditional social organization
and fair prices as having played a significant role.33 Such
a view is plausible because individuals can be inspired
to action by claims that current social arrangements are
unjust. If individuals were not at all likely to be inspired
by such claims, it would be hard to see the ideology as
having had any purchase at the level of individuals, and
correspondingly hard to regard it as having had much to
do with the occurrence of rioting at the level of the group.
Checking for compliance with the norm that accounts
should be plausible in the light of folk psychology differs
from checking for compliance with the norms related to
evidence that we have mentioned. Checking for compliance
with those norms would involve looking at how a historian
had worked. One would ask whether she used appropriate
special methods, and whether her review of evidence ranged
widely enough. Turning to the norm of plausibility in the
light of folk psychology, the focus is on finished accounts
rather than on processes of compilation. This is a norm of




product rather than of process.
Checking does provide a degree of control over judgements
as to respectability. Plausibility in the light of an appropri-
ate folk psychology is a vital aspect of coherence as set
out in the third requirement, because a folk psychology
will be part of the background to almost any account of
human affairs. And historians who review the work of other
historians are likely to have a good sense of what is and
what is not plausible, a sense honed partly by their own
experience of life and partly by their work on the people
and societies studied. (We shall say more about the roles
of background accounts that supply general principles in
section 5.2.4.2.)
Having said that, there may be little to do here. Compli-
ance with the norm of psychological plausibility is likely
whenever historians rely on the fact that they share a
human nature with the people about whom they write.
If they rely on commonality, they are unlikely to think
of people as having been motivated by considerations that
it would be implausible to think would motivate a human
being. So the norm will not often be breached. It is therefore
unlikely that checks for compliance would lead to many
claims being denied respectability. This is not in itself a
problem. If claims routinely cohere with accepted accounts
of human nature, that is to be welcomed. It does mean
that we cannot see checking for compliance with the norm
as routinely doing much work at the stage of consideration
of the respectability of claims, but that is because the work
checking could have done will by and large not need to be
done.
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4.3.4 Norms and judgement
Overall, checks for compliance with norms can go some
way to controlling judgements as to whether claims are
respectable. The making of such judgements is however
not a mechanical process. It remains possible for different
historians to pass different judgements as to respectability,
for example because they differ as to whether there is any
reasonable interpretation of some given pieces of evidence
under which the evidence would support a claim, or because
they have different senses of what would amount to a claim’s
cohering with its own account or an account’s cohering
with background accounts. But we can reasonably expect
that many judgements as to respectability would be widely
shared. So the concept of respectability should be usable.
4.4 Degrees of satisfaction
The requirements for respectability may be satisfied to
varying degrees. We may see this by considering each of
the first three requirements in turn. (The fourth one, being
a requirement to re-apply the first three requirements, is of
a different nature.)
1. Some claims will be better supported by evidence
than others.
2. Some claims will have less evidence against them than
others.
3. The extent to which claims cohere with their ac-
counts, accounts are internally coherent, and claims
and their accounts cohere with background accounts,
will be a matter of degree. Moreover, a claim or
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an account might cohere with some but not all
background accounts, giving additional scope for
satisfaction of the third requirement to be a matter
of degree.
We should not however exaggerate the extent to which
respectability itself may be a standard to be met barely
or amply. Many claims might strike experts as respect-
able, while others struck them as decidedly lacking in
respectability, but even a modest shortfall in satisfaction
of a requirement would disqualify a claim from counting
as respectable. If we suppose a scale of satisfaction in
relation to each requirement from 0 to 1, with any value
in the range from 0.9 to 1 showing sufficient satisfaction
to meet the requirement, any value in the range from
0 to 0.6 showing a decided lack of satisfaction, and a
middle ground ranging from 0.6 to 0.9, claims falling in
that middle ground in relation to any requirement would
not meet the requirement. Thus the variation in degrees
of satisfaction among respectable claims in relation to any
given requirement would only be from 0.9 to 1. (No such
numerical scale would in fact be available in the humanities.
Not only would there be no reputable way to determine
values with precision. The meanings of values of 1 would
need to be clarified. For the first requirement, perfect
support might mean logical implication by indubitable
claims. For the second requirement, perfection might mean
the complete absence of contrary evidence. But for the third
requirement, what would amount to perfect coherence? So
we suppose a scale merely in order to assist our discussion
of variation.)
In addition, we should not be greatly concerned about
claims with mean degrees of satisfaction of requirements in
the lower part of the acceptable range – say 0.9 to 0.95, to
make use of our supposed numerical scale. The frequency
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with which such claims counted as respectable would be
reduced by the rule that a claim was not respectable if there
was any requirement that it did not meet. So a claim that
had values of 0.85, 0.95 and 0.99 in relation to the first three
requirements in turn would not be respectable because 0.85
was less than 0.9, even though the mean of the values would
be 0.93.
While the rule that a claim is not respectable if there
is any requirement that it does not meet would reduce
the frequency with which claims about which one might
reasonably have concerns would count as respectable, this
would be a useful side-effect of the rule. It would not be
the reason for the rule. The reason for the rule is that it is
necessary in order to make respectability a useful guide to
action, and one that has much in common with justification
in its role as a guide to action. If a claim is respectable under
the rule then it is acceptable to make the claim, whether for
its own sake or for use in work that may lead to the making
of other claims. If it is not respectable under the rule then
the claim should at most be entertained as a hypothesis.
Likewise, if a claim is justified it is acceptable to regard it
as correct, and if it is not justified it should not confidently
be regarded as correct but may, unless manifestly incorrect,
be entertained as a hypothesis.
In discussing hypothetical computations here, we have left
aside the fourth requirement. We noted above that it is of a
different nature to the other three, being a requirement to
re-apply the first three requirements. But even if there were
a need to explore hypothetical computations of the extent
to which the fourth requirement was satisfied, it would
not be clear what form such a computation should take.
Computation would depend on being able to give overall
satisfaction values to claims that the claim of immediate
interest needed for support. That would raise the question
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of how to combine values for each of those supporting claims
under the first three requirements, and potentially under
the fourth requirement too if there were an extended chain
of support. And when a claim needed the support of several
other claims, there would be the further question of how to
combine their overall satisfaction values to obtain a value
of satisfaction of the fourth requirement by the claim of
immediate interest.
It is not that there would be no options. One option would
be always to take the lowest value and pass it up the line,
whether the lowest value of the three (or four) for a claim
or the lowest value for any claim in a set of claims.
That would not be the only option. But there would be
something to be said in its favour. It would align at least
roughly with an intuitively useful rule which we can adopt.
This is that if a claim needs the support of some other
claim that is not itself manifestly respectable, that is enough
on its own to deprive the former claim of respectability
through failure to meet the fourth requirement. In that way,
the pattern of failure by reference to any one requirement
leading to the loss of respectability can be maintained.
4.5 Multiple accounts
One characteristic of history, and indeed of the humanities
generally (and to a lesser extent of the social sciences), is
that there is scope for there to be several accounts of the
same subject matter. The accounts may between them give
a fuller picture than any one account would give. We must
recognize that this is so, and that so long as accounts are
consistent with one another, the respectability of a claim is
not likely to be impugned by the existence of accounts in
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which the claim is not made. The respectability of a claim
within one account may even be enhanced by the existence
of a range of accounts, if they are mutually supportive.
The support would come in the form of positive coherence.
An account that included the claim would engage with
the other accounts, rather than merely not conflicting with
those accounts.
There are however situations in which the respectability
of a claim might be impugned. If an account approached
its subject matter in a way that was quite different
from other accounts, the account in question might be
somewhat isolated from other accounts. Then claims that
were only made within it might fail to meet the third
requirement because their account might not engage with
any of the other accounts (which would count as background
accounts). The account might then be regarded as missing
the point. So while there might be evidence for the claims,
it might be thought misleading to give the account that
included them.
One concern we should not have is that the scope for there
to be several accounts of the same subject matter might
drive us to some form of narrative anti-realism.34 There are
two reasons why this should not worry us. The first reason is
that we are concerned with the status of individual claims,
rather than of whole narratives. The second reason is that
we are concerned with the respectability of claims, rather
than with their truth.
34 For a discussion of realism and anti-realism see Stueber, “Agency





We shall now consider relationships between long-established
epistemological approaches and assessments of respectab-
ility. In this chapter we shall consider approaches that
concentrate on how evidence can provide foundations for
claims, and on coherence among claims and accounts. In




The term “foundationalism” picks out a family of positions
that are united by counting the belief that is stated by a
proposition as justified if and only if one of two conditions
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is met. The first condition is that the proposition is
justifiably believed non-inferentially. The second condition
is that it is inferred, whether directly or through chains
of inference, from propositions that are justifiably believed
non-inferentially.1
(Epistemologists tend to speak of propositions, but we shall
continue to speak of claims. Claims are simply propositions
that play the role of assertion in our discourse. And any
proposition that a historian wants to put forward in support
of a claim, for example a proposition that describes some
piece of evidence, will itself be asserted by that historian
and will be a claim.)
5.1.2 Relatively foundational claims
We shall not pursue a quest for claims that might justifi-
ably be believed non-inferentially. Academically interesting
claims are likely to be so far removed from any plausible
candidates to stand in such a foundational role that the
chains of reasoning would be too long and tangled for it to
be clear how the claims were supported by the candidates.
Instead we shall consider the scope to support claims by
reference to claims which, while they cannot justifiably
be believed independently of other support, are relatively
foundational. The most likely candidates are claims that
simply report evidence.
Given that we shall only look for relatively foundational
claims, we must not think that when claims are supported in
the foundationalist way that we shall explore, they have the
level of support that might come from being inferred from
1 For a survey see DePaul, “Foundationalism”.
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claims that could justifiably be believed non-inferentially.
5.1.3 Support
Even when support comes from relatively foundational
claims that are close enough to the claims to be supported
that it is clear how support is given, two points must be
borne in mind.
The first point is that the links in chains of reasoning
will usually be looser than links of logical implication.
The nature of the humanities and the social sciences
ensures that, and we noted specific reasons why chains
of logical implication should be relatively uncommon in
section 4.2.2.1.
The second point is this. Given that we are interested
in claims that go beyond merely reporting evidence or
making obvious deductions from evidence, it will not
always be obvious whether the claims that interest us are
sufficiently supported. Judgement may be needed to decide
how evidence should be interpreted, and therefore which
claims would fairly report the evidence. And since inference
cannot be restricted to logical implication, judgement may
also be needed to decide what can be inferred from
what. Disagreement as to whether claims are sufficiently
supported is perfectly possible.2 This is indeed the major
reason why claims may be contestable.
2 An example of disagreement as to what the evidence supports
is given by Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence
Reinterpreted, the comments on that book in Fried, “Susan Reynolds,
Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted”, and the
response in Reynolds, “Susan Reynolds Responds to Johannes Fried”.
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5.1.4 Disagreement and respectability
While there is scope for disagreement as to whether claims
are supported, it does not follow that respectability is put
in serious doubt whenever there is such disagreement. The
first requirement for respectability is that a claim should
have strong support from at least some of the evidence,
under some reasonable interpretation of that evidence and
making reasonable inferences. The chosen interpretation
will be given by the claims used to report the evidence. The
strong support does not need to exist under all reasonable
interpretations. Even those who think that evidence does
not support a given claim may recognize that the claim
would have considerable support under some reasonable
interpretation of the evidence and with the use of inferences
that were reasonable.
The fact that we are concerned with respectability should
also save us from having to worry about falsificationist
or critical rationalist reservations about the possibility
of establishing claims.3 It is possible for a claim to be
respectable even while it remains at risk of being discarded
should fresh evidence be discovered or evidence already
available be reinterpreted. As we shall note in section
5.1.6.3, respectability at a given time is real even though
it may later be lost.
3 For the critical rationalism that Karl Popper rightly considered
to be more appropriate than falsificationism outside the context of
the natural sciences see Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies,
chapter 24, sections 1 to 3. The same use of criticism rather than
falsification is visible in the work of Hans Albert: Albert, Traktat
über kritische Vernunft, translated as Treatise on Critical Reason,
particularly chapter 4, section 14 and chapter 7, section 28.
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5.1.5 The use of evidence
When historical accounts are given, there is usually a
conspicuous role for straightforward evidence that can be
set out at a lower level of abstraction than the claims that
interest us. The claims that report such pieces of evidence
are then relatively foundational.
There is, however, often a role for the interpretation to
which the first requirement refers. Sometimes a good deal
of interpretation will be needed even before the process
of making inferences can start. For example, a study of
European parliaments over several centuries has made use
both of the expression by the King of León of his willingness
to regard himself as subject to law, and of expressions of
concern by cities in his kingdom about debasement of the
coinage. Such expressions are evidence of the nature of the
context in which parliaments started to become significant.
This evidence can support claims as to why they did so. But
evidence of that nature must be interpreted carefully before
it can be used properly. On the other hand, the same study
uses the much more concrete evidence of numbers of years
per century in which parliaments met. While the process
of drawing inferences from that evidence is intricate and
sophisticated, the meaning of the evidence itself is pretty
clear without elaborate interpretation.4
It is not only evidence in the form of words that may
be subject to interpretation. A piece of evidence in the
form of a physical artefact may need or invite considerable
interpretation, although such interpretation can easily
shade into the drawing of conclusions because there is no
4 Van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker, “The Rise and Decline of
European Parliaments, 1188-1789”. Expressions by the King and by
cities are cited on page 838. The measure of numbers of years in which
parliaments met is introduced in section 2.
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obvious terminus of mere interpretation analogous to that
of establishing the meaning of a sequence of words. (Even
with texts, interpretation can shade into the drawing of
conclusions, but there is a better prospect of establishing a
tolerably clear boundary.) The importance of interpretation
can be seen by looking at examples of the study of material
culture.5
The need for interpretation is however not an obstacle
to the provision of support for respectability that is of a
foundationalist nature. Once an interpretation of evidence
is adopted, a claim that embodies the interpretation
can play a relatively foundational role. There is then
scope to contribute to meeting the first requirement for
respectability, even if the interpretation of the evidence
is not universally adopted. All that is needed is wide
acceptance that the interpretation is a reasonable one.
Beyond claims that report evidence, there are accepted
descriptions of events which can likewise be relatively
foundational and thereby provide support for claims. For
example, it is accepted that we should describe some
clashes in the British Isles in the 1640s as military battles
in a perfectly straightforward sense. Claims that there
were battles at specified times and places are among
the foundations for claims that particular wars should
be identified and should be seen as forming coherent
wholes. Having said that, the foundations allow various
visions of the period to be built on them, visions which
may be summarized by using labels such as “the English
Revolution” and “the Wars of the Three Kingdoms”. There
is no consensus as to which labels should be used, and no
5 Lubar and Kingery (eds.), History from Things: Essays on
Material Culture; Richardson, Hamling and Gaimster (eds.), The
Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe.
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consensus as to which vision should be preferred.6
While there are relatively foundational claims other than
those that report evidence, the ones that report evidence are
the ones that will contribute directly to the respectability
of other claims. They will do so because of the first
requirement for respectability. We therefore concentrate on
evidence.
5.1.6 Temporary support and temporary
respectability
We should not assume that evidence that supports claims
will always do so. Particular pieces of evidence might be
devalued in general. Alternatively they might no longer be
seen as able to support particular claims, even though they
remained available to support other claims. We shall now
look at each of these two possibilities in turn, illustrating
them with examples from existing historical work that
once lay in the future. (Our concern when discussing
these possibilities is with pieces of evidence in themselves,
documents and artefacts, so we shall refer to evidence rather
than claims that report evidence.)
After discussing these two possibilities, we shall turn to the
potentially temporary nature of respectability as a topic
in its own right. Finally we shall remark on another way
in which historiography may move on, a way that is not
connected so closely with the value of evidence as support
for specific claims. This is reinterpretation of the past.
6 For this example of disagreement over labels see Bennett, “The
English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638-1652”
(a review of the book of that title by Ian Gentles). For a discussion of
the difficulty of classifying events and situations in the social sciences




Evidence might come to be devalued in general. A document
or an artefact might turn out to have been forged or
misdated. Then it might only remain useful as evidence
that a forgery took place or as evidence for events or a way
of life in its newly assigned temporal context.
Even if the authenticity of some piece of evidence is only
disputed, and the question is not settled, it would be
difficult for the evidence to contribute to the respectability
of claims that it could only support if it were authentic.
In particular, historians who were confident that the
evidence was inauthentic could not see it as contributing
to respectability in a way that would depend on its
authenticity, because they would not be able to regard as
reasonable any interpretation that implied its authenticity.
To start with documents, inauthenticity may for example
be indicated by their making no sense in their supposed
context of creation, or using language that was not in
use when they was supposedly created or was otherwise
wholly inappropriate, or including egregious mistakes that
the supposed authors would not have been at all likely to
make.
For example, the Tanaka Memorial has come to be widely,
although not universally, regarded as inauthentic, partly
on the basis of its stylistic oddity, its factual mistakes, and
the fabrications and contradictions within it.7 The many
who regard it as inauthentic cannot allow it to be used to
support the respectability of claims that the Japanese were
planning extensive conquests as far back as 1927.
7 Stephan, “The Tanaka Memorial (1927): Authentic or Spuri-
ous?”, pages 740-742.
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Similar things may be said about artefacts. Once an artefact
is for example seen to have been made using techniques that
were not otherwise evidenced as having been in use at the
supposed time of manufacture, it would be very difficult
to regard as reasonable any interpretation that located the
artefact at its originally attributed date.
5.1.6.2 Ceasing to support certain claims
Evidence might cease to support certain claims.
For example, an examination of information about how
builders were employed and paid in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries has been argued to require a rein-
terpretation of existing evidence of payments for building
work. The new interpretation would leave the evidence
unable to support a claim that wage rates in England
were higher than in other countries, a claim that had been
significant because it had been used in explanations of the
course of industrialization.8
To take another example, it has come to be argued that
the Alexiad is misleading on chronology at several hitherto
unrecognized points, with serious consequences for the use
that can be made of it in historical study.9 It is however
important not to let specific concerns slide into a more
general attitude of suspicion, so that the document in
question is not used even when it would be useful.10
8 Stephenson, Real Contracts and Mistaken Wages: The Organisa-
tion of Work and Pay in London Building Trades, 1650-1800.
9 Frankopan, The First Crusade: The Call from the East, pages
9-10.
10 Buckley, The Alexiad of Anna Komnene: Artistic Strategy in the




These are examples where not all historians would come
to agree that evidence could not be used to support
given claims. But as with the view that some evidence
is inauthentic, it may be difficult for those who subscribe
to the view that the evidence cannot be used to support
the claims to regard as reasonable any interpretation that
glosses over the difficulties and thereby allows such use
of the evidence. If the perceived problem with using the
evidence is that it has previously been misread because it
has not been set in the context of some other evidence
(as with the example of the earnings of builders), mental
gymnastics which those who perceived a problem would be
likely to regard as implausible would be needed in order
to ignore the context. Likewise, if the perceived problem is
that the evidence has been found to be unreliable in certain
ways (as with the example of the Alexiad), it may become
difficult to regard as reasonable any use of the evidence that
would require overlooking its unreliability.
5.1.6.3 Respectability may be temporary
Such reflections draw our attention to an important feature
of our definition of respectability. It is couched in terms
of currently available evidence (including evidence that
bears on the interpretation of other evidence) and coherence
with accounts that are current. Respectability is therefore
respectability in the current intellectual environment, and
a claim that is currently respectable might cease to be
respectable in some future year. This risk does not however
detract from the reality of current respectability.
The current intellectual environment would include foreseen
developments, as when a new body of evidence was known
to exist but had not yet been studied. But mere speculation
about possible changes to the range of reasonable interpret-
139
5 Foundations and coherence
ations of existing evidence would give no reason to hold back
from regarding claims as respectable for the time being.
5.1.6.4 The past might be reinterpreted
Sometimes there are significant changes to historians’ views
of events or periods of history. Such reinterpretations may
not be adopted by all or even a majority of historians, but
they may still be adopted quite widely.
One example is given by changes in historians’ views on
various aspects of the developments commonly grouped
together as the twelfth-century renaissance, aspects such
as the role of secularization and the cultural significance of
the Investiture Contest.11 Another example is given by the
evolution of historians’ views on the Industrial Revolution,
and in particular views on the significance of various related
developments.12 A third example, in which changes of
view on specific events or structures are to a large extent
consequences of more general changes in ways of looking at
the relevant periods of history, is given by the multifarious
effects of postcolonial studies on the historiography of the
British Empire.13
Any worthwhile view of some events or of a period of history
will incorporate some claims which are so central to the
view that they have to be sustained under the view. When
there is a shift from an old view to a new one, we may
expect there to be some new claims, not made under the
11 Melve, “‘The Revolt of the Medievalists’. Directions in Recent
Research on the Twelfth-Century Renaissance”.
12 Horn, Rosenband and Smith (eds.), Reconceptualizing the Indus-
trial Revolution. Chapter 1, the introduction by the editors, gives an
overview of the rest of the book.
13 Kennedy, The Imperial History Wars: Debating the British
Empire, chapters 1 to 3.
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old view, which have to be sustained under the new view.
It is perfectly possible that some of those claims will be
incompatible with some claims that were made under the
old view. (The old claims might or might not be ones that
had to be sustained under the old view.)
It might be thought that when this happened, there
should be direct implications for the support that evidence
available before the shift could give to old claims which
were incompatible with claims that had to be sustained
under the new view. If the evidence in question were not in
some way deprived of its ability to support the relevant old
claims, either by being devalued in itself or by being blocked
from supporting those particular claims, then it might be
expected to be evidence against claims that had to be
sustained under the new view, removing their respectability
and undermining the new view. So perhaps the adoption
of a new view should somehow ensure that conflicting old
claims lose their evidential support.
It would be very dubious to allow this as a route to the
removal of evidential support for claims, distinct from the
routes of the devaluation of evidence in itself and the
blocking of support for particular claims by reference to
considerations which were more specific than a general
change of view. If such specific routes could not be
identified, a high-level change of view would be unlikely
to have a sufficiently direct connection to evidence that
supported claims made under the old view for it to be
comfortable to rely on the high-level change alone in
order to reject the evidence in question or prevent it from
supporting the old claims.
Uncomfortable it might be, but a direct conflict between
claims which were supported under the old view and claims
which had to be sustained under the new view could require
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such drastic action. It would however be worth seeking an
alternative. Two ways forward might well be available.
The first one would be to see the new view as changing
the range of reasonable interpretations of the evidence, so
that it could no longer be seen as supporting the old claims.
Thus the general change of view would give rise to a specific
change that would in turn deprive the old claims of support.
The second one would be to argue that the fact that
evidence supported old claims which were at variance with
new claims did not mean that the evidence inevitably
undermined the new claims. Evidence in history tends
not to lead with deductive inevitability to claims which it
supports, certainly not to the claims that interest us, claims
which offer to make sense of the past. So even if evidence




Coherentism in epistemology comes in several forms.14
Some coherentists argue that accounts can be justified by
their coherence, and that claims within those accounts
can thereby obtain a degree of justification at second
hand.15 Other coherentists argue that justification comes
from a relationship of coherence between a specific claim
14 For a survey see Olsson, “Coherentism”.
15 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, section 5.2.
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and a background system.16 A third possibility is to
develop a notion of justificatory coherence which combines
consideration of the relationship between a claim and a
system with consideration of the coherence of the system
as a whole.17
We shall not choose between these forms of coherentism.
Rather, we shall work with a broad notion of coherence and
consider why coherence should support the respectability
of claims. The support will come through meeting the third
requirement for respectability, the requirement that claims
should cohere with their own accounts, that those accounts
should be internally coherent, and that claims and their
accounts should cohere with the background supplied by
other accounts.
We shall be concerned specifically with what is commonly
called explanatory coherence, although we shall broaden the
notion to cover all examples of the coherence that is seen
when claims hang together, whether in small groups or in
groups large enough to create overall pictures of the past,
whether or not the organized groups of claims amount to
explanations in the sense in which natural scientists would
use that term. We shall use the single word “coherence” to
refer to this broad notion.
We shall not concern ourselves with coherence of testimony,
which exists when items of testimony from a range of
independent witnesses all or mostly match up. Coherence
of testimony is relevant to historical work. It is most
reassuring when several pieces of evidence all point in the
16 Lehrer, “Justification, Coherence and Knowledge”, section 4.
Lehrer defines the coherence of a specific claim with a background
system in a particular way. Coherence exists when the background
system provides someone who accepts the claim with resources to
answer all objections to the claim. We shall not use that definition.
17 Bartelborth, “Coherence and Explanations”, section 4.4.
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same direction. But that is for our purposes something to
be considered in the context of the first requirement for
respectability, that there should be strong support from
evidence. Coherence of testimony will add to the capacity of
evidence to support claims, while incoherence of testimony
will detract from it.
In section 5.2.2 we shall discuss the notion of coherence,
then in section 5.2.3 we shall look at relationships between
claims. In section 5.2.4 we shall consider why the coherence
of historical accounts is valuable. And in section 5.2.5 we
shall look at relationships between on the one hand claims
and their accounts, and on the other hand the background
supplied by other accounts.
5.2.2 The notion of coherence
5.2.2.1 Definitions and measures
We have a pre-theoretical notion of coherence, whether
the coherence of one claim with some other claims or the
coherence of a set of claims among themselves. One claim
coheres with some other claims, for example claims that
make up the account within which the first claim is made,
if the first claim does not conflict with the other claims and
engages with at least some of them. (As we noted in section
4.2.2.3.2, engagement may amount to there being either
inferential relationships or other positive relationships. We
shall discuss these other relationships in section 5.2.3.1.)
And an account is coherent if the claims within it do




While such a pre-theoretical notion will suffice to sus-
tain our investigations, it would be reassuring to have
judgements as to coherence disciplined to some extent, for
example by spelling out conditions for coherence or by
giving a way to measure it. In addition, such work would
give more definiteness to a pre-theoretical notion.
There has been plenty of work on what to look for. One
example is the work of Laurence BonJour. Under his
approach, the degree of coherence of a set of claims would
be increased by a high number of inferential relationships
between the members of the set, and decreased by division
of the set into subsets that were relatively isolated from
one another by a lack of inferential relationships between
the members of different subsets.18 Other authors have
offered elaborate sets of principles to apply.19 (It should
be noted that authors tend to focus on inferential rela-
tionships, and do not pay much attention to other positive
relationships. It would however often be possible to set out
corresponding inferential relationships, for example when
a claimed causal relationship could be seen as inferred
from descriptions of the putative cause and effect. To that
extent we may see parallels between work that focuses on
inferential relationships and our remarks on other positive
relationships, in addition to such work’s highlighting the
value of inferential relationships that exist independently
of positive relationships of other kinds.)
Principles set out in such work can on the whole be invoked
more easily in relation to scientific theories than in relation
to historical accounts, but we can still extend some of
them to the question of what makes a historical account
coherent. It would for example be relatively straightforward
18 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, section 5.3.
19 Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action, chapter 3; Bar-
telborth, “Coherence and Explanations”, section 4.4.
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to extend the principles set out by Thomas Bartelborth.
Those principles concentrate on quality of explanation and
on the extent to which there are inferential relationships.20
Those of the principles set out by Paul Thagard that
concern explanation in general, the priority of evidence,
and the need to avoid contradiction could also be extended.
But it would be harder to extend some of Thagard’s other
principles, because they reflect the use of hypotheses in the
natural sciences and the desire for single explanations that
is typical of those disciplines.21
There are also some mathematical measures of coherence,
although measures that have been proposed have also been
criticized.22 Fortunately, we need not be wedded to the
details of such proposals. We need only borrow their general
idea and conclude that a notion of coherence that comes
in degrees, rather than being merely a notion of logical
consistency, need not be a vague or insubstantial notion. We
also need not be deterred by Erik J. Olsson’s argument that
it is impossible to define a measure of coherence, a higher
value of which would reliably indicate a higher likelihood
that the beliefs that cohered were correct.23 This is partly
because we do not need perfect reliability of indication, and
partly because we are concerned with the coherence that is
shown when claims hang together within an account. The
emphasis of Olsson’s formal derivation is on the coherence
20 Bartelborth, “Coherence and Explanations”, section 4.4.
21 Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action, chapter 3, section
1. The principles that it would be easy to extend are principles E2(a)
and (b), perhaps E2(c), and E4, E5 and E7. The principles that it
would not be easy to extend to historical work are principles E3, E6
and arguably E2(c). Principle E1 is not a principle to be applied in
the same way as the other principles, but a claim about the coherence
relation.
22 Douven and Meijs, “Measuring Coherence”, discusses some
measures and considers some criticisms.
23 Olsson, “The Impossibility of Coherence”.
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of different items of testimony – although this includes
testimony from one’s own senses and memory, alongside
reports from other people. His discussion of explanatory
coherence does not yield a formal result.24
5.2.2.2 Claims and accounts
Under the third requirement a claim must cohere with its
account, an account must be internally coherent, and there
must be coherence with background accounts. As we said
in section 4.2.2.3, we shall define coherence with and of
accounts in terms of relationships between claims, whether
the presence of relationships that show engagement or the
absence of relationships of conflict. Claims must engage
with at least some other claims in their accounts, and
they must not conflict with other claims in their accounts.
Accounts must show a degree of internal unity, through
the engagement of a good proportion of claims within an
account with other claims in the same account, as well
as not containing claims that conflict with one another.
Claims must not conflict with claims in any background
accounts. And accounts must engage with at least some of
the background accounts that supply historical detail and
not conflict with any background accounts. An account will
engage with another account through claims in the former
account engaging with claims in the latter account. And an
account will conflict with another account if many claims or
24 For the formal derivation and a discussion of the result see
Olsson, “The Impossibility of Coherence”, sections 4 and 5. For a
discussion of explanatory coherence and of the relationship between
probabilistic and explanatory approaches see section 7 of that paper,
and also sections 6.5 and 9.4 of Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth,
Probability, and Justification. Angere, “Coherence as a Heuristic”,
sections 4 and 5, discusses the usefulness of measures of coherence
that are only imperfect indicators of the likelihood of correctness.
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significant claims in the former account conflict with claims
in the latter account.
The coherence relationship between accounts as thus
defined is asymmetric. One account could cohere with
another to a greater extent than the second account cohered
with the first one. But this asymmetry does not matter,
because our concern is the coherence of an account of
immediate interest with background accounts, not the other
way round. We could have said that one account would
cohere with another if they would combine to form a
single account that was internally coherent. That would
have eliminated the asymmetry. But it would also have
reduced the relative prominence of the account that was
of immediate interest, and would have led to claims losing
respectability merely because of incoherence in background
accounts. We would not want either of those results.
The requirement that an account must not conflict with
background accounts, together with the absence of a
requirement for specific claims of immediate interest to en-
gage directly with background accounts, might be thought
to make the test of coherence of individual claims with
background accounts redundant. But it would not do so
because the no-conflict requirement may be met even
when a few insignificant claims in an account conflict
with claims in background accounts. The respectability
of some of those claims might be of interest. Then their
coherence with background accounts would need to be
tested separately. In addition, the coherence of an account
with a background and the coherence of individual claims
with that background are rather different things. It is
worth highlighting them separately, even if the work done
to establish the former would both establish the latter
for significant claims and show that the great majority




5.2.2.3 Coherence and foundations
Our task is to give and support requirements for claims
to be respectable. We are at liberty to be eclectic when
doing so. There is no need for us to choose coherence to the
exclusion of foundations, or vice versa. It would indeed be
foolish to discard one approach in favour of the other, given
that of the first three requirements for respectability, the
first two (evidence for and against) have a foundationalist
flavour while the third one concerns coherence.
In being eclectic, we stay in line with some coherentist
approaches that allow a foundational element. An example
is Paul Thagard’s theory of explanatory coherence, which
gives reports of observations a degree of acceptability that
is independent of their relationships to other claims.25 An
earlier example, on which Thagard explicitly builds, is
Susan Haack’s foundherentism.26
5.2.3 Relationships between claims
5.2.3.1 Positive relationships
As we have already indicated, coherence that is epi-
stemically valuable requires rather more than the mutual
consistency of claims. It requires engagement, in the form
25 Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action, chapter 3, section
1, principle E4.
26 Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epi-
stemology, chapter 4; Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action,
chapter 3, section 1.
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of what we shall call positive relationships between claims.
These include inferential relationships, but we shall here
concentrate on other types of positive relationship.
We are concerned with the respectability of claims that
help to make sense of the past. But we shall here consider
relationships of those claims to claims that merely recount
events, actions or features of environments. Our main
concern is still the respectability of claims that help to make
sense of the past. We shall however take a direct interest in
claims that merely recount in sections 5.2.4.3 and 5.2.4.4.4,
where we shall be concerned with the characterization of
events, actions and features of environments.
Claims that help to make sense of the past may bear positive
relationships to claims that merely recount because the
claims that help to make sense set out causal connections,
while the other claims describe the putative causes and
effects in ways that make the claims of causal connection
plausible. Or claims may help to make sense of the past
by setting out reasons for actions, while other claims
describe the reasons and the actions in ways that make
the claims of reason-giving connection plausible. (When we
refer to reasons we shall mean reasons that it is plausible
to think of as actually having motivated the agent, whether
consciously or unconsciously. We are not concerned with
reasons that merely should have motivated the agent.)
Finally, claims may help to make sense of the past by setting
out connections that led from features of an environment to
events or actions, for example when they set out connections
between features of a political environment and events
or actions that can be seen as unsurprising given those
features, while other claims describe those features and the




(On a point of terminology, we shall speak of relationships
between claims and connections between actual events,
actions and features of environments.)
Positive relationships of such sorts would amount to
engagement between the claims that interested us and
claims that recounted the relevant events, actions or
features of environments, and also engagement between the
recounting claims themselves. This would be so whether the
recounting claims were in the accounts that included the
claims of interest or in other accounts. We should also recall
the point made in section 1.2.1 that a historian will not
always make claims of causal or other connection explicit.
She may recount events, actions or features of environments
in sufficient detail and in an appropriate sequence to ensure
that appropriate claims of connection arise in the minds of
attentive readers. If it is clear which claims are implicit, it
will be possible to assess those claims for coherence with the
account and with background accounts, and to assess the
whole account, including the implicit claims, for internal
coherence and for coherence with background accounts.
Environments are different from events and actions. We
generally think it appropriate to mention an event or action
as a whole, while only specific features of an environment
should be mentioned. We shall however not let that concern
us. The difference from events and actions is not really very
great. Claims about events and actions also pick out specific
features of them. It is just that we have a sense that such
a claim is about the whole event or action, while it is clear
that a claim about an environment is far from being about
the whole of the environment unless it is very narrowly
defined, such as the environment of fiscal pressures on a
government.
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Claims that events, actions and features of environments
are connected in the ways we have mentioned capture
relationships between claims that recount those events,
actions and features of environments, and between the
claims of connection and the claims that recount. But
claims of connection may also be related to one another.
For example, each one of several claims of connection may
set out a link in a chain which as a whole convincingly
connects an earlier situation with a later one. The success
of the whole chain in doing so would indicate that the links
all hung together. That in turn would indicate engagement
between the claims that set out the links.
5.2.3.2 Examples
We shall now give a few examples of claims that events,
actions and features of environments were connected.
5.2.3.2.1 Causes and effects
A shift from the dispensation of patronage through es-
tablished relationships of obligation to its dispensation for
money has been offered as a cause of weakening of the
government of the Roman Empire.27
Changes in the production of precious metals, patterns
of movement of those metals around the world, and
developments in the availability of financial instruments
have been put forward as explaining both the fact and the
timing of price changes in Europe in the sixteenth century.28
27 MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome.
28 Munro, The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’: South




Falls in the ratio of foreign to Irish wages and in the
proportion of Irish-born people living abroad have been
argued to have led to a decline in emigration from Ireland
in the latter part of the nineteenth century.29
5.2.3.2.2 Reasons for actions
The Duke of York’s strongly-worded complaints to the
King against the Duke of Somerset have been explained as
motivated by Somerset’s surrender of Rouen to the French
in 1449 without putting up much of a fight. This had serious
implications for York’s honour as captain of the town, as
well as leading to the loss of York’s estates in Normandy.30
Frederick the Great’s reasons to occupy Saxony in 1756 have
been given as the need to have a defensive buffer against the
Austrians, the logistical advantage that control of the Elbe
would confer, and the opportunity to exploit the wealth of
Saxony to sustain the Prussian war effort.31
Robert Peel has been argued to have shifted to a position
on the basis of which he advocated repeal of the Corn
Laws because of his observation of the effects of his earlier
reforms, rather than because of what economists were
saying on theoretical grounds.32
29 Hatton and Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and
Economic Impact, page 83.
30 Jones, “Somerset, York and the Wars of the Roses”, pages 301-
307.
31 Blanning, Frederick the Great: King of Prussia, pages 260-263.
32 Irwin, “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws”,
section 4.
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5.2.3.2.3 Features of environments
Complex networks of land ownership, administration and
rights to receive homage, along with ambitions to put
dominion on a firm footing, have been seen as essential
features of the environment within which there started a
conflict that was retrospectively regarded as the beginning
of the Hundred Years War.33
Constitutional arguments about the rights of the British
state over its colonies have been seen as an important
feature of the environment within which the American
Revolution took place. Awareness of those arguments can
help historians to see in some detail how the Declaration
of Independence arose out of the tensions of the time, even
though some compromise that allowed local self-government
would have been possible.34
The psychology of the Emperor Franz has been seen as an
important feature of the environment within which Met-
ternich adopted his careful and less than straightforward
approach to arguing for governmental reform in 1811.35
5.2.3.3 Distinguishing between types of
connection
We have mentioned different types of connection between
events, actions and features of environments. We shall now
note reasons for drawing these distinctions, and a reason
why one boundary may be hazy.
33 Le Patourel, “The Origins of the Hundred Years War”.
34 Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution,
chapter 4.




To start with the distinction between causal and reason-
giving connections, reason-giving talk is more appropriate
than causal talk when setting out the antecedents of human
decisions. When someone makes a decision, that stage in
the course of events is not to be explained causally so long
as it is characterized as a human decision, rather than
as a result of psychological or neurological forces. Even
when it is appropriate to say that some event strongly
provoked someone to take action, the consequences of that
strong provocation depended on processes of thought and
decision. In legal work, it is normal not to trace lines of
causation through deliberate human actions but to see those
actions as creating breaks in causal chains.36 In history
too, it is appropriate to consider instances in which events
encouraged people to act in certain ways under the heading
of connections of giving reasons, rather than under the
heading of causal connections. Exceptions are likely to
involve the behaviour of large groups of people. The actions
of individuals are averaged out, their individual motives and
choices are not discussed, and it then makes sense to talk
of the causes of overall developments.
Turning to claimed connections between features of envir-
onments and events or actions, this category recognizes two
types of situation. In the first type it is not appropriate to
claim a single cause or reason, or a small number of causes
or reasons, but historians can still see that features of an
environment, perhaps including features that had causal
or reason-giving influence, were such as to make certain
developments unsurprising. In the second type specific
causes or reasons may be claimed, but it is the description
of features of an environment that makes it clear why those
claimed causes would have had their effects or why those
claimed reasons would have been strongly motivating.
36 Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, second edition, page 44.
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The boundary between causal connections on the one hand,
and connections from features of environments to events
on the other hand, is a hazy one. Some features of an
environment could easily be regarded as causes. It is indeed
noticeable that a distinction between causes and features
of environments is often not made. When the task is to
show how various factors led up to some significant event, a
sophisticated historian is likely to refer to the origins of the
event, rather than its causes. She may weave a rich tapestry
of immediate events and features of an environment, rather
than trying to set out a causal chain.37
5.2.4 The value of coherence
We shall now consider why positive relationships between
claims are a good sign. This will show that there is good
reason to include our third requirement for respectability,
with its being read as calling for engagement and not merely
the absence of conflict between claims.
What we say here will be concerned with positive re-
lationships of the types that we discussed in section
5.2.3.1. The value of inferential relationships that exist
independently of those positive relationships rather than
being reformulations of them has been amply discussed by
other epistemologists, and we shall let their work support
inclusion of the third requirement to the extent that it
relates to those independent inferential relationships.
37 For the identification of causes and the uses of such identifica-




5.2.4.1 What relationships can show
The presence of positive relationships of the types that we
discussed in section 5.2.3.1 will amount to at least some
parts of an account fitting together. This will indicate,
although it will not prove, that the account is grounded in
historical reality. It will do so because the different parts of
reality automatically fit together as parts of a single world
in which there are connections, whether between causes and
effects, reasons and actions, or features of environments
and either events or actions. If an account is grounded in
historical reality, it is likely to be straightforward for the
account to reflect those connections by making claims that
stand in positive relationships with one another. Conversely,
if the claims in an account stand in positive relationships
with one another, then the most likely explanation is
that it is grounded in historical reality, the parts of
which automatically fit together and in which there are
appropriate connections. This supports the imposition
of our third requirement. The engagement of positive
relationships, along with a lack of conflicts, really does show
something.
(There is an additional premise at work here. This is
that the general principles on the basis of which we claim
connections reflect the way the world works. But we can
support that premise by saying that if our general principles
did not meet that condition, it is most unlikely that they
would be useful in leading our lives. And if they were not
useful, they would have been discarded. We shall return to
the topic of general principles in section 5.2.4.2.)
The second most likely explanation for claims in an account
standing in positive relationships with one another would
be that the account had been contrived to allow this, but
that would be contrary to scholarly norms. It would also be
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a difficult task, for the following reason. An account that did
not make frequent reference to evidence would immediately
be seen as implausible. It would therefore be essential to
refer to evidence. But that evidence would be given inde-
pendently of the formulation of the account, not contrived
to fit the account. A contrived account would therefore
have to be linked to evidence that would sometimes not
provide the required support, and might even undermine
the account. It is true that evidence could be interpreted,
but such interpretations would have to be reasonable. It is
likely that at least some unreasonable interpretations would
be needed to accommodate a contrived account.
If on the other hand an account suffers from a lack of
positive relationships of the types that we discussed in
section 5.2.3.1, such a lack will lead to a suspicion that
the account does not show what was really going on in the
period studied. A reader could reasonably suspect that the
past had been misrepresented, because that would explain
the inability to set out plenty of connections between events,
actions and features of environments.
We have given examples of relationships between claims
within an account. But the same approach of seeking
positive relationships could equally well be applied to claims
in different accounts. If claims within an account that
was the immediate object of interest not only enjoyed
positive relationships with one another but also enjoyed
positive relationships with claims in background accounts,
that would give some assurance that the first account was
grounded in the same historical reality as the background
accounts. If the first account were not so grounded then
it would be quite a coincidence for claims within it to be
able to make positive connections with a range of claims
within background accounts. And it is unlikely that several
background accounts could all succeed in being linked to
158
5.2 Coherence
the first account if they were not themselves grounded in
historical reality. If they were not so grounded, they would
pull in different directions unless they were all grounded in
the same imaginary world.
5.2.4.2 The need for general principles
There will need to be some general principles which can be
used to assess claims that events, actions and features of
environments were connected, as well as their being used
to guide historians when they are writing accounts and
looking for connections to claim. Without such principles,
assessment would be undisciplined and the conclusions
reached about connections would have little value. The
principles will be independent of specific accounts and could
underpin the assessment of claims of connection in many
different accounts. Support for their use will come from
their effectiveness across a broad range of applications.
The general principles may include folk-psychological prin-
ciples that people of certain characters, in situations of
given types, will tend to act in certain ways. Thus for
example a reason that has been given for the willingness
of Philip Melanchthon to seek a quiet accommodation over
the bigamy of Philip of Hesse rather than issue an outraged
condemnation was the perceived need to keep Hesse on the
Protestant side.38 The principle that people will often not
put achievement of their most important goals at risk even if
that means compromising their conscience shows that this
claimed connection between reason and action is entirely
38 Mullett, Martin Luther, second edition, pages 312-317 (pages
231-235 in the first edition). For an alternative account that portrays
Luther, who joined Melanchthon in consenting to the bigamy, as acting
in accordance with sincere beliefs and not merely out of expediency
see Roper, Martin Luther: Renegade and Prophet, pages 358-361.
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plausible. This in turn places the claim of this connection
between reason and action in positive relationships with
the claims that recount Melanchthon’s concerns and his
decision.
Another possible source of principles is well-supported
economic theory. Thus the immediate impact of the Black
Death in reducing the supply of labour has been connected
to the longer-term changes of an increase in wages and
a changed balance of power between different elements in
society.39 Economic principles of supply, demand, prices and
market power come into play to show that it is appropriate
to claim these connections. This in turn places the claim of
causal connection in positive relationships with claims that
recount both the immediate impact of the Black Death and
the longer-term changes.
As these examples indicate, the required general principles
will largely be found in background accounts. We should
however distinguish two different functions which accounts
that supply general principles perform. The first function is
to supply tools with which to identify likely connections and
formulate the corresponding claims. This function relates
to coherence in a positive sense. The second function is to
check the plausibility of accounts. Plausibility is indicated
both by engagement between claims and by the absence
of conflicts between an account of immediate interest and
background accounts that supply general principles. This
function relates to coherence in both a positive and a
negative sense.





We should not simply rest content with a view that the
existence of positive relationships is a good sign. We must
look at how historians characterize events, actions and
features of environments. This is something they must do
if there is to be any prospect of showing how these things
are connected. Reinhart Koselleck has made the point that
historians use general concepts to characterize historical
entities in ways that allow connections to be claimed, so
that histories can be written.40
Historians may for example characterize a disturbance as a
rebellion, or the writing of a letter as the betrayal of a secret,
or a river as a means of communication, so that appropriate
general principles which can both facilitate and regulate the
claiming of connections can be brought to bear.
We need to ask whether the process of characterization
might go wrong, whether it is adequately controlled,
and whether it might be influenced by the claiming of
connections that it facilitates.
5.2.4.3.1 Inappropriate characterizations
We must consider the risk of inappropriate characteriza-
tions, because they might allow connections to be claimed
when they should not be. This is one form of a widespread
worry about coherentism when the goal is to substantiate
the truth of claims. A picture of the world may be
thoroughly coherent but mistaken. It is also a worry that
40 Koselleck, “Darstellung, Ereignis und Struktur”, section 4,
translated as “Representation, Event, and Structure”, section 4.
Koselleck does however say this in the context of a particular argument
about historical reality and our contact with it.
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we may have even if we think there is some objective way
the past was that historians could in due course discover,
giving rise to some one way to tell history by connecting
events, actions and features of environments.41 If there were
such a single way to tell history, there might be some
very limited range of characterizations that would allow
historians to claim connections which were acceptable by
reference to that single way. Any characterizations which
allowed them to do so would then be appropriate and all
others which did not allow them to do so would be shown
to be inappropriate. But historians are far from actually
knowing how any such objective way the past was would
require them to characterize events, actions and features
of environments, so they would still have to decide how to
characterize those things. And they would have no certainty
that they were doing so appropriately.
5.2.4.3.2 Controls over characterizations
Fortunately, characterizations are not uncontrolled. Events,
actions and features of environments cannot be character-
ized in any way that takes a historian’s fancy. They must
be characterized in ways that fairly reflect the documents,
material remains and other sources of information that have
come down to us. Failure to do so is what we mean by
inappropriate characterization.
Another control is that characterizations must allow the
claiming of connections, so that coherent accounts can
be given. The claims must be acceptable by reference to
appropriate general principles. Claims of causal connection
41 For discussions of the possibility of there being an accessible
objective way the past was see Roth, “Narrative Explanations: The
Case of History”; Levine and Malpas, “‘Telling It Like It Was’: History
and the Ideal Chronicle”; Roth, “The Object of Understanding”.
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and claims of connection from features of environments
to the efficacy of causes must be acceptable given the
principles that determine what causal powers would in
general have been available in an appropriate context (for
example, an economic or technological context), and what
conditions for causes to be effective would in general have
applied in that context. Likewise, claims of connection from
reasons to actions and from features of environments to the
impact of reasons must be acceptable given the principles
of a folk psychology that would have been appropriate to
the people studied.
This might seem to be an odd control to identify. A need to
claim connections would seem to encourage inappropriate
characterization. If some set of characterizations offered an
easy route to claims of connection, it would be tempting to
seize the opportunity and overlook any failures to reflect the
available evidence fairly. But a need to claim connections
can be a control, as well as a temptation.
It can be a control for the following reason. Appropriate
characterizations will tend to reflect the actual state of
the world, and the general principles we use are ones that
on the whole reflect the way the world works. (As we
noted in section 5.2.4.1, if they did not, they would not
be useful and we would have discarded them.) If there
are some inappropriate characterizations in an account,
along with some appropriate ones, it is likely to be
difficult to claim connections between events, actions and
features of the environment characterized inappropriately
and those characterized appropriately while still respecting
the general principles. An inappropriately characterized
event is unlikely to be a plausible effect of its supposed
cause, a plausible cause of its supposed effect, or a
plausible reason for the action it supposedly prompted,
where the corresponding supposed cause, effect or action
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has been characterized appropriately. There is likely to
be a mismatch. The same would go for inappropriately
characterized features of environments. They would be un-
likely to be plausible enablers of causal connections between
appropriately characterized events. They would also be
unlikely to help make sense of appropriately characterized
actions. Finally, an inappropriately characterized action is
unlikely to have been plausibly motivated by appropriately
characterized reasons for it that may be offered. So if it is
difficult to claim connections, that will be a warning that
some inappropriate characterizations may have been used.
That much relates to inappropriate characterizations along-
side appropriate ones. But the same argument could be
made in cases in which everything was characterized inap-
propriately. If events, actions or features of the environment
have all been characterized inappropriately, it is unlikely
that the mistakes made would happen to match up so that
connections that were permitted under the relevant general
principles could be claimed.
This control over characterizations is by no means perfect.
Inappropriate characterizations may obstruct the claiming
of some connections, but not all of them. It may be that
enough connections can still be claimed for an account to
come across as satisfactory. And inappropriate character-
izations will not obstruct the claiming of connections at
all if the characterizations have been carefully crafted to
facilitate that claiming, rather than their having been used




5.2.4.3.3 A reverse influence
There is a reverse influence of connections on character-
izations, quite apart from the cases in which a presumed
connection enters into a characterization itself (as when a
political speech is characterized as revenge for an earlier
speech by a rival).
The reverse influence arises as follows. Events, actions and
features of environments are characterized and connections
are then claimed. That in itself further characterizes the
events, actions and features of environments. They come
to be seen as causes, effects, reasons, motivated actions, or
features that show why causes or reasons had their power
or in some other way help to make sense of what happened.
That might deter questioning of the supposed connections,
because the events, actions, and features of environments
were already seen as causes, effects, and so on.
To the extent that the claiming of connections follows initial
characterization, reverse influences are likely to be quite
weak. The main content of characterizations, as it existed
before connections were claimed, is likely to remain both
largely undisturbed and dominant.
We should however be aware that if a period of history
has already been explored extensively, the possibilities for
the claiming of connections that are presented by existing
understandings of a period may have a heavy influence
on characterizations. If for example a period is already
seen as one of striking economic progress, there may
be a tendency to characterize all technological changes
as useful innovations even before they are fitted into a
narrative of progress. The most conspicuous type of writing
in which existing understandings encourage particular
characterizations of events is Whig historiography, in which
each political action is liable to be labelled as enhancing
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or as hindering progress toward liberty under a sound
constitution.42 We may note this concern even without
engaging in adventurous explorations of historical narration
such as those that are found in the work of Paul Ricœur.43
5.2.4.4 Overall patterns
5.2.4.4.1 Things falling into place
Sometimes a historical account will present an overall
pattern in which events, actions and features of an
environment fall into place and make sense in relation to
one another.44
A pattern will typically be structured by claimed connec-
tions between events, actions and features of an environ-
ment, whether causal connections, reason-giving connec-
tions, or connections by which features of the environment
make certain developments unsurprising or show why causes
or reasons had their power. We have already discussed the
significance of claiming those connections. Now we shall
focus on patterns themselves. We are here concerned with
patterns that are revealed by individual accounts. We shall
consider coherence with other accounts in section 5.2.5.
42 The classic criticism of this approach to history is Butterfield,
The Whig Interpretation of History.
43 Ricœur, Temps et récit, volume 1 : L’intrigue et le récit
historique, part 2, chapter 1, “L’éclipse du récit” and part 2, chapter 2,
“Plaidoyers pour le récit”, translated as Time and Narrative, volume
1, chapter 4, “The Eclipse of Narrative” and chapter 5, “Defenses of
Narrative”.
44 For examples of the presentation of large-scale patterns see Von
Sivers, Desnoyers and Stow, Patterns of World History, Volume One:
To 1600 With Sources, particularly the sections headed “Putting It
All Together” at the ends of chapters.
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The presentation of an overall pattern will amount to
showing a form of coherence. This will in turn tend to
promote the respectability of claims made in the account.
We must however consider what is involved in presenting an
overall pattern. There may sometimes be reasons to restrain
the natural impulse to see that achievement as promoting
the respectability of claims made in the relevant account.
5.2.4.4.2 Colligation
We may give some definiteness to the notion of an
account’s setting out how events, actions and features of
an environment fall into a pattern by making use of the
notion of colligation.
There are two sorts of colligation.
The first sort is making sense of events, actions or features of
environments by seeing them as connected to other events,
actions or features of environments. This sort of colligation
falls within the scope of the claiming of connections that
we have already discussed.
The second sort of colligation is the application of organiz-
ing concepts, such as that of the Reformation, the Industrial
Revolution or globalization, in order to give shape to
sets of events, actions and features of environments, to
demarcate the members of each set from non-members, and
to facilitate higher-level accounts that connect one set as a
whole with another set as a whole (as when the Reformation
and the Counter-Reformation are connected).45
45 For the two sorts of colligation and the importance of distinguish-
ing between them see Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation,
pages 16-20. Roberts himself uses the word “colligation” in the first
sense. He also speaks of explanation rather than making sense, but he
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Colligation of either sort may bring an overall pattern
into view. And both sorts of colligation rely on the
appropriate selection and characterization of events, actions
and features of environments. We shall now consider these
processes of selection and characterization, before moving
on to how judgements as to whether patterns are compelling
may be made in a disciplined fashion.
5.2.4.4.3 Selection
Events, actions and features of an environment must be
selected if a pattern is to be presented. Without selection,
any pattern would be obscured by an excess of detail. But
there are additional reasons why selection is needed.
In colligation of the first sort, where connections between
individual events, actions and features of environments are
claimed, a reason for selection is that only some such things
can be seen as connected to one another. For example,
only some events can be claimed to be causes of other
events or reasons for actions that were carried out (rather
than reasons for merely hypothetical actions). This sort
of selection should not give rise to any concerns when we
consider how the respectability of claims may be promoted
by the presentation of patterns. The more comprehensive
the pattern, the better that may be for the respectability
of claims, but comprehensiveness or its lack will be a
consequence of the fact that many or few events, actions
or features of environments can be seen as connected to
one another, rather than a consequence of the fact that
selection has taken place.
clearly has a broad notion of explanation in mind, one that would align
reasonably well with our notion of making sense. For some hazards of
colligation see McCullagh, “Colligation”.
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In colligation of the second sort, where organizing concepts
are brought to bear, selection is necessary in order to leave
out events, actions and features of environments that would
not fit within the scope of the organizing concepts. Here we
may well have concerns. It may be that the impression that
a pattern fairly represents the period studied is given only
by omitting whatever does not fit the pattern.
If that is how a pattern comes to be set out, promotion
of the respectability of claims made within the relevant
account through showing coherence may turn out to
be short-lived. Once reliance on selection is noted, the
pattern may be discredited. Its coherence may then come
to be seen as having no value. Claims might not lose
their respectability when this happened. The requirements,
including the third requirement, might be met in other
ways. But the respectability of claims would no longer be
promoted by the coherence of the overall pattern.
5.2.4.4.4 Characterization
Characterization is needed in order to claim connections
between events, actions and features of environments.
Characterization is also needed to allow the second sort of
colligation we have mentioned. Events, actions and features
of environments must be appropriately characterized in
order to bring them under organizing concepts.
There is a reverse influence on characterizations in both
cases. We discussed the reverse influence of connections
in section 5.2.4.3.3. We noted that it should be quite
weak in that context, except perhaps to the extent that
characterizations are made under the influence of existing
studies of the relevant period. The use of organizing
concepts is however quite likely to mediate the influence
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of existing studies on the characterization of the events,
actions and features of environments that are brought under
those organizing concepts. Then the organizing concepts
may appear to fit the details well, but that may be at least
partly because the details have been characterized in a way
that will tend to make a good fit apparent. This may even
amount to a potentially innocent variation on the crafting
of characterizations to allow connections to be claimed that
we mentioned in section 5.2.4.3.2.
As with selection, promotion of the respectability of
claims made within the relevant account through showing
coherence may then turn out to be short-lived. Once
reliance on characterization is noted, a pattern may be
discredited. And in this case claims may actually lose their
respectability. This is because the claims may turn out to
rely on characterizations that are not supported by the
available evidence, but only by the imposition of organizing
concepts.
5.2.4.4.5 Claimed compelling patterns
It may be claimed that a pattern is an intellectually
compelling one. If a pattern were indeed so, that would
indicate both that the account which presented it had a high
degree of internal coherence and that the account cohered
well with background accounts to the extent that their role
was to supply relevant general principles. How are claims
that patterns are intellectually compelling to be judged?
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There is little prospect of relying on the use of mathematical
tools to identify patterns and supply their credentials,
outside specific fields such as the analysis of economic
data.46 Even when such tools have been used, one should
not assume that the rigour they impose extends to the
drawing of conclusions about how patterns in quantified
data are linked to other factors, such as general approaches
to economic management.47
Attempts have been made to apply mathematical tools
more widely, under the banners of cliometrics and clio-
dynamics. Cliometrics goes beyond traditional economic
history. Cliodynamics holds out the promise of presenting
patterns that repeat across events at different times and in
different places. Such patterns, when presented in individual
instances, might be seen as compelling because they could
be seen as instances of established patterns and not as
devised merely for the occasion. Work under these two
banners has however been regarded sceptically.48
We may also be reluctant to rely on anything akin to
the idea that success in interpretation (or in this context,
success in presenting a pattern) can simply shine forth
and be evident, along the lines indicated by Hans-Georg
46 There are many examples of the use of mathematical tools in
books and articles on economic history. One convenient example is
Chadha, Janssen and Nolan, “An Examination of UK Business Cycle
Fluctuations: 1871-1997”.
47 For an example of the drawing of conclusions see Romer,
“Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations”. Romer
does not however claim any more rigour than she should.
48 There is considerable activity under both banners, as may be
seen from the journals Cliometrica: Journal of Historical Economics
and Econometric History; Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative
History and Cultural Evolution. For some views on the potential of
cliodynamics see Turchin, “Arise ‘Cliodynamics’”; Spinney, “Human
Cycles: History as Science”.
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Gadamer.49
The main instrument of judgement as to whether patterns
are compelling must be the well-trained good sense of
historians. A judgement reached in that way may well
be sound, especially when it is reached not only by
the historian who presents a pattern but also by other
historians. But the fact that the mechanism of the exercise
of good sense is not exposed to view means we could not
be sure of the soundness of any specific judgement that
a pattern was compelling. We could at best conclude on
the basis of a track record that a high proportion of such
judgements were sound.
5.2.5 Background accounts
We shall now turn to the background supplied by other
accounts, a background with which a claim and its own
account should cohere.
Relevant accounts will include accounts of related historical
periods or events. They will also include accounts of
different sorts that cover the same period or events as the
account in question, such as an account of the economic
situation when the account in question concerns political
events. Finally, they will include accounts that supply
general principles to be used in making and assessing claims
of connection, such as accounts of folk psychology and
economic theory.
49 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophi-
schen Hermeneutik, volume 1, part 3, section 3(c), “Der universale
Aspekt der Hermeneutik”, translated as Truth and Method, part 3,
section 3(C), “The Universal Aspect of Hermeneutics”.
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The coherence of an account with background accounts
is something that coherentist epistemologists regard as
significant. They may put it in terms of the coherence of
a person’s whole set of beliefs, encompassing not only the
internal coherence of an account of immediate interest and
its coherence with various background accounts, but also
coherence within and between those background accounts
themselves. That would go further than we need. We may
restrict our attention to coherence between an account of
immediate interest and background accounts. Coherence
of a person’s whole set of beliefs is however important in
epistemology generally. It is a vital component of reflective
equilibrium, which can in turn be made the centrepiece of a
whole epistemology.50 But we shall not enlarge our enquiry
in that direction.
An account’s cohering with a background has a positive
aspect of engagement with background accounts that
supply historical detail, alongside the negative aspect of
the avoidance of conflict. An account should ideally be
well-integrated with background accounts. For example, an
account of political decisions may mention how things were
beyond the political process. Features of the environment
should not be limited to features of the political environ-
ment. An example is provided by events that led up to
the abdication of Edward VIII in 1936, where the political
process can usefully be seen against the background of social
attitudes.51
50 Elgin, Considered Judgment, especially chapter 4.
51 Both the abdication and other developments are seen against






Historians cannot start each piece of research from scratch.
They must make extensive use of existing work. And it is
not practical to check the respectability of more than a few
of the claims that have been made by other historians.
Fortunately, reliance on the work of other historians can
be supported without examining each claim individually. A
historian can instead consider whether the historians who
made the claims worked in the right ways, for example by
making use of appropriate technical and other methods or
by refusing to make claims that were not supported. The
use of appropriate methods is likely to be made explicit in
analyses of evidence. And the degree of care taken to find
support may for example be indicated by the nature and
extent of the references given in footnotes.
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Such a consideration of other historians’ ways of working
is an indirect approach. Support for reliance on their work
comes from the fact that while individual claims made by
a historian who worked in the right ways might be ones
that she should not have made, it is likely that the great
majority of her claims would, if investigated, be found
to be respectable. A subsequent historian might have the
misfortune to rely on some claim for which the first historian
had inadequate grounds, but the risk would be tolerably
low.
We shall look at the ways in which historians come to make
claims under three headings. In section 6.2 we shall consider
both the use of reliable methods and epistemic virtues of
a reliabilist kind. In section 6.3 we shall consider epistemic
virtues of a responsibilist kind. And in section 6.4 we shall
consider the consequences of the fact that historians work
within epistemic communities.
An indirect approach does have its limits. Historians should
not try to support assessments of the respectability of
specific claims by looking at how the authors of the claims
worked. Circumstantial evidence of respectability is not
good enough in relation to specific claims. It can show only
that it is likely that most claims made in a given work
are respectable. This does set what we say here apart from
what is said by those epistemologists who, when discussing
reliability, responsibility and social epistemology, retain a
close focus on the status of individual beliefs, whether as




6.2.1 Respectability and reliabilism
Our interest in the use of reliable methods to give
reassurance as to the respectability of a historian’s claims
creates a link with the epistemic traditions that are grouped
together under the name of reliabilism.1
Positions that may be identified as forms of process
reliabilism pick out certain methods as reliable, and regard
their use as important when arriving at beliefs. For example,
a careful study of evidence and its credentials is a reliable
method, so beliefs that are formed on the basis of such a
study may be justified. On the other hand guesswork is
not reliable, so beliefs that result from guesswork are not
justified even if they happen to be correct.
There is also virtue reliabilism. This emphasizes the posses-
sion and application of competences that make the form-
ation of beliefs more reliable. Possession and application
of a competence together constitute an intellectual virtue.
One example is the competence of analysing evidence well.
Another example is the competence of setting out one’s
sources and arguments clearly.2
The boundary between process reliabilism and virtue reli-
abilism is a hazy one, and there is scope to see considerable
overlap between the two approaches. But how one might
analyse reliabilism does not matter for our purposes. We
only draw attention to the connection between reliabilism
as a whole and our project.
1 For a survey see Comesaña, “Reliabilism”.




6.2.2 What counts as a method?
Process reliabilism concentrates on reliable methods. Many
different things may count as methods.
6.2.2.1 Specialized methods
Specialized methods are included. For example, palaeo-
graphic methods can be used to support an understanding
of the history of documents and the attitudes of those who
produced them.3
Specialized methods may be those of disciplines that are
neighbours of history. For example, archaeological research
that relies on the specialized methods of that discipline may
be used to write political and social history.4 A historian
may however cite only the results of work in neighbouring
disciplines, thereby hiding from the casual reader the fact
that specialized methods have been used.
6.2.2.2 General methods
More general methods are also included. Examples of
general methods are always checking any primary sources
that are crucial to an argument rather than relying solely on
secondary literature, reviewing the private correspondence
of public figures to shed light on their public activities, and
3 Such use is for example made in Crick, “Historical Literacy in the
Archive: Post-Conquest Imitative Copies of Pre-Conquest Charters
and Some French Comparanda”.
4 An example of the use of archaeology in the writing of a wide-
ranging historical account is provided by Sage, Ancient Sichuan and
the Unification of China.
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reviewing accounts after drafting them to see whether they
cohere with background accounts.
6.2.2.3 Lists of methods
We can envisage the construction of a list of reliable
methods for historians to use, fitting in with the approach
that is known as approved-list reliabilism.5 There would
however be scope for disagreement at the margins. The list
would be incomplete, there would be debate about exactly
what belonged on it, and methods listed would not be so
well-defined that we could always tell whether they had
been used properly.
6.2.3 A definition of reliability
We shall define the reliability of a method by reference
to its propensity to increase the ratio of claims made and
not retracted that are respectable to claims made and not
retracted that are not respectable.6 A method will deserve
to be called reliable if it has a strong propensity to do this
whenever its use might have a substantial effect on whether
claims were made. For example, an effective method of
checking the authenticity of documents would often have no
effect, because documents would mostly be authentic, but
on the occasions when documents were inauthentic it would
have a substantial effect by deterring the making of claims
that should only be made if the documents in question were
authentic. It would therefore qualify as a reliable method.
5 Fricker, “Unreliable Testimony”, section 4.
6 A very similar approach is applied to the identification of
intellectual virtues in Sosa, “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue”.
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It will usually be clear whether a given method would
qualify as reliable under this definition. Careful reviews of
the evidence, effective checks of documents for authenticity,
consideration of relevant details of the context, and reviews
of secondary literature for alternative interpretations of
evidence and of the people or events studied are obvious
examples of reliable methods. The importance of the use of
such methods is made clear by criticisms of historians who
are, rightly or wrongly, argued not to have worked properly.7
The use of only one good method will not lead to acceptable
results. Rather, a historian must combine methods in order
to have much prospect of giving a satisfactory account. But
any decent historian will do so. And the need to combine
methods does not prevent us from assessing the reliability of
methods individually, because there is no reason to expect
that a method would improve the ratio of respectable
claims to claims that were not respectable in the context
of use of one set of methods but would worsen that ratio
in the context of use of some other set. At least, that
unfortunate result would only be likely to occur in contrived
and unrealistic circumstances, such as when the second set
included some obviously unreliable methods which would
interfere with the reliability of other methods and which no
sensible historian would use.
7 Examples include criticisms of several historians’ work on the
Merovingian military, set out in Bachrach, Merovingian Military
Organization 481-751, chapter 6; criticisms of Lawrence Stone’s work
on marriage and the family, summarized in Howell, “The Properties
of Marriage in Late Medieval Europe: Commercial Wealth and the
Creation of Modern Marriage”, pages 23-25; and criticisms of claimed
errors of method and unsubstantiated assumptions in the work of
Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman on American slavery,
set out in David, Gutman, Sutch, Temin and Wright, Reckoning with




6.2.4 A risk of circularity
Our definition of reliability uses our concept of respectab-
ility. This means that we must not give the use of reliable
methods a significant role in the definition of respectability.
If we did so, circularity would threaten.
Fortunately, we do not fall into circularity. Our require-
ments for respectability focus on the claims themselves,
on the evidence for and against claims, and on rela-
tionships between claims within accounts, between claims
and accounts, and between accounts. We here propose
paying attention to the use of reliable methods only as a
secondary source of reassurance. And we envisage assessing
the reliability of methods by reference to whether they
would tend to lead historians to make or refuse to make
claims, the individual respectability or lack of respectability
of which could confidently and conveniently be established
anyway, before allowing the use of methods that passed such
a test of reliability to provide reassurance that it was likely
that a high proportion of the claims made in a given work




We shall now turn to virtues of historians that embody
attitudes rather than specific competences. These virtues
include thoroughness, inquisitiveness, creativity, a sense
of one’s responsibility only to make claims when there is
appropriate support for them, willingness to change one’s
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mind when that is appropriate, and the courage to maintain
one’s position when criticisms are inadequately supported.
Epistemic virtues such as these are discussed in the context
of virtue responsibilism.8 They also matter directly in our
context because the exercise of such virtues should promote
the making of respectable claims and reduce the likelihood
of making claims that are not respectable. Since these
virtues are relevant in the context of our project in the
same way as the virtues of possession and application of
competences, the fact that the boundary between the two
sets of virtues is a hazy one need not concern us.
6.3.2 A risk of circularity
In section 6.2.4, we noted and dismissed a risk of circularity.
The definition of reliability made use of our concept of
respectability, so it was important not to give the concept
of reliability a significant role in defining respectability.
We should consider the same risk here, now that we are
discussing virtues of attitude.
The risk is even lower here than it was in relation to
reliability. Not only can we see that the virtues we identify
here are beneficial by seeing that exercise of them does in
fact tend to encourage the making of respectable claims
and deter the making of claims that are not respectable, in
cases where the respectability of the claims can be assessed
independently of seeing whether the virtues were exercised.
We can also see that these virtues are not at much risk
of entering into the definition of respectability in some
disguised form.
8 For a survey see Wright, “Virtue Responsibilism”.
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Moreover, these virtues are regarded as virtues in all
academic disciplines. These include disciplines that use very
different methods from those of history. This gives the
virtues status as virtues that is independent of their benefits
in history. So even if the identification of virtues had some
influence on the definition of respectability, any influence
on the other side of the circle, from respectability to status
as virtues, would not depend on the specific requirements of
historical work. That would help us to defend against any
charge of circularity.
The same responses to charges of circularity could be
made in relation to the virtues associated with work within
epistemic communities that we shall discuss in section 6.4,
and we shall not repeat the responses there.
6.4 Epistemic communities
6.4.1 Social approaches
Social epistemology studies ways in which progress toward
having justified beliefs or toward having knowledge can be
assisted, or occasionally impeded, by interaction with other
people. Those other people may for example debate claims
that have been made or provide testimony.9
If the participants in an epistemic community of historians
exhibit appropriate virtues and their interactions involve
suitable levels of discussion and criticism, this may help
to give historians confidence that they can use work by
members of the community without checking all of the work
9 For a survey of the field see the papers in Haddock, Millar and
Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology.
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in detail. We shall first consider relevant virtues in general,
and then look specifically at testimony.
6.4.2 Communities and virtues
We have already noted some epistemic virtues of historians.
We shall now draw attention to virtues that are significant
when historians interact. We shall not be concerned as to
whether specific virtues relate to competences or attitudes.
As we noted in section 6.3.1, we do not need to draw a sharp
boundary between the two categories.
There are several virtues to consider. Virtues of a historian
who has produced a piece of work include transparency as to
the contents and the worth of the evidence for and against
claims, and openness about the processes of reasoning that
led from evidence to claims. Virtues of someone other than
the author include willingness to discuss the work and
provide honest feedback, and openness to being influenced
by the work so as to amend existing views or make future
work well-directed. When a piece of work is debated, virtues
of its author include two that we have already noted:
willingness to change one’s mind when that is appropriate,
and the courage to maintain one’s position when criticisms
are inadequately supported.
6.4.3 Testimony
Historians have to rely on work done by others. A historian
may cast a critical eye over what others have written, but
she will usually not be able to check more than a modest
proportion of the evidence that is cited in footnotes. What
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are the implications of this inevitable reliance on testimony
for the respectability of the claims that interest us?
We may start by considering that if the claims contained
in testimony are respectable, that should increase the
likelihood that claims made in reliance on the testimony
will also be respectable. One reason why this should be so
is that respectable claims contained in testimony will be
supported by evidence, so use of those claims will allow
the underlying evidence to give at least some support to
the new claims. This will help the new claims to satisfy
the first requirement. Another reason is that respectable
claims contained in testimony will engage with other claims
in their own accounts and some claims in those accounts will
engage with claims in background accounts, making it likely
that the claims in the testimony are grounded in historical
reality. Then reliance on the testimony should in turn steer
historians to make new claims that are themselves grounded
in historical reality. So long as claims in the accounts that
contain the new claims are in general grounded in historical
reality, it is likely that the new claims will engage with
other claims in their own accounts and that some claims
in those accounts will engage with claims in background
accounts. This will help the new claims to satisfy the third
requirement.
In order to pursue this line in specific cases, one would ask
whether the claims in the testimony were really founded on
good evidence and whether they really engaged with other
claims. When such a detailed examination of the support
for testimony was impractical, one would seek comfort
in evidence that the testifier had used reliable methods
and had exhibited appropriate virtues. But evidence of
the conduct of the testifier would only give secondary
reassurance that it was reasonably safe to make use of the
testimony. It would at best show that it was likely that a
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high proportion of the claims contained in the testimony
were respectable. It would not show that individual claims
within the testimony were respectable, let alone that
individual claims made in reliance on the testimony would
be respectable.
Another line of enquiry differs from the first line because
instead of focusing on the processes by which testimony
was produced, it focuses on the process of transmission
of testimony and on the relationship of trust that may
exist between testifier and audience. Benjamin McMyler
examines testimony in this way.10 And Sanford Goldberg
sees the process of forming beliefs on the basis of testimony
as not limited to what goes on in the mind of the person
who receives testimony, but as including the intellectual
processes of the testifier.11
We can see this line of enquiry into the process of
transmission as concentrating on the extent to which a
specific virtue was exhibited by the testifier, the virtue
of acting responsibly toward those who received or will
receive the testimony (including, for written work, unknown
future readers) by seeking to convey respectable claims and
not to convey other claims. (The testifier would probably
10 McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority, chapter 2. See
in particular McMyler’s comments on the speaker’s acceptance of
epistemic responsibility on pages 68-70. McMyler’s approach is, as
he sets out, particularly relevant to testimony that is given without
providing argument in support of the testimony that would, if
provided, allow the audience to bypass the role of the testifier and
consider the argument directly (pages 58-59). This is not likely to be
the precise position in our context, because historians will normally set
out their arguments as well as their conclusions, but other historians
who read those arguments are often unable to test the arguments in
detail because the labour of going through all the sources cited would
be too great.




prefer the terminology of correctness, but given that our
requirements for respectability centre on evidence and
coherence, the means to work toward the two goals of
respectability and correctness would not differ except to
the extent that a goal of making respectable claims would
permit the making of contestable claims.)
The fact that the testifier could only seek to convey
respectable (or correct) claims, and could not guarantee
to do so, would mean that the claims contained in the
testimony could not automatically be regarded as indi-
vidually respectable and therefore as likely to promote the
respectability of claims made in reliance on the testimony.
On that note, we shall end. The community of historians is
both the source of requirements for claims to be respectable,
and the body of people with a responsibility to do their best
to meet those requirements.
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